Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972

344. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State¹

Nicosia, July 22, 1969, 1030Z.

1081. Subject: Cyprus: Makariosʼ Views.

1. Summary. In prompt follow-up to credentials presentation July 18, FonOff arranged my initial private discussion with Archbishop morning July 21. Makarios obviously sought convey impression of reasonableness, magnanimity and restraint. Portraying Turkish community as misguided, he foresaw probability of deadlock in intercommunal talks and proposed both sides agree refrain from use of force in this eventuality.

2. President received me alone, without customary interpreter, for interview lasting almost one hour. He began conversation with congratulations on Apollo XI success thus far and hoped for astronautsʼ safe return.² There no doubt he deeply impressed with every aspect of flight.

3. Turning to substance, I told Makarios that as I had said to Acting FonMin July 16,³ I brought with me no preconceived notions and no dramatic proposals for settlement. I assured Makarios of keen interest of Secretary and other Washington officials in a successful solution of Cyprus problem. Archbishopʼs wise guidance and leadership had, I noted, been a major factor in progress which had occurred since late 1967. We were confident that, given his unique position among his own people, he would continue to guide them toward a settlement which would assure interests of all parties in an independent Cyprus. I knew that President Nixon and the Secretary would be interested in his analysis of situation as it now stood.

4. Archbishop replied he thought matters had reached a difficult stage. He had hoped communal talks would have resulted in agreement three or four months after they had started. Instead, he feared they might be deadlocked. Turkish Cypriot leaders did not wish to clear ground for any agreement at least until after elections in Turkey. What would follow then he could not predict, but what he saw did not encourage him.

5. Archbishop particularly regretted that no great progress had been made on critical local government issue. Problem was that Turks were attempting to use negotiations on this matter to set up what amounted to a federation, in order to set stage for ultimate partition. Turks insisted that local government units be created on purely racial basis, even though this would result in quite infeasible administrative situations. He had no problem with drawing lines which would give Turks majority in certain areas and Greeks in others. But Turks wanted to go much further.

6. Resulting stalemate could only harm Turkish Cypriot community. Maintained by Turkish Government subsidy, it was being reduced to a parasitic status. Cyprus was in period of rapid development, with growing industry and prosperity. If Turks waited too long, they might never obtain their fair share of benefits.

7. This was why, Archbishop said, he especially regretted failure of Turks to accept Greek Cypriot proposal that local government issue be put aside and agreements on police and judiciary be implemented at once. Turks had assented, he continued, to police arrangements which would ensure that police stations in Turkish area were manned almost exclusively by Turkish policemen, with corresponding token Turkish representation in police posts in Greek Cypriot areas. This would enable each community to police itself, while giving the other the opportunity to keep watch over what was happening. Under such conditions, further steps could be taken to pursue deconfrontation, with mixed police units as well as UNFICYP forces patrolling areas from which two sides would withdraw their military personnel. But this obviously required Turkish agreement, of which no sign was forthcoming. Kuchuk and Denktash were moderates who might have been expected to be attracted by such a proposal; MinDef Orek, on contrary, was hardliner who, Archbishop understood, was taking position that Turk Cypriot community had nothing to gain from agreement with Greek Cypriots since it was doing quite well as things now stood.

8. If his fears were realized, Archbishop added, and deadlock occurred, he would propose that both communities agree that despite their differences they would not resort to force to solve them. “We must live together,” he stated, “we are on the same ship.” UNFICYP could continue to play an important role. In this connection, he could understand why states providing men and money for UNFICYP might wish reduce costs of UNFICYP operation. If they should find it necessary to do so, Greek Cypriot community would not object. He understood, however, that Turkish community desired force to remain at present level. This was good sign, since it indicated Turks did not intend to resort to violence. Greeks of course would have no objection if force were maintained at existing strength.

9. In tune with Archbishopʼs mood, I assured him US wanted to do all it appropriately could to facilitate a solution. We were convinced it was not beyond ingenuity of negotiators to work through complex of details regarding local government issue and come up with something which would give satisfaction to both sides. It would be mistake for anyone to despair at this point, despite inevitable past frustrations. We hoped Turk Cypriot replies to Greek local government proposals would provide basis for new impetus toward agreement. With spiritual strength and goodwill I could see in Archbishopʼs approach to problem, I felt encouraged to believe this was not “impossible dream.”

10. Concluding, I told Archbishop I was at his disposal at any time. He could count on me to do my best to keep USG fully informed, and he could count on continuing interest of USG in cause of just and lasting solution of Cyprus problem.

Popper

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27 CYP. Confidential. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, London, Ottawa, USUN, and USNATO.
2. Reference is to the July 16–24 mission of Apollo XI that landed on the moon July 20–21.
3. Reported in telegram 1068 from Nicosia, July 17. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27 CYP)