Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972

261. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

• Military Supply Policy on Greece

Attached is a paper on Greece cleared by the members of the NSC Review Group.² It details the issues and arguments fairly.

The situation. The Johnson Administration after the April 1967 coup suspended shipment of major military aid items. Equipment valued at $52.6 million remains suspended. However, a flow of $165 million in basic items has continued—about $100 million in grant aid. The suspension was paralleled by the ambassadorʼs urging the military government to move as quickly as possible back to constitutional government. The suspension of major items has slowed the modernization of Greeceʼs armed forces, although it is far from being a “cut-off” of military aid. The government has moved gradually in implementing its new constitution but still has not set a date for elections.

Your first choice is whether to continue present policy—suspension of $50 million in major items, continuation of lesser items—or to remove the suspension.

The argument for continuing present policy: It enables the US to continue basic supplies to a NATO partner while maintaining a semblance of disapproval for Congressional purposes and to maintain a bridge to a succeeding representative government.

The argument for removing the suspension: The Greek government is becoming increasingly annoyed with present policy. At the same time, we are becoming increasingly dependent on Greek bases. The main purpose of our military aid is to preserve our access to those bases.

If you wish to remove the suspension, there are two options (detailed at black tabs in Review Group paper; pros and cons attached to this memo);³

A. Tacit “quid pro quo” policy. Tasca would say that Greek movement toward a constitutional situation would make it easier for you to remove the suspension. He would not link release of equipment with specific liberalizing steps. But as the government took steps, we would quietly release suspended items.

B. Resumption of normal military shipments. Tasca would tell Papadopoulos we were resuming full military aid in expectation that the government will re-establish genuine democratic forms as soon as possible. Publicly we would stress the overriding importance of US security interests while saying we will keep urging return to democracy.

The following views have been stated in the course of my review:

• —Secretary Rogers (next memo)⁴ believes that, before deciding to resume full military deliveries, Tasca should try to persuade the government to take some steps toward political reform. Tasca should say that the US would like to resume full shipments but this is not possible unless the government improves its image. He suggests awaiting Tascaʼs report before deciding.
• —Defense favors full resumption while recognizing the desirability of managing this move to put the best possible public face on it and even to enhance the ambassadorʼs influence in urging further progress toward constitutional processes.
• —The Vice President suggests releasing some suspended items to show good faith and then asking the government to make some liberalizing moves to help minimize criticism both in the US Congress and among our NATO allies. He has learned informally through continuing, high-level contacts in the Greek-American community that Papadopoulos appears willing to give you secretly a schedule for reform, including a tentative date for elections.⁵

The issue is the degree to which release of the suspended items is made conditional on further Greek steps in implementing the constitution. Secretary Rogersʼ approach—while skirting a clear decision now—could give the Greeks the impression that we are making the release conditional. Defense and the Vice President lean toward unconditional release, while still trying to get some constitutional movement in return.

My solution would be to weave these options together to release the suspended equipment without condition but urge the government to make some moves to improve the public atmosphere for our action. It is the issue of conditional release which most alienates the Greek government.

Recommendation: That you authorize the following course of action which I would record in a decision memorandum:

1. Authorize Tasca to tell Papadopoulos he is prepared to discuss the resumption of normal military shipments, including suspended items.

2. Instruct Tasca to explain privately that you understand Papadopoulosʼ political problems and applaud his intentions to move to fully representative government as quickly as possible. You remain interested in his plans.

3. Instruct Tasca to say that movement toward a constitutional situation would ease US political problems in releasing the suspended equipment. [But this linkage is not a condition.]⁶

4. The US would, after Ambassador Tascaʼs report of the governmentʼs response and your approval, begin shipping the suspended items gradually beginning with the smaller and avoiding a dramatic resumption.

5. After your approval, the following public line would be taken: Overriding US security interests were the principal factor in our decision. The US will continue urging the government to move toward a constitutional situation.

6. Tasca would attempt to develop a relationship with the government that would permit him to exercise influence for democratic reform and a relationship with the civilian political leaders that would maintain a bridge to possible future leadership.⁷

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1235, Saunders Chronological Files, Greek Military Supply 1/20/69–12/31/69. Secret;Nodis. Sent for action.
2. Document 257.
3. Attached but not printed. The pros and cons of the two options are identical to those listed under Options 1 and 2 in Document 257.
4. Document 260.
5. In a November 7 memorandum to Kissinger, Saunders noted the Vice Presidentʼs contacts with various figures in the “Greek community” and recommended that Kissinger brief him personally on the Presidentʼs decision on military aid. “The choice is probably between his getting some mileage with his contacts and Tasca being the bearer of the Presidentʼs decision. I recommend splitting the difference—asking the Vice President to hold off until Tasca has touched down in Athens and then telling his contacts simultaneously with Tascaʼs first appointment with Papadopoulos.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1235, Saunders Chronological Files, Greek Military Supply 1/20/69–12/31/69)
6. Brackets in the original.
7. Nixon initialed the approval option on November 11.