Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972

281. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State¹

Athens, June 12, 1970, 1608Z.

3034. Subject: Meeting with Prime Minister Papadopoulos.

1. I met with Prime Minister Papadopoulos today accompanied by Admiral Richardson,² whom PM expressed desire to see. The PM expressed his fears regarding Soviet intentions in Eastern Mediterranean, particularly possible effort on part of Soviets to open up Suez by driving Israelis back from Canal.PM also said that in his view major target of Soviets in this decade is Africa, particularly North Africa.PM was also concerned that in face of rising Soviet threat cohesiveness of Alliance shows signs of serious weakness as reflected in political attacks on NATO member Greece inspired ultimately by political warfare tactics of Soviets, as well as in increasing weaknesses of military contribution to common defense on northern flank. PM said in reply to Admiral Richardsonʼs expression of appreciation for facilities granted US Navy in Crete that there was no need to mention or even thank Greece for these facilities now. Our interests were common and it was in Greek interest to make these facilities available.

2. In reply we stressed importance of Greek contribution within a strong alliance, whose cohesiveness is indispensable to NATO strength. PM countered by saying that cohesiveness was important but could be purchased at disastrous price if prerequisite for Scandinavians of bringing back Papandreou were to be fulfilled, a possibility which he completely excluded. PM asked where would cohesiveness principle be for Scandinavians if US were to request NATO assistance in extreme contingency arising out of Middle East conflict.

3. I told PM I might be leaving for US in next several days on consultation. He said he would never again raise question of US military assistance because he questioned seriously whether US had the capacity to overcome resistance to aid to Greece, such a denial of aid being a high priority Soviet political warfare objective against the US. Greece would be faithful to the alliance but it would buy to the extent necessary the arms it needed to defend the country against communism, however costly these might be.

4. In reply I noted Presidentʼs deep preoccupation with Vietnam and the repercussions from his great and courageous decision to move against Hanoiʼs forces in Cambodia,³ a problem which would not have arisen had his predecessors acted to move against the use of the Communist sanctuaries to attack our own and allied troops in South Vietnam. I also pointed to the problem of NATO cohesiveness, the maintenance of which is an objective worth supporting. Finally, I stressed again the importance of public opinion in the US, particularly as it affected the Senate.

5. At this point I sought to put question of military aid into perspective, noting our mutual obligations under the Alliance and stating that no country could stand alone. Thus, it most important that we keep strategic aspects of our friendship continuously in foreground. An alliance of free countries required above all patience and understanding for success. This was more important than military requirements, vital as the latter might be.

6. Comment: I found PM deeply friendly as usual towards the US, but clearly depressed by inability of US to act at a time of great danger to the West. His attribution of our inabilities to Soviet political warfare tactics may appear far-fetched, but the fact is he does not understand what he appears to see as our political incapacity to face up to public opinion in face of the growing Soviet threat, while taking into consideration the great dedication of Greece to NATO and even more its friendship with the US, and its status as a country publicly committed to a democratic course. I think we should take very seriously indeed his statement that Greece will purchase arms elsewhere (particularly from France). With French attitude toward the Mediterranean and the Arab-Israeli crisis being what they seem to be, in addition to the other reasons set forth in my report to the President, I fear we may even lose a good deal of the flexibility which we have enjoyed to date in this most friendly country. This is not to mention the loss of bases for the US which are important to the balance of payments equilibrium and currency stability.

7. Request Dept pass this message to USMission NATO.

Tasca

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 593, Country Files, Middle East, Greece, Vol. I. Secret; Exdis. Another copy is ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 GREECE.
2. Admiral David C. Richardson, Commander of the Sixth Fleet.
3. On April 30 President Nixon announced that U.S. forces had entered Cambodia to destroy the North Vietnamese Armyʼs line of communications. The decision set off a serious protest in the United States. For the text of Nixonʼs statement, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1970, pp. 405–410.