Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972

386. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, December 14, 1971.

SUBJECT

• Denktash Views on Cyprus Situation

PARTICIPANTS

• Rauf Denktash, Leader of Turk Cypriots
• Thomas D. Boyatt, Director of Cypriot Affairs
• Roger A. Long, Political-Economic Officer

Rauf Denktash, Turk Cypriot leader and negotiator for his side in the intercommunal talks, called on Deputy Assistant Secretary Herz of International Organizations on December 14. Although NEA officials were fully engaged with Indo-Pak and Middle East crises,² Assistant Secretary Sisco saw Denktash for a brief “hello.” Messrs. Boyatt and Long of the Cyprus country directorate accompanied Denktash on the call. The conversation was reported in State 225745.³

Following Denktashʼs call on Deputy Assistant Secretary Herz, I took him to lunch where he, Roger Long and I had an extended, varied, and lively discussion. The following points of interest emerged.

1. SYG Proposal—Denktash was quite relaxed about the new negotiating procedure in which representatives of the UN, Greece and Turkey would participate. He felt this would be helpful in that the added participants could suggest fresh approaches as stalemates occur. He also accepted the idea that, since Greece and Turkey would have to live with any eventual settlement, it was good to have them participate in the formulation of such a settlement. In addition, the participation of the “mother” country and the “father” country would give the Greek and Turk communities respectively added confidence in any compromises reached.

2. Prospects for Settlement—Several times Denktash said that the time to have reached a settlement was in 1968 when he and the Turk Cypriot community were psychologically prepared to make fairly major concessions to the Greek Cypriots. He said that if he and Clerides had gone away by themselves for a few months they could have reached a settlement. His only demand would have been recognition of Turk Cypriot partnership status, which he said would not have been as detailed or as strong as his 1971 local autonomy demands. He stated that he would have conceded everything else to Clerides. Instead, he and Clerides talked on Cyprus and it gradually became clear that Makarios was controlling Clerides. In the three years since the talks started Denktashʼs views had changed. He now is much more of the opinion that Makarios will not permit a settlement acceptable to the Turk Cypriots.

I told Denktash that in my personal view he could have either the kind of autonomy he wanted or the kind of guarantees he felt necessary, but not both. I asked, on a hypothetical basis, whether Denktash would choose full autonomy or the present set of international guarantees if the choice had to be made. Denktash replied that he would choose the guarantees. I told Rauf that in that case it was a good thing that he was prepared to start de novo on constitutional issues as he had told the press before leaving Cyprus and had confirmed to Martin Herz.

3. Normalization—A good bit of the discussion was devoted to “normalization.” In general, Denktash was receptive to the idea of normalization which would include not only concessions by the Greek community but by his community as well. Of course, things got a bit more sticky once details were discussed but at least Rauf was prepared to discuss the establishment of a variety of normalization subcommittees under UN aegis not excluding one on “that damned Kyrenia Road.” I repeated the point I made earlier (State 225745) that a visible normalization move by the Turkish side was important in getting a lot more normalization out of Makarios.

4. Deconfrontation—On the subject of disengagement and deconfrontation of military forces, Denktash made the usual Turk Cypriot point, viz., it is unfair to ask Turk Cypriot fighters and Greek Cypriot National Guard to each withdraw 100 yards when the Turkish position is only 200 yards deep and mobile Greek forces have the entire island into which they can withdraw. I acknowledged Denktashʼs point and suggested that deconfrontation should be approached in a different way. I asked Rauf what would be his reaction, for example, to the proposition that National Guard troops withdraw into their barracks and in return the Turks would replace TMT fighters with policemen. To my surprise Denktash replied that he thought this suggestion had merit and was certainly worth exploring. Comment: I think we should follow up on this one with UNFICYP and Denktash when he returns.

5. Internal Political Situation in Turk Cypriot Community—The most important point on this subject was Denktashʼs frank admittance that his ability to “impose” an intercommunal settlement had decreased radically since 1970. He said that particularly in the 1968 period, the Turk Cypriot community felt that a settlement could be reached and that the right man to reach that settlement (i.e., Denktash) was available to reach it. As time has dragged on without a settlement, however, more and more Turk Cypriots have lost faith not only in the general prospects for reaching a settlement but in particular in Denktashʼs (or anyoneʼs) ability to do so. When asked if this meant that Turk Cypriots are becoming more belligerent in their interaction with the other community, Denktash said this was not the problem but that a certain lack of confidence in the possibility for reaching a settlement had developed.

6. Comment—Both in his call on Martin Herz and later during our follow-up luncheon and talk, Denktash was his usual articulate, forceful and intelligent self. He did, however, generally come through as much more positive and creative than he has in recent Embassy reporting. Perhaps he consciously tried to project a constructive aura or perhaps release from the confines and demands of the community makes him more statesmanlike. Either way, Rauf Bey put himself across as a determined, but sensitive and rational, leader of his community. Denktash was definitely in good spirits and enjoyed the give and take of our discussions. Physically, he said he was in good shape and said his health was 80 per cent improved. He did, however, complain that the constant pressure of his many responsibilities and lack of progress on the Cyprus problem had induced a certain malaise. As an example, Denktash explained that he simply was no longer interested in recreation or entertainment and everything seemed rather flat. I got the impression that Rauf could use a vacation.

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 CYP. Confidential. Drafted by Long and Boyatt. Copies were sent to Ankara and Nicosia.
2. Reference to the December 4–12 clash between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. The United States sent elements of the Seventh Fleet into the crisis area.
3. Dated December 15. (Ibid.)