185. Editorial Note
On his return from his visit to Romania with President Richard Nixon, Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger stopped in Paris on August 4, 1969, for talks with French Prime Minister Jacques Chaban-Delmas and President Georges Pompidou. Among the topics discussed was Nixonʼs visit to Romania. Kissinger characterized the public reaction to the Presidentʼs visit in his talks with Chaban-Delmas:
“The Romanian visit was characterized first by the overwhelming warmth of the reception accorded President Nixon. It was clear of course that this reception was in part inspired and staged by the government. But even if the reception had been a 100 per cent artificial one [Page 456] created by the government, it would still remain an extraordinary sign of the independence of the Romanian government vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. However, a second element in the reception gave it an added dimension. The second element was the emotional, joyful, human quality of the reception. It is difficult if not impossible, as Dr. Kissinger pointed out, for any government to create an emotional response by thousands of people. Yet, in fact, the streets of Romania were lined with hundreds of thousands of people at all times waiting for a mere glimpse of the Presidential automobile. They did not merely line up along the boulevards coming in from the airport, nor only around the guest house where the President stayed, but they waited hour by hour for the mere appearance of the President anywhere. Thousands stood in the rain for hours. These manifestations seemed impossible for a government to create simply by fiat, so that the first impression of the Nixon entourage was the Romanian people welcomed in an emotional way this first chance to greet the President of a nation which for many of them still stands, as it did in the 19th century, as a symbol of democracy and freedom of the individual.”
After Kissinger described in general terms the various discussions in Romania, he asked Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council staff to “describe the conversations between the various advisors”:
“Sonnenfeldt said that a number of bilateral questions were discussed between the advisors. First of all the subject of a new consular convention. Secondly, there was discussion of the landing rights and connections for airlines serving the United States and Romania. And third, there was discussion of the Most Favored Nation treatment which the Romanians would like to receive from the United States. Sonnenfeldt said there was no agreement reached on any of these items but that the two governments did agree to continue talking on each of the three points.
“The second area of discussion among the advisors was the Middle East. Assistant Secretary Sisco outlined the American position for the Romanians and we found nothing new in the Romanian responses on the Middle East.
“Third, at the meeting of advisors there was a general review of the Nixon Administrationʼs approach to Asian policy, to the SALT talks, and to European issues in general. But there were no conclusions reached between the two groups on these points except that both agreed that results on specific issues were preferable to a large-scale conference on European problems.
“In general both Kissinger and Sonnenfeldt stated that there was nothing new in the Romanian positions expressed to the United States, however both Kissinger and Sonnenfeldt agreed that Romania believes that its ultimate protection against the USSR is helped most by a [Page 457] progress of East-West conferences and negotiations because they feel that in a situation of détente the Soviets would be inhibited.” (Memorandum of conversation, August 4; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 675, Country Files—Europe, France, Vol. III Jan 69–31 Oct)
The same day, Kissinger met with President Pompidou. After a brief discussion of Vietnam, Kissinger gave Pompidou his impressions from the Presidentʼs visit to Romania. He “started by observing that some critics who seemed to support the interest of the USSR more than even the USSR supports its own interests have repetitiously claimed that President Nixonʼs trip would be an empty enterprise. They characterized the trip as a mere publicity stunt lacking in any substance whatsoever. Dr. Kissinger observed that this certainly was not true in light of the actual record of results. He then repeated for President Pompidou the presentation which he gave to Chaban-Delmas in which Dr. Kissinger described two separate meetings—one of principals and the other of advisors, and the agendas of both of those meetings. Dr. Kissinger described the Romanian leaders as tough, unsentimental, and nationalistic. The only point Dr. Kissinger made in addition to those told to Chaban-Delmas was the fact that in President Nixonʼs discussions with the Romanians, European issues as such were never raised. NATO, for example, never came up. Pompidou asked whether President Nixonʼs visit increased the prospects of a Russian invasion either in our minds or in the minds of the Romanians. Dr. Kissinger replied that that question had never been raised by the Romanians, but that the Romanians had volunteered the information that they would fight if a Czechoslovakian-type invasion were attempted. The Romanians, according to Dr. Kissinger, were uneasy about any potential US–USSR deal under which peace would be achieved in Eastern Europe at the expense of other European countries. On this point Dr. Kissinger said the Romanians and the US had no disagreement whatsoever. Therefore, the Romaniansʼ uneasiness was unfounded.
“Pompidou then asked whether we anticipated any relaxation on East-West trade, and he asked further whether there was any Nixon Administration position or principle concerning the Most-Favored-Nation doctrine. Dr. Kissinger responded that with respect to East-West trade the US wants to deal with each Eastern European country on the basis of their political acts vis-à-vis the US, i.e., we are not adopting generalized positions on East-West trade. Dr. Kissinger added with respect to the Most-Favored-Nation doctrine that the Nixon Administration is not in a position at this time to take any action because of the law which states that any nation trading with or helping North Vietnam cannot receive Most-Favored-Nation treatment. As long, therefore, as the war in Vietnam continues and the East European countries help North Vietnam, the Nixon Administration cannot take any actions with [Page 458] respect to the Most-Favored-Nation doctrine in Eastern Europe. He added that with respect to Romania, we have agreed to review our policy on export licenses; we have agreed to send a scientific team to Romania to improve the exchange of scientific information and personnel. We have also agreed to review the applications already made by Romania to join certain international organizations.
“Pompidou then asked whether this Romanian trip will be followed by other Nixon trips to other Eastern European countries. Dr. Kissinger responded by saying that no trips outside the United States are planned for the remainder of this year. Secondly, Dr. Kissinger said that the only unequivocal Eastern European invitation now outstanding is one from Yugoslavia to which President Nixon has responded by agreeing to go there during his first term in office. The precise dates for such a visit have not been decided.
“Pompidou then stated that France approves of the Nixon visit to Romania, and that in his judgment the Romaniansʼ popular response is explained first of all because it was government inspired and government controlled, and secondly, because it demonstrates the Romanian taste for Western culture and their desire for economic freedom. Therefore, the warmth of the reception is most reassuring, but it is also very dangerous. Pompidou went on to say that he thinks the same change is taking place in Hungary. Dr. Kissinger then said that he agreed with President Pompidou and asked whether Pompidou thinks that the USSR might increase its friendliness with the US in Eastern Europe. “President Pompidou then wondered why it is timely for the USSR, France, England and the United States to be talking about Berlin. Dr. Kissinger said we are not pushing hard.” (Memorandum of conversation, August 4; ibid.)