Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972

135. Letter From the Ambassador to Poland (Stoessel) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Hillenbrand)¹

Warsaw, February 25, 1970.

Dear Marty:

I am writing you in connection with the Oder-Neisse issue. I do so with some hesitation, since it is a subject deeply involved with our German policy, on which you are the expert; also, I realize that I probably am not fully aware of Washingtonʼs current thinking on the problem and what may already have been passed to Bonn confidentially on this score. Nevertheless, I hope you will bear with me if I convey some of my own thoughts about the Oder-Neisse question, which is the key point in the Polish-FRG political talks.

In brief, I am concerned that in our attitude (expressed in some detail in State 017691 of February 5²) we may be giving too much emphasis to the legal aspects of the frontier question—particularly the reservation of our own legal prerogatives—to the possible detriment of achieving a solution of this long-standing and important issue.

I appreciate, of course, that it is essential that we retain our rights in respect to Berlin, which stem from victory in World War II and the various post-war accords, notably the Potsdam Agreement.³ However, the status of the Oder-Neisse line does not appear to be of such vital importance to the U.S. interest, except as it may derive from Potsdam and its solution may affect Potsdam. I therefore feel we should approach the idea of an agreement settling the Oder-Neisse question with as positive an attitude as possible and demonstrate as much flexibility in handling it as we can.

From what I know of the current FRG attitude on the Oder-Neisse issue, it appears to coincide with ours, i.e., a “final solution” of the problem must await a peace treaty and the Four Powers must consent to any boundary settlement. However, my fear is that this may not—and probably will not—be sufficient to obtain an agreement with Poland, since I anticipate that the Poles will insist on a definitive agreement which does not mention any peace treaty to be held in the future.

This situation could well lead to a deadlock and to the ultimate failure of the Polish-FRG talks. Such an outcome, I would imagine, would have an adverse impact on Brandtʼs ostpolitik and conceivably could be a serious blow to his political fortunes in the FRG, although I am in no position to pass judgment on that. So far as Poland is concerned, a failure of the Polish-FRG talks would clearly be a setback for Gomulka, and might be an important factor in causing him to lose his present position. While this at first glance might seem no great loss for the U.S., I think it is at least questionable whether a new Polish leadership, succeeding to power in the aftermath of a breakdown of the efforts aimed at normalizing Polish-FRG relations, would be better for our interests than a continuation of Gomulkaʼs reign.

A number of other aspects could also be cited, of course, in favor of an agreement on this issue, including its contribution to stability in this part of the world and the likelihood that over the long term an agreement would lessen Soviet influence over Poland. We have gone into these aspects in previous reporting, and I will not repeat the details here. In sum, however, I feel strongly that we have a stake in seeing a successful outcome of the Polish-FRG talks on the Oder-Neisse.

What I would like to suggest is that, if it comes to a point of impasse between Poland and the FRG over the form of an accord on the Oder-Neisse, we should be prepared in advance to use our influence with the FRG to help find a way out of the impasse.

For example, why couldnʼt we in fact go along with a Polish-FRG treaty which—along the lines of the Belgian-FRG border agreement—would state that the Oder-Neisse border is considered as final between the two contracting parties? Such an agreement in itself would not make reference to an eventual peace treaty. However, as in the case of the Belgian treaty, the Allies would then come forward with notes of consent as required by the Bonn Conventions. (L in its Memorandum of December 10, 1969, page 10 and following pages, has described this procedure clearly.)⁴ This should establish for the record our continued view that the final determination of the boundaries of Germany as a whole must await a peace settlement. Brandt, of course, could make use of these Allied notes in securing Bundestag approval for a treaty, but he would not have to stress them to the Poles.

I am aware, of course, that the Oder-Neisse problem differs from the Belgian-FRG border question in many ways, not least in the political importance of the territory involved and the fact that the temporary nature of the Oder-Neisse line is specifically mentioned in the Potsdam Treaty. However, I wonder if, in the interests of obtaining Polish-FRG agreement, which could bring so many benefits in its train, we should not try to overlook these differences and treat it in fact like the Belgian case.

I would imagine that we would find support from the British and French for this line of action. Indeed, I fear that if we are not prepared to move in a direction along these lines, we may find ourselves isolated in the future from our Allies. This could include, I believe, the FRG itself, for the time may come when Bonn may wish to give up strict adherence to legalities in an effort to reach a solution with Poland. I suggest that it would be well to prepare for such an eventuality and to take the lead in finding a solution which, while perhaps falling short of our ideal position, would still preserve the essentials of what we want.

In addition to the “Belgian route,” which would preserve for the legal record our Potsdam prerogatives, and after bilateral FRG-Polish agreement, another helpful move in promoting an Oder-Neisse solution would be to have the three Western powers declare (as they did at Potsdam with regard to the Soviet border in East Prussia) that they would support at a future peace conference the agreement reached between Poland and the FRG. This, I can imagine, would be even trickier from the legal standpoint than the Belgian formula, and would also require careful formulation and coordination with Britian and France; but it could be of real help as a specific step to relieve regional tensions, and I do not see that it would damage our interests.

In all aspects of the Polish-FRG negotiations, the influence of the Soviet position is undeniable, and at the same time difficult to define precisely with regard to the various areas of negotiation. I do feel, however, that a good possibility exists that, almost regardless of the outcome of the Soviet-FRG talks, the Poles probably have a relatively free hand to work out an agreement on the Oder-Neisse, so long as it can be described as “definitive.” The actual timing of signature of such an accord might well be subject to some delay in the event of a breakdown of the Soviet-FRG talks, but I believe it would eventually take place.

Forgive me for running on so long on this question, and also if I am belaboring a dead horse or am all wrong—perhaps because of a “parochial view”—on the policy involved. I do feel it is important to move soon, while the political conjuncture in Poland and the FRG appears propitious, to an Oder-Neisse accord. And I would hope that we would neglect no opportunity to make such an accord possible, sacrificing, if necessary, some of our legal desiderata in the process if they are not absolutely essential.

While the FRG seems to be moving along well at present, and I know we do not wish to press unnecessarily, it may be that the FRG will need some encouragement before long as to ways of finding an Oder-Neisse accord, and I trust that Brandt, when he comes to Washington if not before, will receive such encouragement from us.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Russ Fessenden in Bonn for his information and possible comment. Elliot Richardson may also be interested in our views, but I will leave that to your discretion.⁵

With very best personal regards,

As ever,

Walt

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 32–3 GER–POL. Secret; Limdis. A copy was sent to Fessenden at the Embassy in Bonn.
2. Telegram 017691 to Warsaw, February 5, is ibid., DEF 4 EUR.
3. See footnote 9, Document 130.
4. Not found.
5. On March 16 Fessenden responded in a letter to Stoessel: “The present phase [in the talks between the FRG and Poland] is one of exactingly fine work in developing formulas and exchanging language on the Oder-Neisse. I am almost more confident of the ability of both sides to come to an agreed formulation on this point than I am about the possibility of inclusion of wider points in the agreement like benefits for ethnic Germans in Poland. These are the issues in which the CDU [the opposition party] is now placing great stress. This, not the U.S. position, is the big problem for Brandt….I donʼt think … that there is any practical necessity for us to try to bring influence to bear on Brandt in this matter [i.e., the Oder-Neisse line]. Nor do I believe we should be in a position of appearing to force his hand…. For us to intervene could even run the risk of getting us involved in the middle of a hot German internal political issue.” (Department of State, EUR/CE Files: Lot 85 D 330, Box 9, Chrons (1969)—Letters (Outgoing))