Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972

278. Memorandum From the Chairman of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee (Richardson) to President Nixon¹

Washington, May 21, 1970.

SUBJECT

• Resumption of Deliveries of Suspended Military Shipments to Greece

The Under Secretaries Committee has been asked to consider courses of action for carrying out the recommendations in Ambassador Tascaʼs “Report on Greece.”

Background

Last November you instructed Ambassador Tasca to tell the Greek Prime Minister that you were prepared to lift the suspension of all items of military aid.² At the same time our Ambassador was to make clear that movement by the Greek Government toward a constitutional situation would ease our problems in speeding the release of the suspended equipment. Ambassador Tasca was to report the Greek Governmentʼs response, and, following your review and approval, we were to begin to ship the suspended items at a gradual pace beginning with the less dramatic items.

Ambassador Tascaʼs report has now been received (Enclosure No. 1). Ambassador Tasca has also transmitted a letter to you from the Greek Prime Minister (discussed below) which bears on the question of movement toward constitutional normality in Greece.

Ambassador Tascaʼs Report

Ambassador Tasca concludes:

• —that our policy should be based on the assumption that the present regime in Greece is here to stay,
• —that the withholding of military equipment has proved ineffective in accelerating the return to democratic government and is indeed beginning to undermine Greeceʼs strength,
• —that if the United States does not provide Greece with military aid, the Greek Government will turn to other countries to buy the military equipment Greece needs, thus creating logistics problems for the Greeks, and weakening United States ties with the Greek military establishment and government.

We should therefore

—lift the suspension on the delivery of military equipment and continue grant military aid for Greece at an adequate level.

At the same time we should continue to press the Greek regime to return to representative and constitutional government. The regime attaches primary importance to the approbation of the United States and the American people. We should use this far more positive tool in dealing with Athens, rather than the unrelated and counter-productive one of restricting military aid. Forceful, persistent, but friendly persuasion will be our best tactic.

The Ambassador is satisfied that the Greek Government does indeed intend to move forward, albeit at its own often reluctant pace, with its program to implement the constitution and return Greece to a more representative form of government. He also doubts that progress towards representative democracy will be sufficiently dramatic or rapid to satisfy fully Greeceʼs vocal critics here and abroad. Only the fixing of a date for elections would suit them.

Developments in Greece Since November

The Greek Government has taken some positive steps in the direction of the restoration of civil liberties. But the Greek Government has only a very primitive understanding of what it must do to improve its image in Western Europe. It tends to announce measures which would earn it credit at precisely the moment when it is attracting hostile criticism to itself for its arbitrary behavior in suppressing political opposition.

We agree with Ambassador Tasca that the Greek Government does indeed intend to move forward with its program to return Greece to a more representative form of government, though its progress so far is slow and the record is spotty. This conviction is not shared by some of Greeceʼs NATO partners (chiefly the Norwegians, Danes and Dutch) nor, broadly, by certain elements in the Congress, some of whom show intense concern on this question. These critics assert that the Greek Government has retrogressed instead of making progress toward constitutionalism and that the United States (and NATO) should disassociate itself from a regime which has earned so much moral obloquy.

The NATO Problem

Public knowledge in Western Europe of an increase in United States military aid to Greece will damage NATO solidarity and the NATO image, regardless of how the matter is handled tactically.

If the Greek question were to be highlighted by a United States decision to resume heavy military shipments to Greece before the NATO Ministerial Meetings of May 26–27 and June 11, it is very probable that one of the Western European countries, probably one of the Scandinavians with the support of some of the others, would attempt to raise the Greek question, arguing that the question of military assistance to Greece is basically political in nature and that it is not possible to ignore public opinion in their countries on the issue. Even if the Greek question itself did not come before NATO, indirect attacks on Greece could harmfully dominate these two meetings and effectively prevent progress on other matters.

Public opinion in Western Europe generally with respect to Greece has not improved in recent months; and there is already mounting political pressure upon some NATO governments (Norway, Denmark, The Netherlands) to raise the question of Greece in NATO, alleging that the undemocratic nature of the regime is a matter of concern to the Alliance. Together with the British, Germans and Italians we have made démarches in the Scandinavian and Benelux capitals to stress the need to avoid raising Greece in NATO. We are hoping that these démarches will succeed but we cannot be sure.

With respect to NATO, we conclude therefore:

a) The damage to NATO from an increase in United States military aid to Greece can be reduced if the decision is announced after the May and June NATO Ministerial Meetings.

b) Our efforts to further a Spanish link to NATO will be handicapped if consideration of the link comes at a moment when the Greek question is active, simply because of the emphasis the two issues would give to NATOʼs relationship to two “dictatorships.”

c) In order to avoid implying that our NATO partners can share the responsibility for the decision to resume arms shipments, it is better to inform our NATO partners rather than to consult with them since we could never secure a favorable NATO verdict on this question.

d) A disruptive and noisy NATO discussion on the subject of Greece would complicate our Congressional problem by highlighting Greece as a weakness of the Alliance rather than as a positive element.

The Congressional Problem

The problem with Congress raised by the resumption of the shipment of the suspended military equipment is at least of equal gravity, posing a major public relations problem for the Administration vis-à-vis the Congress. Severe emotional attacks both in the Congress and the press are anticipated. It seems inevitable that the decision to lift the suspension of arms shipments will trigger an effort on the part of Congressional critics to restrict the freedom of the Executive through amendment of one or another pieces of legislation then before the Congress. The targets for such action might include the Foreign Assistance Appropriation Act, the Foreign Military Sales Act, and the Second Supplemental Appropriation.

The intensity of public feeling in the United States and among our allies in Western Europe and the consequent impact on the Congress suggests the virtue of a joint State-Defense presentation of the decision on the resumption of arms shipments to the Congressional leadership, augmented by the Chairman and ranking minority members of key committees.

The Prime Ministerʼs Letter

The Greek Prime Minister has transmitted a letter to you (Enclosure No. 2) relating to the restoration of parliamentary government in Greece. The key language in the letter is the Greek Prime Ministerʼs assertion that “the situation is being led with steadfastness toward political normality and parliamentary government on the basis of the November 15 constitution…” In another place the Prime Minister asserts that the “Greek Government has no intention whatsoever to deviate from the full restitution of political normality or to slacken its pace.”

A suggestion for your reply is enclosed at Enclosure No. 3.³

It is not yet clear the degree to which the exchange between you and the Prime Minister can be used to help persuade critics of the regime that the regime does in fact firmly intend to return the country to parliamentary democracy. The effective use of the exchange depends in part on the Prime Ministerʼs willingness to agree to the publication of the text of the two letters or, alternatively, the substance of the letters.

Recommendations

The Under Secretaries Committee recommends:

1. That no announcement be made public concerning the resumption of arms shipments before the NATO Ministerial Meeting and the Meeting of NATO Defense Ministers are behind us (the latter meeting takes place on June 11).

2. That after the June 11 NATO meeting, we will resume the shipment of the arms now withheld (and make a public announcement of our decision) unless it appears that the resumption of arms shipments would seriously jeopardize any of the legislation in the Administrationʼs foreign aid program, and also taking into account other Congressional foreign policy considerations.

3. That Ambassador Tasca be authorized to inform the Greek Prime Minister of the decision along the following lines:

a) that the President was taking him at his word on the question of constitutional reform.

b) that the President is prepared to resume the normal shipment of military equipment to Greece, including all the items which have been suspended.

c) that there is a serious problem with some elements of Congress who are in a position to attack and perhaps to endanger foreign aid legislation which neither the Greek Government nor the United States Government would like to see endangered; this is a fact of political life in the United States which must be recognized.

d) that we will keep the developing Congressional situation under intensive review in order to choose the earliest appropriate moment at which it will be possible to begin the resumption of arms shipments, and to make a public announcement that we are doing so. Asis obvious, premature advance speculation from Greek sources about the Presidentʼs intention to resume arms shipments will necessarily delay the resumption of arms shipments to Greece.

As regards timing, it is proposed:

a) that Ambassador Tasca speak to the Greek Prime Minister in the sense of these instructions promptly after you have authorized Ambassador Tasca to transmit to the Greek Prime Minister your reply to the Prime Ministerʼs letter.

b) that when a decision has been made as to an appropriate time to proceed to resumption of the shipment of the military equipment on the suspended list we would inform selected Members of Congress as well as our NATO partners shortly before the public announcement.

ELR

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 593, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. I Jan 69–Oct 70. Secret; Nodis. A handwritten notation reads: “Haig—FYI action—Saunders Info—HAK.” The enclosures are attached but not printed here. Enclosure 1, Ambassador Tascaʼs report, is Document 273; Enclosure 2, Papadopoulosʼ letter to President Nixon, is Document 275. Ambassador Tasca was informed of the recommendations of the Under Secretaries Committee in telegram 82138 to Athens, May 28. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 593, Country Files, Middle East, Greece, Vol. I) See also Document 277.
2. See Document 262.
3. Not found.