329. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon1
SUBJECT
- Homeporting in Greece
Under Secretary Johnson has written informing you (Tab B)2 that State and Defense have reached agreement to go ahead with the “homeporting” of a carrier task force in Greece.
State has opened discussions with the Greek government and plans to notify Congressional leaders in the next few days.
The Homeporting Proposal
The “homeporting” of a carrier task force in Greece involves the permanent stationing of 6,000 naval personnel and some 3,100 dependents in Athens. Our current presence in Greece is about 6,100 personnel including dependents. Thus, homeporting involves a 150% increase in our presence.
As you know, the “homeporting” of a carrier task force in Greece could have significant political liabilities. Ambassador Johnson describes them as follows:
- —It would significantly reduce our policy options in dealing with the Greek regime.
- —It would presumably require an increase in MAP or a program of comparable benefit to the Greeks.
- —It would result in some criticism from the Congress and some of our NATO allies:
The State/Defense judgment is, however, that these political liabilities are outweighed by the military advantages of the proposal.
On the other hand, however, the homeporting proposal will have substantial strategic benefits:
- —Our present force enables us to maintain 5 carriers continuously forward-deployed in peacetime: 3 carriers in the Pacific and 2 in the Mediterranean.
- —With the reduction to 12 carrier force level already planned by the Navy, we will be able to maintain only 4 continuously deployed compared to 5 at present. This would probably mean a return to the pre-Vietnam war level of 2 carriers forward deployed in the Pacific.
With homeporting, however, we would be able to maintain 5 carriers forward deployed in peacetime even with the planned reductions in our carrier force levels.
Another military benefit foreseen by the Navy is to improve the retention of Navy personnel to whom the absence from their families during deployment must be an important consideration.
Given these military advantages, I agree with the State/Defense judgment that the homeporting proposal should be discussed with the Greeks. If the cost demanded is too great, however, we should be prepared to modify or drop the proposal.3
If you approve homeporting in principle, I will issue the attached directive to State/Defense starting preliminary negotiations with the Greeks. (Tab A)4
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 594, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. III Jan 72–Oct 73. Secret. Sent for action. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.↩
- Attached but not printed at Tab B is Johnsonʼs December 30, 1971 memorandum to the President. Johnson noted that during the last 12 months, the Navy had been vigorously pursuing a solution to its personnel retention problems caused by family separations by homeporting selected combat units in overseas locations. The Departments of State and Defense had collaborated on a successful homeporting agreement with Japan for a U.S. destroyer squadron in Yokosuka. They were considering homeporting in the United Kingdom or the Netherlands and also wanted to begin negotiations with Greece to homeport one of the Sixth Fleetʼs carrier groups in Athens. A more detailed explanation of the issue is contained in a memorandum from Director of the Office of Political-Military Affairs Spiers to Johnson, December 23, 1971. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF POL GREECE–US)↩
- Nixon initialed the approval option.↩
- See Document 331.↩