Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972

37. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, June 5, 1970.

SUBJECT

• RFE Problem with Bonn is Getting More Serious

The attached message (Tab A)² from Bonn indicates that the crisis over Radio Free Europe is picking up. I understand that funding and other aspects have been considered in the 40 Committee recently.

The issue is the expected one: mounting Eastern European pressure to get rid of the Radio. There now apparently is a threat from several East European countries to boycott the Munich Olympics in 1972 if RFE is still there. The Germans want to avoid a confrontation with us (they say) and have apparently been trying to get RFE to do something to its scripts to remove any basis for charges that they are inflammatory. It is far from clear, however, that even if RFE were to modify its scripts [1 line not declassified] the East Europeans would cease their pressure. There have been suggestions that the Germans should assign someone to Munich to pass on scripts and participate in operations generally, but it is highly unlikely that the Germans would want to be that much more identified with the Radio. If present trends hold, sooner or later the Germans, whatever is in the scripts, will be confronted with the choice of keeping the Radio and avoiding a problem with us or propitiating the East for the sake of “successes” in Ostpolitik.

Bureaucratically within the US Government, CIA had wanted to send Fred Valtin to Bonn today to see if a modus vivendi between RFE and the Germans could be found and also to determine whether RFE scripts are in fact offensive. (CIA says the Poles have in the past given the FRG doctored tapes to make RFE appear in a bad light.) State, however, has held up Valtinʼs trip on the ground that whoever goes to negotiate with the Germans should be properly instructed. State and CIA have been meeting for the past week to consider the options. I gather they have guidance from you to the effect what we should not permit the Germans to bargain with our chips. However, it is not clear that there is any specific White House direction of the current State/CIA effort to develop a course of action or that any more basic thought is being given to the future of RFE or a possible alternative to it.

I take it there is a judgment in the Administration that both RFE and Radio Liberty can at some point be used by us for bargaining purposes with the East and that for this reason we should keep both operations functioning in Munich, whatever the Eastern pressures on the Germans to circumscribe or remove them. This also presupposes German unwillingness to antagonize us for the sake of relations with the East. This set of judgments may well be accurate; but if it has not already been subjected to analysis, it certainly should be.

Recommendation

That you pursue this matter further in the 40 Committee.³

Approve

Disapprove

Put on agenda for next meeting

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 379, Subject Files, Radio Free Europe & Radio Liberty, Vol. I. Secret; Exdis. Sent for action. Concurred in by Jessup.
2. Printed as Document 36.
3. At the bottom of the memorandum, Kissinger added by hand the options “Approve” and “Disapprove” and initialed “Approve.” The option, “Put on agenda for next meeting,” is also written by an unknown hand. The date of June 12, 1970, is stamped below the options.