Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972

384. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece¹

Washington, November 24, 1971, 0255Z.

214961. Subject: Cyprus: Grivas Situation. Ref: State 214614.²

1. We have carefully considered point made in Athens 6187³ that GOT pressure on Greece is main factor in increasing consensus within GOG for double enosis “solution” to Cyprus problem. While it is clear that GOT is, of course, keeping up pressure for solution to Cyprus problem, Department does not feel this is primary causal element in GOGʼs attraction for double enosis. In fact, increasing sympathy for double enosis among prominent Greeks seems to have momentum all its own, based on equal parts of pressure for a solution, dislike of Makarios, desire for enosis even if flawed enosis and fear of Communist penetration of Cyprus.

2. Departmentʼs reading of developments over past several months is that GOT pressure for Cyprus solution peaked late last summer shortly after Erim government took over. At that time GOT at all levels appeared to be pushing for “dynamic” solution to accompaniment of cheers from Turk-Cypriot community. We believe firm representations by USG initially in Ankara and later in New York and Washington emphasizing that USG continued strongly to support peaceful, negotiated settlement of Cyprus problem was very important factor in defusing Turkish demand for solution to Cyprus by end of 1971. In any case, we feel that further representations in Ankara on this subject are not necessary, at least for present.

3. Department would also like to comment on points made in para 8 of Athens 6177.⁴ We agree wholeheartedly that US approach to GOG on Grivas be presented in way that does not bring into question Greek veracity. Démarche outlined in reftel was drafted with this in mind.

4. Athens 6177 also recommends that US not leave impression “that we prepared to make contribution to solving Cyprus problem substantial enough to give us voice in such considerations as future of Grivas.” We believe USG efforts from 1963 to present to bring peace provide basis for this manifestation of interest. Fact is that over period of almost a decade USG has made substantial contributions to efforts to solve the Cyprus problem. Ball, Acheson, and Vance missions of 1963, 1964, and 1967 are high points of a whole series of US initiatives, most recent of which have been our efforts to get local talks started in 1968 and our continuing efforts to revive them at present stage. As historical record clearly indicates, USG involvement in Cyprus problem both in crisis resolution and problem solving terms does give US voice in anything bearing on problem including “future of Grivas.” It is worth recalling that prior to November 1967 crisis there was discussion within USG as to whether or not USG should request GOG to recall Grivas. While debate was in progress, with many claiming status of Grivas was not US concern, Grivas directed violent attack on Turk-Cypriots which caused 1967 crisis and this, in turn, involved USG directly in Cyprus situation under worst possible conditions.

Irwin

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 CYP. Secret. Drafted by Boyatt; cleared by Silva, Dillon, and Fry (S/S–O); and approved by Davies. Repeated to Nicosia, Ankara, USNATO, London, and USUN.
2. Dated November 11, it reiterated concern about Grivasʼs actions even in the event that he was ready to support a Greek Government plan for “double enosis.” (Ibid.)
3. Dated November 19, it commented on the need to lessen Turkish pressures on Greece. (Ibid.)
4. Dated November 19, it stated the Embassyʼs view that Papadopoulos had not sent Grivas to Cyprus and discussed options for dealing with Grivas. (Ibid.)