Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972

323. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, September 8, 1971.

SUBJECT

• Straightening Out Our Policy Toward Greece

As a result of Ambassador Tascaʼs two visits in the White House, there is again a confusing set of signals on Greece:

• —The President apparently told Tasca that he wanted him to persuade Papadopoulos to set a date for elections in connection with Vice President Agnewʼs visit.² Tasca went away wondering whether the Presidentʼs policy had changed so that he was now supposed to be pressing the Greeks for major concrete steps toward a democratic government.
• —Your talk with him³ left him with the clear impression that we were not supposed to be beating the Greeks over the head. Since he prefers this policy himself and since it is easier to carry out, the reason for his great pleasure in his talk with you was his relief in feeling that perhaps he had some relief from the pressures of what the President had said.

Now Tasca has sent you the back channel message at Tab B⁴ suggesting a trip by Robert Murphy in early October to make a general pitch to Prime Minister Papadopoulos on taking some convincing action to implement the 1968 constitution before our 1972 elections.

I, at least, am not sure how to put these two positions together. The attached memorandum for the President is one possible way of trying to get these positions into balance.

Recommendation: That you send the memo at Tab A to the President unless you have a more precise sense of what our policy really is. [It may be that it will be better to kill this memo and sort the issue out in connection with a separate memo on the Vice Presidentʼs visit.]⁵

Tab A

Washington, undated.

Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon⁶

SUBJECT

• Policy Toward Greece

After talking with you, Ambassador Tasca has suggested the possibility of a visit to Greece by Robert Murphy. By Tascaʼs design, Murphy would go to Greece ostensibly on a business trip but he would see the Prime Minister and develop the theme that it would be useful if the Prime Minister could take some clear and convincing action to implement the 1968 constitution before the 1972 U.S. elections.

This suggestion brings us back to the familiar question that plagues our Greece policy—what balance should be established between accepting Greece as it is and attempting to move it further to fully constitutional government. We know that our position in our own Congress and in NATO would be made easier if the Greeks were to continue to move. On the other hand, it seems that there is little we can actually do that will budge them on a matter the Greek leadership considers vital to its political survival.

There would be no harm in a Murphy visit if he were simply to explain your general problems. But, if we are really going to go all out to try to trade the Vice Presidentʼs trip for some significant political move, then we must be fairly sure that we have some chance of success. Otherwise, the Vice Presidentʼs trip, along with our general relationship, may be soured.

Since I did not sit in on your meeting with Tasca, I am not sure exactly what you had in mind when you spoke with him. I realize the Vice President thinks he may have some chance of creating a trip for a political move, but I need to know whether this is what you wish to have done or whether you prefer just to let this situation go along fairly much as it is on the assumption that there is little we can do to change it.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 594, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. II 1 Nov 1970–31 Dec 1971. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. A notation by Haig on the memorandum reads: “Hal–OBE. HAK has held.”
2. See Document 320.
3. See Document 321.
4. Tab B, attached but not printed, is backchannel message 1099 from Athens, August 13.
5. Brackets in the original.
6. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Drafted by Saunders and Hoskinson on August 17. A note on the covering memorandum to another copy of this memorandum reads: “Hal [Saunders]—Haig decided memo to the President not necessary but neither could he enlighten me re. what our Greek policy is! I assume memo went to Henry [Kissinger] but I am not absolutely sure. SH [Samuel Hoskinson]” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1264, Saunders Subject Files, Greece 4/1/71–8/31/71)