Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972

325. Telegram From the Vice Presidentʼs Party to the Department of State¹

Athens, October 18, 1971, 2310Z.

Vipto 36/5590. Subject: Memorandum of Conversation Between Vice President and Prime Minister Papadopoulos, October 16, 1971, 5:30 p.m.²

Summary.

Warm but intense two hour meeting between Vice President and Prime Minister Papadopoulos highlighted by discussion of link between strength of NATO and Greek domestic politics. Emphasizing that he came in true friendship without slightest intention to criticize or intervene, Vice President asked Papadopoulos to explore with him means of making domestic policies less vulnerable in effort to disarm critics and strengthen Alliance. Vice President promised he would not reveal publicly that he had discussed domestic politics while in Greece, if Prime Minister so wished. Prime Minister gratefully accepting Vice Presidentʼs pledges of friendship, secrecy, and non-interference, agreed to discuss problem further in subsequent talks.³ Remainder of conversation devoted to discussion of Communist threat, necessity for NATO, and special friendship between Greece and United States.

2. The Vice President began by thanking Prime Minister Papadopoulos for the warmth of his welcome in Athens; describing the history of Greek-American relations from World War Two through the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, NATO, and the Korean War; and extolling the close links between the two countries (“the best friends come out of adversity”). His primary purpose in the talks, the Vice President added, was to discuss the security relationship between the two countries and find out how the Prime Minister viewed the Alliance, its cohesion and progress.

3. The Prime Minister agreed that the bonds between the American and Greek people had been forged in history. The warmth of Greek feeling about the Vice Presidentʼs visit, he continued, was due not only to the origin of the Vice Presidentʼs father, but also to Greek respect for Americaʼs position as the leader of the free world and protector of the threatened ideals that both countries hold dear.

4. The Prime Minister began his review of Greek attitudes toward the NATO Alliance by quoting statement “if you love peace, prepare for war.” He next cited the saying of the ancients that the strength of a people is measured by the strength of their belief in what they are called upon to defend. The Prime Minister said that he was anxious about both the state of preparations and the strength of beliefs within NATO. There were elements within the NATO Alliance that did not take the threat seriously and others that did not believe in it at all.

5. The situation was far from hopeless, the Prime Minister continued. What the NATO countries had to do was activate what President Nixon described as the silent majority, prepare for the ultimate threat and maintain faith in the U.S. as the cornerstone of the NATO Alliance. American leadership, rather than dollars, was the absolute necessity in the current situation. In fact, U.S. leadership had in the past often been more effective when dollars not at issue.

6. The Vice President said that he felt Prime Ministerʼs perception of the threat was reasonable. Too many people in the U.S. believe that you can talk the threat away by advocating unilateral disarmament. Some of these people have deep-seated guilt complexes and believe that the tough problems of the past could have been solved without bloodshed. Though wrong, they have considerable influence with a generation of American youth brought up in an atmosphere relatively devoid of stress and marked by plenty. Some of the youth believe the benefits will continue even if they do not defend them.

7. President Nixon is a careful and experienced leader who is fully aware of the dangers, Vice President continued. However, his efforts to gain better communications with our adversaries are being misconstrued by our enemies and misunderstood by some of our friends. The Vice President wished to assure the Prime Minister that the U.S. was not naive and that the President had no intention of giving the game away. Mr. Nixon recognized that the U.S. has the burden and the honor of free-world leadership at this point in history and that to maintain this he must convince significant elements within the U.S. that his course is correct. This major task of persuasion is made more difficult because of certain currents running within the intellectual community and the press. During this difficult time, with all the problems caused by the Vietnam War, the President needed all the support he could get in Congress and among the people.

8. Greek and American goals, the Vice President continued, are the same. We must concentrate on the means by which to achieve these goals. Realizing that the attitudes of some of our mutual allies toward the Communist threat had softened, the paramount requirement is still unity. Criticizing our allies certainly would not help.

9. The Vice President said that his credentials as a friend of Greece were not subject to question both because of his background and philosophy. He had not come to Greece to criticize or intervene in her political affairs. Rather, his primary interest was to determine whether the Prime Minister saw any means of stopping the erosion of support for the NATO Alliance. How do we change the sincere but misguided opposition in Congress to aid, the Vice President asked. How do we persuade our critics that they are wrong? The Vice President assured the Prime Minister that these questions were not posed as criticism of the GOG.

10. Accepting without question the Vice Presidentʼs credentials as a friend of Greece, and respecting his refusal to interfere, Prime Minister said he would love to be able to tell the Vice President and the NATO Allies that Greece would hold elections tomorrow. However, if the elections meant a return to the economic and political stage of 1967, they would have no purpose. There is another course beside elections, the Prime Minister continued, which does not involve the surrender of our principles. Principles were most important. If a man with a gun entered the room and demanded that we throw down our weapons, we would do so unless we felt he threatened the basic principles that guide our existence. Then we would fight. We are now on a course that will lead us eventually to complete implementation of the 1968 Constitution. However, situation is complicated by internal and external factors. If it had not been for shouts of critics in U.S. Congress, Prime Minister continued, martial law would have been lifted everywhere but in Athens and Thessaloniki by now and would have been ended throughout the country by next April. To lift martial law now, however, because of pressure from abroad would be to encourage the critics of Greece, the Communists, and subversive elements.

11. Prime Minister said that he did not believe that any measures he took would end the struggle waged by the liberals outside the country against the Greek Government. Even if he lifted martial law, so-called friends like Representative Hays and Senator Hartke would always find reasons to attack the Greek Government. Faced with this situation, there was no other course but the one he had chosen. Prime Minister wanted personally to assure Vice President and President Nixon that the sincere objective of his government was to stay in power for the shortest possible time. When the revolutionary organization launched their movement, they kissed their children goodbye with a firm belief that they would see them only once again—just before they were shot. The risks were enormous, the Prime Minister said, and they were ready to sacrifice their lives. “Given this background, how can the leaders of Greek Government break oaths, tell lies or act as cowards?”, Prime Minister asked. The only thing that could force the Government out was realization that it was leading Greece astray.

12. Americans and Greeks, Prime Minister said, are tied by common ideals rooted in the traditions of ancient Greece; imagine how the Greek people feel when accused of censorship and detaining large numbers of political prisoners. The U.S. Embassy in Athens knows how many detainees there are. There would be fewer if more would cooperate. Mr. Zygdes⁴ for example has been granted the right to appeal but has refused it. If he appealed, his request would be considered favorably. As for censorship, pick any newspaper and look at it. These lies against us have made us wary of others and liable to withdraw into our shell.

13. Vice President said he was convinced beyond question that the Prime Minister was a sincere patriot. In 1967, “the name Papadopoulos was not exactly a household word,” and some felt he was “the man with the gun” of the earlier anecdote but the people had been reassured when he promised that return to constitutional government would be achieved as soon as conditions would allow. Any student of the 21 months of dissension and instability that characterized Greek history between 1965–67 could see logic behind the sudden events of 1967.

14. A considerable amount of time has passed since then, however, Vice President added. He said he could not question Prime Ministerʼs judgment on when the time would be ripe for the return of constitutional government; however, the difficulty was not so much in what has been done on this score but in “what appears not to have been done.”

15. Vice President knew Papadopoulos as a military man would seek to avoid frontal action when attacking would decimate his forces. Rather, he might think about flanking attacks which would disarm his enemies without great cost and buy time.

16. Prime Minister Papadopoulos had said U.S. leadership was more important than provision of dollars; however, Vice President stated U.S. would remain for the foreseeable future the major source of dollars to underwrite the defense of Greece within NATO. Would not our mutual efforts to strengthen NATO be furthered if Greek domestic policy were rendered less vulnerable to attack? Although he had no concrete measures to suggest, Vice President said he would like to discuss matter in greater detail later, if Prime Minister agreed. If he disagreed and considered this entire subject none of Vice Presidentʼs business, Vice President would understand. However, he was anxious to explore ways that the U.S. and Greece could better understand and help each other, and find ways of persuading critics that the path which Greece was on was correct.

17. Finally, Vice President assured the Prime Minister that he would not use the occasion to embarrass him. He pledged that when he left he would never publicize that he had discussed domestic questions while in Greece. The Vice President repeated that he had found in this discussion a link between the security of NATO and the domestic and the political scene in Greece. He asked again whether there were no measures which the Prime Minister could take which would weaken critics without jeopardizing attainment of his objectives. The Vice President said he had been criticized for coming to Greece because his visit would be seen by many as a sign of support for the present Greek Government. In reality, his deep concern was NATO and the preservation of the Alliance. Anything we could do to strengthen our position would be worthwhile.

18. Prime Minister said that he accepted the Vice Presidentʼs pledge not to announce that he had discussed domestic politics. He would, however, like to talk more about this subject and discuss with the Vice President the strategies and tactics of “flank attacks.” He would be most interested to hear how one could face reasonably an enemy who was deprived of reason.

19. The Vice President said he was most willing to discuss the subject further. He had no concrete solutions but thought a fresh point of view would be helpful. He felt that he and the Prime Minister had established communication without becoming enmired in diplomatic language. They should go on with their talks at an early opportunity.

Participants: Greek—Prime Minister Papadopoulos, Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs Xanthopoulos-Palamas, interpreter; U.S.—Vice President, Mr. Sohmer, General Dunn, Mr. Platt (reporting officer), Mr. Barrington King (Embassy political officer).

Agnew

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 594, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. II 1 Nov 1970–31 Dec 1971. Secret; Nodis.
2. At 10 a.m. that morning the Vice President had been Papadopoulosʼ guest at a briefing on NATO and defense issues at the Greek Pentagon Center. The meeting was reported in telegram Vipto 38 from Athens, October 19. (Ibid.)
3. Telegram Vipto 37 from Athens, October 19, reported: “By mutual agreement Vice President met privately Sunday, October 17 with Prime Minister Papadopoulos at his house for three hours. Earlier meeting in Persepolos with King Constantine main focus of discussion. Substance both conversations will be reported personally.” (Ibid.) Regarding the meeting with the King on October 15 and Papadopoulos on October 17, see Documents 326 and 328. In an October 26 memorandum to the President, Agnew forwarded his observations on the talks and enclosed copies of the memoranda of conversation with the King and with Papadopoulos concerning the Kingʼs future. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1329, NSC Unfiled Material 1971 11 of 12)
4. John Zygdes, a leader of the Center Union Party.