Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972

397. Memorandum From Harold Saunders and Richard Kennedy of the National Security Council Staff to the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, February 11, 1972.

SUBJECT

• WSAG Meeting on Cyprus—February 11

The Situation

The view from Athens: Papadopoulos has set the wheels in motion for a squeeze play against Makarios and seems determined to follow through. He turned down flatly our request that he at least delay presenting his ultimatum on the grounds that it was a “national imperative.”² In Nicosia there is evidence the Greek Cypriot National Guard units loyal to Greece are being positioned to take over key installations and it is assumed that the signal to do so will “come sooner rather than later.”

The view from Nicosia is that if Greece really intends to move with the National Guard, is not really counting on popular support and is willing to take the international onus, it can probably seize control of the Presidential Palace and other vital government installations. But if this is not its intent and it is depending on popular support, its planning is based on some “incredibly bad estimates.” Ambassador Popper points out that contrary to the apparent Greek view, the Greek government is held in low esteem in Cyprus and Makarios has strong public support.³ Most observers believe that Makarios will turn down the Greek ultimatum, thus forcing the crisis to a head.

The view from Ankara is that the Turks are upset about the situation, especially the importation of more arms in the Greek Cypriot community, but for the moment at least intend to let the Greeks settle their own problems. They are treating the whole affair in unusually low key and say they will try to leave the whole matter to the parties directly concerned as long as the security of the Turk Cypriot community is not threatened. From all indications the Turks and Greeks have been in close communication as the crisis has developed and it is just possible that there is more collusion than we know.

The Issue

The issue in the Cyprus question arises from two factors:

• —The government in Athens appears to have decided to make a major effort to change the character of the Cypriot government or even to force Makarios to resign. They feel they are in a position to do this by use of the military on the ground—the Greek Cypriot national guard and the terrorist forces responsive to General Grivas. Such a change would, in Athensʼ eyes, be a prelude to a Cyprus settlement along one of two lines: (a) it could presage formation of a cabinet which would be more flexible than Makarios has been in negotiating a settlement with the Turkish community; or (b) it could be a prelude to partition of the island between Greece and Turkey. In the first case, the independence of Cyprus would be preserved; in the second, Cyprus would cease to exist as an independent nation.
• —As this Greek plan moves ahead, the following elements will come into play: If Makarios is still free, he will turn to the international community in the UN Security Council and ask for protection against an attack on the integrity of his state. If he is jailed, the Soviets or some third-world power may take the case to the UN. In either case, the Soviets will back Cyprus in the UN and might conceivably even use Soviet naval forces to intimidate Greece. The US could then be called on to defend a NATO ally against this kind of Soviet threat. At the same time, NATO opinion and much opinion in the US Congress—which are already unfriendly to the government in Athens—would stand against the Greek action. While the Turks would probably remain silent on the Greek effort to achieve a Cyprus solution, they would be concerned by the Soviet involvement.

This collection of elements explains why US policy has been to try to push a Cyprus solution ahead of us rather than supporting dramatic solutions. For this reason, we have supported intercommunal talks between the Greeks and Turkish Cypriot communities. We knew that a solution which the Turks could accept was unlikely to come out of those talks but feeling that the talks could help to avert violence and keep open the door to an ultimate settlement. Coupled with these slow talks, we have recently thought about introducing the idea of steps toward deconfrontation between the two communities on the island in order to reduce the possibilities of violence there and permit the island to lead a more normal life.

Against this background, the principal issue now is whether the US is to confront the government of Greece to back away from following the course on which it has embarked to its logical conclusion, the forceable removable of Makarios. The vehicle for a way out could lie in an arrangement which would have Makarios turn over the arms he has acquired to the UN while the Greeks take General Grivas off the island and remove the military threat to Makarios.

The issues to be discussed at the WSAG, therefore, are whether we get into that kind of confrontation with the Greeks, and, if not, how we might handle the problem that we would then be faced with and may be faced with in any case.

Your talking points (at tab) cover the options that follow from the above.

Also included in this book are:

• —“Situation and Cables.” The latest CIA sitrep as it becomes available and key cables.
• —“Background Paper.” This is the general paper you read last night.
• —“Contingency Papers.” These are general papers prepared for your last SRG meeting on Cyprus. At this tab is a guide to the relevant portions.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–084, Senior WSAG Meeting Cyprus, 2/11/72. The tabs and appendixes to the memorandum are attached but not printed.
2. See Document 396.
3. See Document 395.