Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972

289. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State¹

Athens, August 26, 1970, 1746Z.

4723. Ref: State 137363.² Department please pass White House.

1. I saw PriMin Papadopulos last night and discussed with him in detail question of further liberalization measures by GOG. In this context, I referred to greatly improved relations between our two governments as shown by exchange of presidential letters,³ the role of U.S. regarding action by the Council of Europe, our attempt to persuade opposing countries in NATO that DPC report on Greece⁴ should be treated as defense not political issue, as well as efforts in Senate regarding both Pell and Hartke amendments, and finally, imminence of action on military aid issue. I pointed out problem not supply of military aid but totality of relations between administration and Congress and ability of Congress to exert its power at any time on individual issues of high priority to U.S. national interest. I stressed our concern was in consolidating our friendship and that I spoke as friend of PriMin and government. I repeated again we had to take public opinion into account, and GOG should realize their actions of crucial importance insofar as they affected public opinion. I noted President had recently specifically designated Apollo XIII astronauts to visit Greece. Finally, as evidence that U.S. has sought to give positive assistance to creating favorable image for GOG abroad, I added we had made clear to all NATO governments that only way to progress was to work with present Greek Government.

2. Within this context, I reported the Secretary of State and USG very pleased with release of 500 prisoners. We hoped that they would now decree entry into effect of Articles 12, 111, and 112 coupled with a specific statement that remaining “shadow of martial law” removed. I added opinion that combined with release of detainees, such action would sound most convincing note to opposition abroad that new regime here to stay and that progress lay through not against them. It would be especially helpful, I continued, if such an announcement came before the DPC meeting in September. I added that in any event we considered that meeting did not present an insurmountable problem.

3. PriMin began his reply with preface that what he had to say would unfortunately have to be unpleasant.GOG was unable understand U.S. posture, particularly delay of USG in regularizing relations. Resumption of military aid (i.e., suspension of embargo) did not depend on public opinion or action of Congress. It required simple decision by USG. Moreover, USG had been able to conclude an agreement with Franco Spain,⁵ and undertaken Cambodian operation without being blocked by hostile opinion of a minority in Congress. Why had USG hesitated on Greece? Even worse, we had taken the place of Denmark and the Scandinavians in seeking to pressure Greece and to intervene in Greek internal affairs. He asked how Denmark with one regiment could be allowed to exercise so much influence. Did U.S. really care more about Denmark in NATO than Greece? Greece had its public opinion also and if he told Greek people arms, urgently needed for NATO defense, were being withheld by USG because of GOG internal policies, Greek people would be upset with U.S. and react negatively. It was for this reason that he had not to date made arms issue clear to Greek people. If President favored strong relations with Greece, why did he not deal with the minority frankly and straightforward? Bulgaria was building up military strength and gap growing greatly. He was really fighting to move forward toward constitutional government. Did we want him to be replaced through the type of pressure we were exerting? What would take his place? We might have someone else tougher to deal with. Had we really thought this through? PriMin continued that DPC a matter for NATO and that U.S. action on this matter essentially a NATO matter not a bilateral question, since in U.S. interest to keep Greece in NATO. If NATO wished to expel Greece through DPC, then that was decision for its members.

4. As for my specific question, he emphasized there was nothing further to tell USG at this time. When time came for action, he would tell us and Greek people, implying that he would not inform U.S. Government before he told Greek people.

5. In my comments on his lengthy statement, which was made with obvious emotion, I repeated positive aspects our relations, my conviction that we were at a key turning point, and my sincere hope he would understand my comments as coming from a friend conveying a message from President Nixon, the same man who told me last December prior to my departure for Greece that he considered PriMin Papadopoulos a friend of America and his friend and who had expressed his disagreement with action by Council of Europe against Greece. With regard to Denmark, we were in an alliance and it was only natural for U.S. to try to keep alliance together and to eliminate or reduce divisive factors. I asked PriMin again whether he could tell me anything about martial law and Articles 12, 111, 112 of the 1968 Constitution. He said he had nothing more to add and that next move was up to the United States (meaning clearly the elimination of the embargo on arms shipments to Greece). I said we had confidence in PriMin Papadopoulosʼ leadership and that we believed in the constitutional direction he had charted for Greece. Finally, I said that objectively I saw no reasons to doubt there would be further progress along the lines we had discussed earlier and that I was essentially optimistic regarding future developments.

6. Comment: (A) I believe PriMin and new establishment which he leads greatly annoyed with our delay in lifting embargo and decidedly unhappy about what they regard as our initiative in putting pressure on Greece to move forward toward constitutional government. They see us taking on role and all the qualities of the Danes. It is this aspect which they find particularly obnoxious. PriMin obviously under great pressure by the new establishment to take strong position against U.S. at this time (see septel)⁶ regarding internal liberalization, which important members of revolutionary group consider moving far too rapidly. These people are not eager to see a date fixed for elections at this time, nor do they wish to see the King returned, nor are they happy about the release of Communists from prison camps.

(B) As I suggested in my report to the President, the retention of the arms embargo is counter-productive and can only serve to weaken moderate forces within the new establishment. Since the embargo is not favored even by strong internal opposition to the regime, I would hope that we could forthwith eliminate embargo, citing the Senate victory, exigencies in the Middle East, and the implicit obligation of the U.S. not to deprive Greece of arms available and needed to defend itself if attacked by the Warsaw Pact or if obliged to go to the aid of its NATO allies under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, both contingencies which are totally independent of the progress of the present regime back to parliamentary government—a course already accepted as the fixed goal of the GOG.

(C) At this time I should think that our position on lifting of suspension would be largely determined by our assessment of our strategic needs in Eastern Mediterranean. At stake are goodwill and privileged U.S. military position in Greece upon which we now rely heavily. Moreover, as I pointed out in my report to the President, I consider the embargo a hindrance to our efforts to persuade GOG to implement 1968 Constitution. In any event, I have made abundantly clear to GOG importance of Greek constitutional progress to public opinion in the U.S. and NATO.

Tasca

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 593, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. I Jan 69–Oct 70. Secret; Nodis.
2. Telegram 137363 to Athens, August 22, provided instructions for Tasca to use in his discussion about regime liberalization with Papadopoulos. (Ibid.)
3. Apparently a reference to the Nixon–Papadopoulos exchange of letters. See Document 274.
4. For information.
5. Reference is to the cooperation agreement signed August 6. For text, see 21 UST 1667. Documentation is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XLI, Western Europe; NATO, 1969–1972.
6. Tasca reported on “signs of growing tension within the regime” over U.S. pressures in telegram 4724 from Athens, August 27. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 593, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. I Jan 69–Oct 70)