Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972

198. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, September 1, 1970.

SUBJECT

• The Visit to the U.S. of Romanian President Ceausescu

The Romanian Foreign Minister has advised us confidentially that President Ceausescu has decided to attend the U.N. General Assembly in New York, perhaps in time to address the G.A. on October 19 or 20. Following that, Ceausescu would like to confer with you in Washington, and then spend 4–5 days in a private visit to the U.S. Accompanied by his wife and one of his children, Ceausescu would like to go to the West Coast, visit a leading university and one or more industrial plants.

It is significant that Ceausescu considers it an acceptable risk at this point in his balancing act to undertake an extended visit to the U.S. He has just recently returned from a Warsaw Pact meeting in Moscow² (related to the FRG-Soviet treaty) where he was able to give the impression of at least basic loyalty to the Soviets. He has also been careful to continue cultivation of the other half of the communist camp, for example, his Defense Minister has recently returned from an extremely cordial visit to Peking and Pyongyang. In the latter part of September, Ceausescu is scheduled to visit neutral Austria. In short, he may feel that, with this ground work, he can afford to make a foray into the U.S. as part of his efforts to further delineate Romaniaʼs more symmetrical role.

In addition, Ceausescu probably considers that the attendance at the U.N. General Assembly of the heads of most of the Warsaw Pact governments provides him with adequate cover for his own visit. If Kosygin were to meet with you, this would offer Ceausescu even more protection. He can be expected in any event to underscore the “private” nature of the post-U.N. portion of his stay in the U.S.

In bilateral terms, Ceausescuʼs visit is certainly intended clearly to signal his interest in continuing the enhancement of relations so dramatically advanced by your visit last year. (When informing us of Ceausescuʼs decision, the Romanian Foreign Minister made special efforts to stress that the decision was taken independently of any decisions by Pact members, and we were being given advance and confidential information since the decision was not yet known to others in the Romanian establishment.) Though Ceausescu wishes expressly to confer with you on the Middle East and Asia (and will certainly press for a conference on European Security), his main emphasis will be on trade, economics and science. He will be seeking more tangible evidence of the direct and immediate benefits to Romania in return for the risk he is taking in these special dealings with the U.S. The Romanians have hinted lately that they expected higher levels of trade during the past year, and of course they continue to harbor hopes that some means will be found around the legislative restrictions which prevent credits and other incentives to greatly expanded trade opportunities.

This will be Ceausescuʼs first visit to the U.S., and he has said that he wants to see capitalism in action. While the impressions he acquires will obviously not result in any dramatic shift in the Romanian system, he should be offered a good exposure to American institutions and society. Precautions will have to be taken to avoid potential incidents by Romanian émigrés and others, for Ceausescu is not the usual sort of foreign guest. (I have asked the State Department to prepare suggested itineraries.) Special care will have to be taken to ensure that his visit runs along the narrow route between over dramatization (which could cause him trouble, and arouse Soviet sensitivities) and inadequate exposure which would fail to exploit the visit for our own best interests.

You had earlier indicated that you wanted Ceausescu to come to Washington during the U.N. meeting and that you would host a small dinner for him. His very tentative schedule calls for him to deliver an address before the General Assembly on October 19 or 20, then come to Washington, and then spend 4–5 days touring the U.S. In informing us of this planning, the Foreign Minister asked for any suggestions we would make regarding this program.

I think it best to ask Ceausescu to come to Washington after the final U.N. ceremonies are completed on October 24 when most, if not all, of the heads of government have gone home. In any event, your meeting with him should follow a possible summit with the Soviets at a decent interval. Therefore, I recommend that we reply to the Romanians along the following lines:

• —That you are delighted at the prospect of seeing Ceausescu in Washington;
• —Due to the complications of the presence of so many heads of government in the U.S. during the week preceding the October 24 celebration, we would prefer to arrange Ceausescuʼs visit to Washington after the ceremonies are completed;
• —Assuming that he wishes to attend the final observances at the U.N. on October 24, you would be pleased to host a small black tie dinner for him on October 26 or 27.

Recommendation

That you approve a response to the Romanian inquiry along the above lines.³

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 936, VIP Visits, Romania, Ceausescu Visit. Secret. Sent for action. A handwritten note on the first page by Kissinger reads: “Al—Note P[resident] comment.” Haig wrote: “Sonnenfeldt/Downey informed.”
2. August 20.
3. The President initialed the approval option; in a handwritten comment he added: “But give us more leeway—Tell him we are in the middle of a campaign & will arrange a date before or after his trip around the country—we will give him a firm date sometime around Sept 20.”