Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972

341. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State¹

Ankara, May 1, 1969, 1047Z.

2896. 1. Even my brief revisit to Cyprus² was depressing with respect Turk Cypriot predicament. The Greek sectorʼs economy is boom ing, while the Turk Cypriots stagnate barricaded in their enclaves. The growing economic disparity between the two communities is even more visible. Despite this, I sense little give among the Turkish community in Cyprus or their backers in Ankara. Indeed Denktashʼs remarks almost suggested that the greater the economic disparity the more determinedly the Turk Cypriots would insist on the full measure of their “rights.”³

2. Ambassador Belcher has reported on our brief talks with Denktash and Clerides.⁴ His rapport with the key actors on the scene is impressive indeed. He and I have also suggested in Nicosia 627 some new financial device to help break the deadlock. I would only add that in default of some such new catalyst to stimulate a compromise solution, GOC has powerful incentive to sit tight for another 2–3 years of gradual erosion of the Turk Cypriot position until latter are worn down. I need not remind Department of the possibilities of flareup implicit in the growing hopelessness of the Turk Cypriots. It is for this reason, and because their economic weakness and enforced idleness seem to be impressing itself more and more on Turk Cypriot thinking, that some kind of financial sweetener might have powerful appeal.

3. I know how hard it is for Washington (or any other potential donor) to think of new commitments at this time. In fact, however, any settlement which could be achieved by investing $25–50 million over 2–3 years would be cheap at the price. Current dispute is costing US, UK, Greece, Turkey and UNFICYP countries, and the two Cypriot communities a great deal more than that. We would all probably end up saving money if we could substitute rehabilitation and development for what we are investing in now. Moreover, by directly tying any such package sweetener to an across-the-board settlement, we could avoid spending our money until we saw what we would get for it.

4. I recognize the difficulty of designing a financial package purely for the Turk Cypriots. However, for it to have appeal to them and Ankara, they must be given clear assurances that the bulk of it will be spent on them. We must also guard against the GOC using it as an excuse to avoid providing GOC funds which would normally be provided anyway to the Turkish community. But these pitfalls could no doubt be skirted by ingenuity and imagination.

Komer

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27 CYP. Confidential. Repeated to Nicosia, Athens, London, Ottawa, USUN, and USNATO. An error on the date-time line of the telegram dates it as April 1 instead of May 1.
2. April 28.
3. Belcher reported on the two Ambassadorsʼ discussions with Denktash in telegram 627 from Nicosia, April 30. He concluded that the disparity in economic situation might provide the “sugar coating” in the form of economic assistance for a “bitter pill” of compromise the Turkish community might have to swallow. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27 CYP)
4. Telegram 626 from Nicosia, April 30. (Ibid.)