Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972

238. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Yugoslavia¹

Washington, July 25, 1972, 0211Z.

134026. Subject: Secretaryʼs Talk With Tito: Part II of IV.

1. At the start of the business session, Secretary Rogers thanked the President for receiving him, apologizing for the intrusion on his time on the same weekend when he had just received the President of India.² Tito indicated there was no need to apologize and that he welcomed the Secretary.

2. US Relations With USSR and China: The Secretary said that he and Secretary Tepavac had talked extensively the previous day³ and he did not wish to repeat their discussion. However, he said, President Nixon had asked him to come to Yugoslavia to assure President Tito that we had made no agreements with the USSR behind the backs of our friends.

Tito said the Soviets had said the same thing.

The Secretary referred to the Moscow Declaration of Principles and the Communiqué⁴ and indicated they contained many points that can serve to assist in a CSCE.

Tito said that Brezhnev had said that we had agreed to start a CSCE.

The Secretary responded in the affirmative, indicating that exploratory talks could start in November or December with a conference in 1973. He asked if Brezhnev had said anything about a fight on GDR participation in the conference.

Tito said that Brezhnev had indicated that both Germanys should be represented at the conference. The Yugoslavs, he said, think this might not be too difficult to achieve once we see how the dialogue between the two Germanys develops. He added that most Europeans want both Germanys to attend.

3. The Secretary asked if Tito had any questions to raise with him about the summit.

Tito replied that the Soviets had told him that we were disposed to cooperate and avoid competition. They had also said that we agreed on the need for a political settlement in the Middle East. Both the Soviets and the Yugoslavs believe that the US should put more pressure on Israel to be more flexible. He said that it is his personal impression that there may be some evolution in American policy on Israel after the U.S. elections. Moreover, there are rumors in Israel that responsible people there say that if the U.S. put pressure on Israel it would give. So, he said, the “key is in your hands.”

The Secretary responded that we always hear that.

4. The Secretary then gave President Tito the letter he had carried from President Nixon.⁵ President Tito read it, referred to his correspondence with the President and expressed his appreciation.

The Secretary said that President Nixon has no higher regard for any leader than he has for President Tito. He stressed that President Nixon took fully into account Yugoslav policies at the summit and sought to assure that nothing happened there that would be adverse to Yugoslav interests. Moreover, the President wanted to assure this point with the Soviets in writing and this was done in the Declaration of Basic Principles, particularly in points 3 and 11. The Secretary asked that these be translated for President Tito. He noted that the U.S. had insisted on the inclusion of the word “all” rather than just using the word “countries” alone. The resulting language is more specific than any previous formulation. They “recognize the sovereign equality of all states.”

5. Tito said all this has helped with the Soviets. When he was in Moscow the Soviets agreed about Yugoslav sovereignty. There was no problem when it was discussed. There was no request for bases in Yugoslavia.

The Secretary asked if this last trip to Moscow was better than previous trips.

Tito said much better. Many things were clarified. They accepted “us as we are. They want good relations with us.” We are now seeking, he said, to better our economic relations. We now have a balanced trade of $700 million. We can sell in the USSR what we canʼt sell in Western markets. The West wants only to sell, not to buy.

6. The Secretary asked Tito to comment on the future of the USSR and leadership problems. He noted that at the time of the summit we detected problems internally in the leadership but could not define what they were.

Tito said that the strongest man is Brezhnev and that he will continue to be so in the future. He is also taking more and more interest in foreign policy. The policies of the USSR in recent years have been those of Brezhnev and he has sought support for them within the leadership.

The Secretary noted that Kosygin did all the talking at the summit on trade and economic matters but that Brezhnev handled all else. The Secretary asked about the younger leaders, noting that Polyansky and Mazurov seemed to be strong.

Tito said both have prospects.

The Secretary noted that few in the leadership have traveled abroad and few have been in the U.S.

7. Tito asked for the Secretaryʼs impressions of the USSR, aside from the summit meeting “where no great conclusions were reached” and particularly about the future of U.S.-USSR relations.

The Secretary said that the most important agreement reached was on Strategic Arms Limitation (SALT). It means that neither side will be tempted to start a nuclear war because neither side can defend its population.

Tito said that the Soviets had said the same. It is important that both agree on this.

Continuing, the Secretary noted that neither side can violate the agreement without detection because it takes too long to build an ABM system.

When Tito said that agreement permitted defense of the capitals and one ICBM base, the Secretary responded that the only reason for this aspect is political. It has little significance. We had two ABM sites under construction. The Soviets had one around their capital. But neither defense of the capital or of an ICBM site has any significance because a nuclear attack upon either Moscow or Washington would be successful regardless of an ABM system. What this all means is that both sides realize that if either launches a nuclear attack, the other would be destroyed by retaliatory strikes.

Tito indicated that this is clear.

The Secretary noted that the continued buildup in offensive systems on both sides will be largely political to assure that neither side has an advantage. However, when you talk of advantage you must take into account destructive ability. The U.S. now has an overall numerical superiority in warheads. The Soviets will build up over the next five years and approach our level. But this still does not change the basic conclusion, the Secretary said. And it may be that in phase II of SALT talks we can get a further limitation of offensive weapons. This would save both sides a bit of money.

8. However, the Secretary continued, starting with the premise that neither side can start a war, U.S. relations with the USSR should improve as we go along. He said we believe that the Russians are concerned about the Chinese and would like better relations with us so as not to be concerned about us. The Russians are also worried about consumer goods for their people. They look at Yugoslavia and know that they are behind in this area. Therefore, they want to develop greater ability to produce consumer goods and think the U.S. can help them. They have raw materials the U.S. needs and the U.S. could be a good market for them if better relations develop.

Tito said that the economic and political are connected together. The Secretary noted, however, that as things open up, the Soviets will have more problems. They know that, but we are not sure how they will cope with them.

9. Tito indicated that there is a mutual fear in USSR-Chinese relations so that out of this fear for each other both look for good relations with the U.S. He said that the Soviets have no intention to threaten the Chinese but the problem is territories which the Chinese want.

When the Secretary asked if it wasnʼt more than that, Tito responded by saying it also included ideological factors. The Chinese are penetrating areas in Asia and Africa. There are several elements involved as China more and more becomes a key power. Moreover, the Chinese have had good results. They participated last year in the Zagreb Trade Fair, displaying electronics which they are developing for use in atomic weapons.

Tito agreed that the Chinese had started far behind as a poor country and so they want to get ahead. Like the USSR, they need consumer goods. But in the USSR, industry is badly in need of modernization.

The Secretary noted that it was interesting that the U.S. got along better with both the USSR and China than they do with each other. Tito noted that this is because the USSR and China are neighbors.

The Secretary indicated that each is competing for position in the socialist world and each is worried about the other in terms of territory. However, the Chinese are more worried about the Russians because they fear that the USSR will use the territories problem to terrorize the Chinese and eventually seize upon it as an excuse for actually taking over the disputed territories.

Tito said both must develop and neither has any need for additional territory. However, he noted that there seems to be some contact between them now. When the Secretary said that this was an encouraging development since Tito had last discussed it with President Nixon, Tito responded that in improved relations there are opportunities for avoiding catastrophe.

Rogers

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, ORG 7 S. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Springsteen (EUR) on July 9 and approved in S/S. Repeated to Moscow. A brief summary of the talks and detailed reports on the other portions of the discussion covering the CSCE and the Mediterranean and the Middle East were reported respectively in telegrams 134025, 134027, and 134028 to Belgrade. (Ibid.)
2. President V.V. Giri, who met with Tito July 22–23.
3. A memorandum of conversation of Secretary Rogersʼs discussion with Foreign Minister Tepavac on July 8 is contained in telgrams 770 and 771 from Dublin, July 12. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 953, VIP Visits, Secretary of Stateʼs Visit to Mid-East and European Countries, 28 June–7 Jul 72)
4. For text, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1972, pp. 633–642.
5. A copy of the July 18 letter is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 766, Presidential Correspondence 1969–1974, Yugoslavia, Pres. Tito Corres.