Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972

369. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey¹

Washington, June 4, 1971, 2104Z.

100122. Subject: Cyprus: Review of Contingencies and Options. Refs: (A) State 90020; (B) Nicosia 826; (C) Ankara 3781; (D) Athens 2733; (E) State 88843; (F) USNATO 2291; (G) State 88485; (H) Moscow 3311; (I) State 88810; (J) USUN 1411.²

1. We wish to commend all action addressees for their excellent responses to our request for a “no-holds-barred” review of selected options on Cyprus. Result has been extremely useful and thought-provoking series of cables which have been of great value to us. Following summarizes results of this review, with comments on situation as we see it.

2. All seem agreed that although intercommunal talks in danger, they will probably continue through summer months. Continuing stalemate in talks, however, appears to have induced Turkish side to cast about for alternative to status quo which works against them. One such alternative is now being explored—a direct dialogue with Greece as a means of breaking the impasse. This dialogue itself as it gets underway may produce (a) nothing, (b) referral for consideration by communities of points of agreement reached between Greece and Turkey, or (c) agreement to attempt a dynamic solution through pressure on Makarios and the GOC, perhaps looking toward double enosis.

3. Should Greece and Turkey decide on latter following would appear to be most likely result, dependent on nature and extent of pressure: Significant portions of Greek Cypriot community (Makarios, right-wing total enosists, and AKEL) would oppose the move despite Greek pressures to accept it and could probably prevent a swift, painless accomplishment of Greco/Turkish objective. This would in all likelihood activate international community in face of probable Cyprus crisis.

4. We note your unanimity of opinion that it would not be in USGʼs interest if such contingency came to pass, i.e., dynamic solution such as double enosis could not be easily imposed and an attempt to do so would almost surely result in another crisis, which would (a) draw Soviets into Cyprus situation more deeply than ever before, (b) expose our Greek and Turkish allies to intense pressure for public retreat, and (c) place US in position in which high expenditure of political capital and an alienation of one or more of parties would likely result.

5. Comment: From your analyses, which closely parallel our own, it clear that it is in interest USG to forestall such a contingency, but without alienating Greece or Turkey and without slamming door to possible alternatives to exclusive reliance on deadlocking intercommunal talks. Thus, USG should encourage Greco/Turkish dialogue—but as a means to help breathe new life into intercommunal talks, not as replacement for them. We should make our view clear to Athens and Ankara but in positive sense of supporting a dialogue supportive to intercommunal talks, rather than in negative sense of coming down against any particular Greco/Turkish agreement or action at this stage. Since dialogue probably will take some months to mature and we should be able to gauge its progress, no action on our part at the moment other than continuation of present stance would either be necessary or helpful.

6. Some discussion was also carried out in reftels as to actions USG might consider relative to mediation effort or use of Nicosiaʼs constitutional compromise proposals (A–31, 1970).³ Consensus would appear to be that time is not right for either US, UN, or third-party mediation. We agree with assessment that present situation is such that mediation would likely fail. Basic prevailing conditions will have to change before it will be possible to bump one or both of communities from their bedrock positions. In our view, Greco/Turkish dialogue will present best means for imparting such movement.

7. We expect to have contingency/options exercise completed within next days and will be sending you results. Exercise has benefitted materially from your efforts.⁴

Irwin

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Noforn; Exdis. Drafted by Davis and Long; cleared in NEA, INR, EUR, and S/S; and approved by Sisco. Sent to Ankara, Nicosia, Athens, Moscow, USNATO, and USUN. Repeated to London, EUCOM, and USDOCOSOUTH.
2. In telegram 90020, May 21, the Department of State requested the three Embassiesʼ (Ankara, Athens, Nicosia) thinking on ways to proceed with the Cyprus issue given the dangerous stalemate on Cypriot intercommunal talks. The Department believed, despite rising frustration on all sides, that the talks were the best solution. In telegram 826 from Nicosia, May 21, the Embassy expressed pessimism about the outcome of intercommunal talks and suggested the United States should be prepared to seek an accommodation with the Soviet Union on the Cyprus issue at the United Nations. In telegram 3781 from Ankara, May 29, the Embassy suggested encouraging dialogue between Athens and Ankara with the option of U.S. mediation if the dialogue matured. In telegram 2733 from Athens, June 3, the Embassy, while agreeing with Nicosiaʼs outlook, suggested a low profile approach while waiting for developments in Greek-Turkish discussions and the intercommunal talks. The Department, in telegram 88843, May 20, requested the three Embassiesʼ comments on policy in the event of a breakdown of intercommunal talks and joint Greek-Turkish efforts to divide Cyprus. Telegram USNATO 2291 from Brussels, May 22, reported Brosioʼs views on Cyprus. In telegram 88455 to multiple posts, May 20, the Department commented on possible Soviet reaction to the breakdown of intercommunal talks. In telegram 3511 (not 3311) from Moscow, May 26, the Embassy assessed likely factors in a Soviet response to a renewed Cyprus crisis. In telegram 88810, May 20, the Department requested the three Embassiesʼ comments regarding the impact of the breakdown of intercommunal talks. In telegram 1411 from USUN, May 27, the U.S. Delegation reported on the attitude of UN member states toward Cyprus. (All ibid.)
3. Dated March 3, 1970; in it the Embassy discussed the constitutional organization of Cyprus. (Ibid., POL 15–5 CYP)
4. Further comments on contingencies were forwarded to the Department in telegram 929 from Nicosia, June 7, and in telegram 2799 from Athens, June 7. (Both ibid., POL 27 CYP)