Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972

213. Telegram From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon¹

Belgrade, July 7, 1972, 1755Z.

Secto 198/3307. For the President from the Secretary. My visit to Romania reaffirmed the wisdom of your decision to visit there in 1969² and to have Ceausescu come to Washington in 1970.³ The welcome of the President and the Foreign Minister was most warm and cordial and they seized upon this first visit by an American Secretary of State to further US-Romanian relations. We advanced that relationship by signing for the first time in 191 years a consular convention with Bucharest.⁴ We also took steps to ease entry requirements, to permit greater travel freedom to Romanian diplomats in the U.S., and to speed consideration of loans by the EX–IM Bank.

Both the Foreign Minister and the President stressed in strong terms their wish for action by the administration on MFN for Romania. They understand our difficulties but urged that receipt of MFN is essential to the further improvement of our relations.⁵

I saw President Ceausescu for almost four hours. The first two with a small group of advisers present were spent on Vietnam.⁶ I will want to talk to you about this conversation when I return because I believe it may have considerable significance.⁷

I then met privately with the President where I reviewed your Moscow trip and other matters.⁸

The President and his government attach great importance to their relations with us and were appreciative that you took fully into account in Moscow their interest in maintaining equal sovereign power regardless of their social system or Pact membership.

Rogers

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 953, VIP Visits, Secretary of Stateʼs Visit to Mid-East and European Countries. Secret; Priority; Nodis.
2. See Documents 178, 183, and 184.
3. See Document 199.
4. For text of the convention, see 24 UST 1317.
5. Telegram 4011 from Rome, July 12, contained a memorandum of Rogersʼs conversation with Manescu on July 6, in which the two discussed MFN in some detail. The telegram reads in part: “The Secretary … provided a detailed exposition of the status of MFN legislation for Romania, referring to his recent discussion of the matter with Ambassador Bogdan in Washington. As a consequence of that meeting, the Secretary had talked with Chairman Mills who thought the prospects were ‘dim’ in the period before the elections…. He explained that because of strong protectionist sentiment in an election year, riders of a protectionist nature would be attached making passage doubtful or the Presidentʼs veto necessary. The Secretary expressed his confidence that passage could be secured after the elections…. Manescu said that the Secretaryʼs presentation and the practical problems arising from our balance of payments difficulties and the closeness to elections were understood.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, ORG 7 S)
6. Telegram 133193 to Bucharest, July 22, contains a memorandum of Rogersʼs July 6 conversation with Ceausescu on Vietnam. (Ibid.)
7. Nixon, accompanied by Kissinger, met with Rogers on the morning of July 15. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, Presidentʼs Daily Diary)
8. Telegram 2666 from Bucharest, July 31, contained an account of Rogersʼs July 6 discussion with Ceausescu provided by Romanian interpreter Sergiu Celac. The telegram reads in part: “Secretary explained bilateral agreements reached in Moscow, and emphasized that they did not prejudice rights of other countries not represented at Moscow talks. He alluded to statement of basic principles and said that declarations included here should help promote U.S. and Romanian interest in equal rights for all states, respect for sovereignty, and non-interference in internal affairs. Ceausescu said he had read Moscow documents with care; he saw that U.S. and USSR had given each other certain undertakings in nuclear weapons field, but for middle and smaller powers there was no commitment by great powers not to use nuclear weapons against them. Secretary replied that perhaps something to take care of this concern could be worked into a declaration on use or threat of force to be considered at CSCE.” (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 703, Country Files—Europe, Romania, Vol. IV Jan 1972—)