Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972

393. Memorandum From Harold Saunders and Rosemary Neaher of the National Security Council Staff to the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, February 10, 1972.

SUBJECT

• The Cyprus Situation

You have been reading in your brief of new elements of tension in Cyprus. We promised you a fuller picture. The situation is beginning to move more quickly; the following should bring you up to date.

The talks

The new and expanded intercommunal talks have been held up by haggling over their format. Turkeyʼs final assent is expected soon, and talks could begin before the month is out unless present tensions prevent that.

The new talks would have a UN representative, a mainland Greek and a mainland Turk constitutional law expert join the Greek and Turk Cypriots. As you may recall, the genesis of this was in the meeting between the Greek (Palamas) and Turk (then Olcay) foreign ministers at the UNGA last fall. They agreed to add the mainland representatives, thereby creating a four-party format. U Thant insisted on the inclusion of a UN person in order to make the format sellable to Makarios who sees protection in a UN role. It is this five-party arrangement that has bounced around for several months.

The Greeks accepted outright and have said they will go along with any arrangement which would launch new talks. Makarios agonized at the thought of being pressured in new talks by mainland representatives; he sought assurances that the UN would indeed be involved and then stole the thunder from Turkey by promptly accepting. Turkey was left as the chief hold-out.

Turkeyʼs problem is the inclusion of the UN representative. They feel this will undercut new pressure on Makarios injected by the mainland representatives. Recalling their problems with past special UN mediators, Turkey has insisted on clarifications from the Secretary Generalʼs special advisor on Cyprus that any UN representative not be a “mediator” per se but be on hand with his “good offices” and that the mainland representatives be actively involved. Turkish Foreign Minister Bayulken said this week that Turk needs on this score were on the point of being met and opined that talks could begin by the monthʼs end. Matters stand there.

This procedural debate has been lengthy, but even if talks now begin, there will be a long debate over the agenda. On the one hand, Makarios has made it clear he does not believe mainland representatives belong in talks between the local parties on the constitutional questions at stake, on which he believes he has already made maximum concessions to the Turk Cypriots. He is lobbying for broad discussion including the international aspects of the problem such as withdrawal of Turk mainland support. The Turks, on the other hand, are adamant that new talks zero in precisely on the constitutional stalemate; they want none of the past treaties (London-Zurich accords) or constitutional points already agreed upon undercut. Assuming progress at that level, they could envisage broadening the agenda at a later date.

The UN special representative who will be involved has been turning over possible new approaches to the talks beyond the simple reliance on the trading of position papers between the two locals which characterized the last phase. He is thinking of (a) trying to consolidate areas of common agreement from past talks and (b) talking about interim or permanent measures which would help the communities live together without confrontation in the current situation of de facto separation. State has also been developing some ideas on deconfrontation—mutual withdrawal by the two communities from lines of confrontation around the island—if there came a time when they might help the UN representative. Interest by the parties in deconfrontation has been evident but Ambassador Popper now feels the issue has been dealt a blow by the reports of Makariosʼ new Czech arms.

Grivas

The clandestine re-appearance of General Grivas on Cyprus and the resulting war of nerves between him and Makarios has added a new element of tension.

To put this in perspective, Grivas was the famous pro-enosist and fanatical anti-communist Greek Cypriot who fought against the British in the mid-50s, almost hand in glove with Makariosʼ struggle on the political level. With independence and the guarantees given to the Turk Cypriots he pressed on for enosis and became heavily involved in the terrorism of the sixties which twice brought Greece and Turkey to the brink of war. Those events convinced Makarios and Greece to drop their campaign for enosis and turn to intercommunal talks. Grivas, anathema to the Turk Cypriots and to Makarios by them as a political rival, was moved to confinement in Greece where he remained until his “escape” last fall.

A number of factors have made Makarios certain if not all but sure that Greece is behind the plot. We do not really know.

For one thing, Grivasʼ escape came shortly after Makariosʼ resistance to Greek pressure last summer to be more forthcoming in the talks, immediately before the Olcay/Palamas talks in New York. These facts against a backdrop of increasing Greco-Turk consultation on the Cyprus problem have led the Archbishop to suspect a plot against him unless he reaches a compromise, presumably satisfactory to the Turk Cypriots. The alternative would be to risk confrontation with Grivas leading to enosis and, again assuming Greco-Turkish dialogue, satisfactory results for the Turk Cypriots, i.e. double enosis or partition.

In reaction, Makarios has stiffened in the face of a threat. As you know, he has clandestinely imported sizeable quantities of Czech arms almost certainly for the arming of a private police force outside the Greek-controlled National Guard.

The introduction of these new arms has sparked reactions in Turkey and Greece. Whether these flow from the fact that they have been involved in the Grivas episode with the idea of precipitating double enosis or whether they view it as a further eroding factor for the new talks, the issue is that our allies are once again concerned enough about Cyprus perhaps to be moving toward some drastic step which would confront us with difficult choices.

Greek-Turk Relations and the New Situation

On the one hand, Greece and Turkey have recently embarked upon a new period of cooperation over Cyprus. Both sides have privately and publicly insisted that Cyprus not become an issue between them and both shared the initiative in reviving the intercommunal talks as the best framework for solution. It has been their reasonableness which has kept negotiations over procedures for the talks from breaking down. The US has encouraged these efforts.

On top of this cooperation, we have had reports that officials on both sides continue to talk about a so-called “dynamic” solution ending in double enosis (partition) as the best way out. Ambassador Popper hears this not only from Turks and Turk Cypriots but also from mainland Greeks and elements of the Greek-Cypriot establishment.

Makariosʼ recent importation of arms has upset both Greece and Turkey and reopened the possibility of a solution imposed on Cyprus by the two of them.

• —The Turks have gone on record to express their grave concern and to indicate privately that they may have to ship new arms to their community. The Greeks are aware of this. We also have a reliable report that in its dialogue with Greece, Turkey has indicated that Makarios must go.
• —Palamas has told Tasca Greece is urging Turkey to keep cool while it tries to deal with the situation. He also implied that Makarios was the obstacle. Tasca gained the impression Greece would like to see him replaced.² Greece plans on the following steps:
  • —Makarios will be told tomorrow that he must turn the Czech arms over to UNFICYP control and that he must form a government of “national unity” (presumably involvement of the Turk Cypriots) in Cyprus.
  • —If Makarios refuses, the GOG will make its demands public and will also inform the UN and UK.
  • —Greece does not want violence nor will it make use of Grivas but if Makarios resists, the GOG will take its case directly to the Greek Cypriot people.
  • —If Makarios refuses to form a government acceptable to Greece and is backed by Greek Cypriots, then Greece may withdraw from the island.

Ambassador Tasca, who has already expressed hope to the GOG that they are not entertaining the thought of a “dynamic” solution, has now told Palamas he believes that the GOG plan is highly dangerous given the support Makarios has among Greek Cypriots.³

To buy time, State—with our clearance—has instructed Tasca to make the following points to Papadopoulos: The GOG scenario may have the effect of consolidating support behind Makarios and impelling him towards Soviet support. All diplomatic options to resolve the Czech arms problem should be exhausted. One course could be a GOG–GOT démarche to the UNSYG which the US is prepared to support and would ask the UK, Canada and others to make parallel approaches to the UN. At a minimum, the US hopes that Greece will hold off with its scenario to permit discussions among the NATO allies.⁴

Meanwhile, a Greek Cypriot official has told Ambassador Popper that Makarios had acquired the arms because of overwhelming evidence of Greek complicity in Grivasʼ movement to precipitate double enosis. He maintained that Makarios had every right to defend himself and his regime and urged the US to help stop Greece from talking about a political settlement on the one hand while conspiring with Grivas on the other. He did suggest that there could be a trade-off of the Czech arms for a return of Grivas to Greece and urged the US to play a role in working this out. But he also said it is obvious to Cyprus that the Greeks are using the arms pretext as a first step toward partition in collusion with Turkey; he believes it would never work and would only set Greece and Turkey against each other.⁵

The Situations the US May Face

We have traditionally maintained that the intercommunal talks best address the US interest in defusing tensions on Cyprus and hence tensions between Greece and Turkey. We have taken a position of supporting Cypriot independence, and we have cultivated a relationship with Makarios in that context.

The situation we now face is one of apparent increased Greek and Turkish interest in imposing a solution regardless of the fate of Makarios, or possibly even regardless of the independence of Cyprus. At the very least it seems that Greece and Turkey may have agreed that (a) Makarios must settle this problem in a way satisfactory to the Turks and Greeks (a national unity government which could mean either Turk Cypriot participation in it or, a step further, partition) or (b) Makarios must go. In short, if Greece and Turkey are determined to force a situation which would violate Makariosʼ view of a unitary independent state, or, further, partition Cyprus, the US will face difficult choices between the wishes of our allies and our established opposition to dismemberment of UN members.

The following are the situations we may face and the principal implications:

Situation 1: There remains a chance simply to diffuse the tensions created by the arms issue. This could come about if we could focus attention on the tensions raised by the arms problem and get everyone back on the track towards resuming talks and forgetting any dynamic overall solution now. Our instructions to Ambassador Tasca to urge the GOG to hold off on its ultimatum to Makarios and concentrate instead on exhausting diplomatic options to resolve the arms problem are one step in this direction. The suggestion has also been made on Cyprus that a trade-off to diffuse tensions be arranged by returning Grivas to Greece in exchange for Czech arms being turned over to UNFICYP. The Cypriots have asked us to become involved in working this out with the Greeks.

Implications: The US definitely has an interest in isolation of the arms issue and getting on with the talks. However, it is much less clear that we want to be in the middle in a dispute within the Greek-Greek Cypriot community. If we tried to negotiate the return of Grivas to Greece, we would have to take into account that Greece may well be taking advantage of Grivasʼ presence on Cyprus to pressure Makarios and may not want such a trade-off. [Intelligence reports suggest that the Greeks may even have Grivas in one of the Greek Cypriot National Guard camps—for release at the proper moment.]⁶ Athens has already tried privately to force Makarios on the arms question and has now surfaced its proposal to issue an ultimatum to him. We would have a question whether:

• —we want to pressure Athens off a course it may have already decided on;
• —we want to line up with an initiative on trade-off that essentially meets Makarios needs but may not do much to produce his flexibility in the talks;
• —we want at all costs to see the talks resumed even though Greece and Turkey are fed up with Makarios.

The argument for involving ourselves is that this may be far easier than dealing with either of the two situations that follow.

Situation 2: The Greeks go ahead and issue their ultimatum to Makarios to conform or step down; he resists, rallies his people against external pressure and perhaps takes his case to the UN. The assumption here is that the Greeks take a strong stand hoping Makarios will acquiesce but waver before following their strategy through to the conclusion of quickly deposing Makarios.

The main implication here would be that the US would be caught between Makariosʼ call for support in the face of external pressure and Athensʼ defense that it is attempting to solve a problem as it sees fit. Makarios would get Soviet and perhaps Chinese support (their position is that the local parties solve their own problem) at the UN. The US would be allied with Greek and Turkish intervention. This situation would be the worst of two worlds. It would not involve decisive enough action to solve the problem and it would generate worldwide pressure on us to pull the Greeks and Turks off. Whereas there is a theoretical option of acquiescing in a decisive Greek move, the proposed Greek action of issuing an ultimatum and waiting for reaction seems doomed to failure.

Situation 3: Greece and Turkey have already decided to cooperate in a dynamic solution to impose a solution or partition Cyprus. They are beyond backing off from this course, actively engaged in deposing Makarios and installing a new Cypriot government.

This would put us squarely between our interests in having Greece and Turkey resolve the issue to the benefit of good relations between them and in not seeing intervention in or dismemberment of Cyprus by our two NATO allies. The US in the least would be faced with weathering the storm of intervention on Cyprus by NATO allies who would justify their moves as guarantor powers of the London-Zurich accords or worse, face a situation of partition or double enosis in opposition to our principle of not endorsing the dismemberment of UN nations. If there is to be action, however, this would be better than some indecisive intermediate step. The additional argument against acquiescing in any such move is that it stands a good chance of failing.

In Conclusion

This memo is intended simply to provide background on steps taken to date and a framework within which to think about where events might go from here. If this heats up any more, it may be necessary to call a WSAG meeting.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 594, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. III Jan 72–Oct 73. Secret. Sent for information. Sent through Haig who initialed it. Kissinger wrote the following notes on the first page: “Excellent paper” and “I want to be told before GOG is given any more advice. I am afraid our meddling will land us squarely in situation?”
2. Reported in telegram 690 from Athens, February 8. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 19–6 CZECH–CYP)
3. Reported in telegram 742 from Athens, February 10. (Ibid.)
4. See footnote 2, Document 394.
5. Reported in telegram 281 from Nicosia, February 10. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 592, Country Files—Middle East, Cyprus, Vol. I Jan 1969–June 30, 1974)
6. Brackets in the original.