Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972

366. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State¹

Nicosia, May 11, 1971, 1153Z.

744. Subj: Cyprus: Intercommunal Talks. Ref: State 78126.²

1. It may be natural for us on the scene to be more impressed with new potentialities for trouble in Cyprus than others. Nevertheless, we believe Cyprus situation has materially changed since advent of Erim govt.³

2. What is new is that Govtʼs vigorous assertion that it will give intercommunal talks one last clear chance. If as Turks expect this produces no agreement, talks would presumably be broken off and other measures starting with enhanced separate status for Turk Cypriot community, with Turkish support, would follow.

3. This may be only war of nerves technique, but on a “worst case” plannersʼ basis we think it must be taken with some seriousness. Turks have not merely resumed square one position, as Deptel asserts; they have thrown up prospect of a Cyprus without the stabilizing presence of the intercommunal talks—a new situation as compared with the status since Spring 1968. If Greeks and Greek Cypriots do not respond in some way to Turk demands, it will be difficult for Turks not to follow through on their threats.

4. We are not predicting dire developments in the short term. But we do think that urging all concerned to keep the talks going—which is obviously right as far as it goes—will not in itself prove sufficient in the longer run. Contingencies and options paper lays out various courses of possible action which merit re-examination in light of changed circumstances.

5. Paras 3 and 4 State 78126 suggest that no one except possibly Turk Cypriots would see advantage in breaking off intercommunal negotiations, and that GOT could control them. We agree GOC/GOG have much to gain from keeping talks in being indefinitely, in belief that Turk Cypriot community will gradually crumble. This GOT is now saying it is determined to exclude developments which would lead to talksʼ collapse, through chain of events in which either side might take the decisive step.

Popper

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 CYP. Confidential. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, London, USNATO, EUCOM, USDOCOSOUTH, and USUN.
2. Dated May 6, 1971; ibid.
3. In a May 4 letter to Sisco, Popper commented: “Over the last six months we here have been of the belief that the existing de facto situation in Cyprus could be prolonged for months, or even years: Makarios clearly wanted it that way and a weak and preoccupied Turkish Government did not seem able to stir up any trouble by decisive action. The Erim Government has changed all this. It speaks with a voice which is at once far more knowledgeable and technically more proficient than its predecessor, and with a vigor that has been quite lacking on the Turkish side since intercommunal talks started.” (Department of State, Cyprus Desk Files: Lot 75 D 41, Pol 17 US in Cyprus)