Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXVIII, Southern Africa

203. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Zurich, September 6, 1976, 8:30 a.m.–12:06 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• South Africa:
  • Balthazar Johannes Vorster, Prime Minister
  • Dr. Hilgard Muller, Minister of Foreign Affairs
  • Amb. B.G. Fourie, Secretary for Foreign Affairs
  • Gen. H.J. Van den Bergh, Director, Bureau of State Security, Security Adviser to the Prime Minister
  • Amb. R.F. Botha, Ambassador to the U.S. and Permanent Representative to the UN
• U.S.:
  • Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
  • William D. Rogers, Under Secretary for Economic Affairs
  • Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Executive Assistant to the Secretary and Deputy Under Secretary for Management; Acting Special Assistant to the Secretary for Press Relations and Spokesman of the Department
  • Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff
  • Amb. William E. Schaufele, Jr., Assistant Secretary for African Affairs
  • Amb. William Bowdler, Ambassador to the Republic of South Africa
  • Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

[The Secretary and the Prime Minister conferred privately in the Secretary’s suite from 8:30 to 9:00 a.m.

[At 9:00 a.m., they were joined by Mr. Rogers and the members of the South African delegation.

[After a few minutes the South African Prime Minister and delegation went to the adjoining room to confer on the documents for Rhodesia and Namibia.

[At 9:35 a.m., the other members of the U.S. delegation joined the Secretary and Mr. Rogers.]

Kissinger: Win, my instinct tells me your darlings are going to kick me in the teeth. Have you seen the Dar newspapers? They are debating whether to “invite me” to Africa to continue the negotiations. They are saying the blacks will never be party to anything that “perpetuates imperialism in Africa.”

It’s the Soviet line. It is what the Soviet Ambassador in Zambia was saying. They are determined not to allow what happened in the Middle East to happen again. Especially because in Africa we have no cards.

[Fourie comes out of the side room.]

Fourie: All right, we are ready.

Kissinger: I want to speak to the Prime Minister alone for a few minutes.

[At 10:02 a.m, the full meeting began downstairs in the meeting room:]

Kissinger: To me, the amazing thing in the Syrian-Israeli negotiations is that both sides are nearly identical in their approach to negotiating. Yet each one thinks it is morally superior to the other.

I got a massage in the hotel in Jerusalem. The masseur said he prayed for me every night. I said “How many kilometers are you willing to give up?” He said: “Kilometers? None!” [Laughter]

Gentlemen, Mr. Prime Minister, we have to discuss two things: the substance of where we are going, and the contingencies that may arise and the procedures we would follow.

On substance, we have three papers.

• —One, the paper Britain handed us on Rhodesia [“Annex C” at Tab A].² My estimate is it is substantially agreed, allowing for the margin of negotiations.
• —Second, the document on economic and political guarantees for Rhodesia as agreed between Rogers and Fourie [Tab B].³

Vorster: And the period.

Kissinger: That is in the document.

Vorster: The period for this interim government. That, gentlemen, you must just accept from me: It’s in the interest of both blacks and whites that it be as long as possible.

Kissinger: But as we agreed privately—I will state it as my view—what will determine the outcome of the negotiation is not what is in the interest of whites and blacks but the power relationship.

Vorster: The blacks will have their view, but they will want it as long as possible. I don’t mean the Dar blacks but Nkomo and Gabella. I am sure.

Kissinger: We won’t oppose a longer period, but we can’t be for more than 18 to 24 months. If the Rhodesian blacks want it, in a manner that can express itself, we won’t oppose it. In the formal plan, it will be 18–24 months unless both parties agree to extend it.

Vorster: Who is “both parties”?

Kissinger: Whoever negotiates for the whites and blacks.

—Then we have the document on South-West Africa [Tab C.]⁴

On Rhodesia: The first one [Tab A], the British already have, since they wrote it. We will also give the economic one to the British.

As I understand it, Duff is visiting you in Pretoria this week. My strong recommendation is to say these papers were indeed worked out here; they are under serious consideration, but there can be no final decision until I have come. Because if you say you’ve accepted it, he will immediately run to Dar. And on the political paper too. Say you are sympathetically considering it.

Vorster: Agreed. There is one thing: [Reads from Tab A:] “Appointment of a Council of State by the Queen on the recommendation of the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs . . .” Will the British be the sole judge of this? So there is no misunderstanding.

Kissinger: According to this paper, yes. We can modify it.

Vorster: Suppose they appoint someone totally unacceptable to the whites? Like former Prime Minister Todd, who is in disgrace.

Kissinger: Shall we say “in consultations with both communities”?

Vorster: All right.

Van den Bergh: “In consultations” still leaves them the final say.

Kissinger: It gives us something to talk about [with the British] this afternoon.⁵

Vorster: If it’s not acceptable to the whites, it will fall down immediately.

Kissinger: The British will say “in consultation” anyway.

Vorster: As long as they realize there is a reservation here that they must take into account.

Kissinger: The Ambassador will honor us Wednesday?⁶

Botha: Yes.

Kissinger: We will give you the results Wednesday. You don’t need it before then.

Muller: As soon as possible.

Kissinger: Wednesday. Because I want it in as little cable traffic as possible.

Any other problems with that paper?

Shall we go through the rest of it?

Vorster: [Reads over Tab A:] In this paper, what will be the position of the civil service, the army, and police? Because that is a clue to the whole thing.

Kissinger: In the interim government?

Vorster: Yes.

Kissinger: Also, let’s put down what you said: Although the time is 18–24 months, it can be extended by agreement of both parties.

The army, police and civil service are under the interim government, correct?

Rogers: Yes.

Vorster: And the independent judiciary also.

Kissinger: All these things we will confirm with your Ambassador Wednesday morning.

So much for the political paper. I am not trying to rush you, just to find out.

Vorster: I’ve said to you there is merit in this but it is not binding on the Rhodesians.

Kissinger: I understand. It will be urged on the Rhodesians.

Muller: Whether there are three or two, that will make it easier.

Kissinger: The question is, one, whether the whites have a voice in the selection of the people appointed by the Queen. Second, what happens to the army, police, and judiciary in the period of the interim government. And three, whether the period can be extended by the agreement of both parties.

Rogers: And the civil service.

Kissinger: Right.

Then there are two contingencies to consider.

Vorster: I must warn that the composition of the Council will be shot down by Dar es Salaam and Lusaka.

Kissinger: I agree with you.

Vorster: It will be shot down in flames immediately.

Kissinger: Therefore we should leave some room for flexibility.

Van den Bergh: And the local authorities.

Vorster: That can be left for the interim government.

Kissinger: The whites have a majority on the Council and the blacks have a majority in the Cabinet. Since it is a British proposal, why not let them try it?

Vorster: This ought to be acceptable to them.

Muller: Especially if they are consulted in the selection of the three.

Kissinger: What is the Council?

Botha: It is the dictator. It is the government, the executive authority.

Fourie: The British will argue: You get the power later.

Schaufele: The Cabinet is the legislative power and the Council is the executive.

Botha: But the Council has legislative power too.

Vorster: The British must not change this for the worse; they can change it for the better.

Kissinger: If the British judgment of what they can sell were correct, they would still be governing in East Africa.

Rogers: And North America. [Laughter]

Vorster: I am willing to urge this on Rhodesia. If the British keep their side of the bargain, and if they don’t go wild on 8(i). And the five is better than the three.

Botha: A man like Nkomo might accept it if he can make the selection.

Muller: We must assume their Minister of State has been to Africa and sounded them out. Rowlands.

Kissinger: No, no, no. One rule I have learned in eight years is never underestimate the incompetence of bureaucrats.

Once I read a long report of a Russian-American conversation on strategic arms, of a complexity and subtlety I’d never seen a Russian use. I asked the Soviet Ambassador. He looked into it and he found out it was our fellow who proposed all of it and the Russian said he would consider it!

Will the blacks accept this?

Rogers: If there is a time limit.

Van den Bergh: They might agree to it if there is an 18-month to two-year time limit.

Vorster: Eighteen months to two years has been bandied about as a British proposal, or a British fiat. If it is three years, it will be so much better.

Kissinger: I doubt it. We must be realistic.

Vorster: From our discussions with the Africans.

Kissinger: That’s a year ago. Now, with the Russians in full opposition . . .

Fourie: They may need time for their own unity.

Kissinger: That is an important factor.

Botha: They may need time.

Kissinger: Now let us take the two contingencies—that Dar will tell me to go ahead, and that Dar tells me not to go ahead.

If Dar tells me to go ahead, you should keep your agreement private until I arrive in South Africa. I will meet with Smith and his Cabinet in Pretoria, to add our weight to what has been said. Then it will be announced—two weeks after I return to the United States, so I can manage the situation.

I would not give all this to the blacks. I would give the general outline that I would work with you and Smith. I wouldn’t ask their approval of any detail, because if they say no, we are in an endless negotiation.

If—which I consider to be a 50–50 chance—the Dar meeting makes intransigent demands, I think it is an even more important reason to put this forward. Because the only way to resist enormous African pressures is to say that the substance of the problem has been solved and the only question is the method. It has to be done in a timeframe close to what is in effect a declaration of war. The only way to avoid panic is for Smith to announce this fairly rapidly. Then we will take position in the U.S.—we can’t take a position in support of Smith but a position that the negotiation was on the point of succeeding and the total program was accepted, but the radical blacks, urged on by the Soviet Union, insisted on a violent solution.

What we can’t have is that the blacks turn us down, and there is a five-week debate on whose fault it is, and no one will remember who proposed what.

We can say it was rejected by the radicals and the Communists and we will go no further.

Larry, you are the expert. Will this be understood?

Eagleburger: I agree.

Kissinger: If we can get answers to the three questions you asked, these are the two papers on the basis of which we will proceed.

If I go to black Africa, I will keep it confused. If I go to Pretoria, I will meet with Smith and his Cabinet. Two-three weeks after, he will announce it as his program. Then we’re in a negotiation, and it will have to be a matter of goodwill.

Botha: What about the Security Council debate?

Kissinger: This is on Rhodesia.

Botha: It may spill over.

Kissinger: Then it will be useful to do it in a timeframe relevant to the Security Council debate.

Botha: They will raise one and then the other.

Kissinger: We will try to drag out the debate, but this has to appear as early as possible to avoid appearing to yield under pressure.

Vorster: If Dar says no, you won’t go to Africa.

Kissinger: No.

Vorster: Then you won’t come to South Africa.

Kissinger: No, I regret it.

I would not worry about Dar if it weren’t for the Soviets. They are unhappy and remember the experience of the Middle East.

Schaufele: This has been their line all along. But it has stepped up in intensity.

Kissinger: It’s pretty intense now?

Schaufele: Yes.

Kissinger: My worry about Dar was not to be in the air for 15 hours while they are beating up on the United States. I wanted to know where I was going. Because in America, if there is any difference between the Secretary of State and a black leader, I am wrong. Not just a black leader, but the Democratic leadership. But if this comes off, it will have wide support.

When is the Security Council debate?

Botha: 21–22 September.

Schaufele: I am not so worried about the spillover on Rhodesia.

Kissinger: I will tell you what we will say: It’s now clear that a peaceful solution existed—majority rule in short period of time. It failed only because the radical elements, assisted by the Soviet Union, insisted on violence. The most they ever asked for, had been achieved.

Botha: Can we delay it?

Kissinger: It depends entirely on what they decide in Dar.

Vorster: If Dar turns it down, Smith has nothing to lose.

Kissinger: If Smith can be induced to put this forward, he can’t put in 800 escape clauses. The simpler the better.

Vorster: I understand. That is my business.

Kissinger: He shouldn’t put in a Council of State, etc. He should say: I am prepared immediately to have an interim government with a black majority, and negotiate immediately. It shouldn’t be in detail.

Schaufele: We haven’t told the Africans such detail, and they will resent it.

Vorster: He will have to put in the Council of State because he needs that to get European support.

Kissinger: But this is after a breakdown.

Vorster: If you are on the trip, you will see him.

Kissinger: If it fails, the necessity is to get on the table as soon as possible terms as favorable as possible. If the people surprisingly say yes, he can then put forward the details—as long as the general proposal was not misleading.

I would put forward the Council of State in the context of success; not in the context of failure.

The interim government should be described in ambiguous terms but leaving the implication of majority participation by the blacks.

Muller: In the interim government.

Kissinger: We will find a formula: “The interim government will be set up with the blacks, the whites and the British.”

Schaufele: “Interim arrangements. . .”

Kissinger: In case of a failure, I can go myself to the Security Council and say we worked for five months and achieved all we said we were for. I can cite the announcement on Namibia and the Smith announcement on Rhodesia.

The only thing we were against was violence. “This body can’t be for violence.”

Muller: This final statement if Smith should be cooperative—is this the final push for a solution?

Kissinger: What I will suggest to the President, and my colleagues, is that we generate some resolution that supports a peaceful solution in terms of the proposals that have been made. If it fails, we will veto sanctions and probably veto a contrary resolution.

I will have to discuss it with the President, because it will probably be a major event in the election. It will probably help him to take a strong stand, but I am not sure. In any event, you will know by Thursday. The chances will be nine out of ten he will go along with the strategy I have outlined. I personally think it will help him. I am practically certain it will be accepted. But I do want to get the President and Scranton aboard.

All right. Shall we talk about South-West Africa?

Schaufele: This is the South African position on these items. [He gives the Secretary Tab D.]⁷

Kissinger: [Reads] What is the meaning of number Six?

Vorster: The meaning of Six is the question of United Nations supervision which we have constantly rejected, which is a major political issue in South Africa.

Kissinger: What I have in mind here, Mr. Prime Minister, is not United Nations supervision of the negotiation but United Nations supervision of the election after the process is completed.

Vorster: What I have in mind, as I told to Senator Percy, is I am not prepared to recognize, as the South African Government, UNO supervision. But if the Conference wants it, it is none of my business and I won’t stand in their way and it is not my business.

Kissinger: This point Seven is still not the way I wanted it. The first paper [Tab C–1]⁸ I thought was badly drafted.

Fourie: The sequence follows the first paper, but the wording isn’t exactly the same. It’s been married with the second paper [Tab C–2].⁹ “Which any of the participants wish to raise,” or “to which the participants agree.”

Kissinger: “May wish to raise” has the advantage of suggesting that any side can raise any issue it wishes. It’s tactically very important.

Vorster: “To which they agree, or may wish to raise.”

Kissinger: “May wish to raise” is tactically much better. We can tell the Africans: “Anything you want to raise you can raise. It may not be agreed, but it will be discussed.” If it has to be agreed, you have a veto over what is discussed.

Vorster: Why not both?

Kissinger: I think “may wish to raise” is simpler.

Vorster: “Which any of the participants may wish to raise.”

Kissinger: That is fine. “Which any of the participants may wish to raise.”

Muller: That is very wise.

Kissinger: We’re talking as much about propaganda as about substance.

Can I go to the South African position on point One? [He reads over Tab D.] My problem is the less we can say things have already been done, even if in fact they have already been done, the more impressive it will be to world public opinion. It is better to say “the date for independence will be . . .” than to say “the Constituent Assembly has already announced the date will be . . .” Because millions of people don’t know it has already announced it.

[The South African side confers.]

Botha: We have a proposal.

Fourie: “The South African Government has indicated it accepts the proposal of the Constitutional Conference that independence will be achieved by December 31, 1978.”

Kissinger: I like your second point. Can you say, “The South African Government indicates”—instead of “has indicated”—“that it accepts any such proposals?”

Can we go back to the original order? “The South African Government indicates it accepts any such proposals.”

I am trying to put you in the best possible light. If it fails, I want to be able to say “Here is the forthcoming South African position,” so we can block sanctions.

I would do this. [He marks up a change of order.]

Six rephrased: “The South African Government accepts the proposal of the Constitutional Conference that the date for independence will be December 31, 1978.”

I understand some of these points you have to raise in South Africa. I just have to put them in the order in which I want them.

[He marks up the draft.]

The only one we have not formulated yet is the one on free elections under United Nations supervision.

We will get it typed up so there is a minimum of confusion.

[The Secretary, Fourie, Rogers, and Schaufele go off to arm chairs to discuss the new order of points and mark up the draft. They confer from 11:07 to 11:26. Then all return to the table, except Rogers who goes upstairs to get the new draft typed up.]

Kissinger: Mr. Prime Minister, the thing I implore you is there be no further leaks out of the Conference. These points have to be taken up with the Conference, and I am concerned that these points will come out.

Vorster: There will be no leaks from this side of the table.

Kissinger: Of that I am confident.

Vorster: But candidly, from the Conference I can’t be sure.

Kissinger: Why don’t you wait, then?

Vorster: All right.

Kissinger: But you will put your weight behind these?

Vorster: With no question.

Kissinger: Leaks this week would be dangerous out of all proportion.

If you know I am coming to Africa, then wait until a day or two before I come. If you know I am not coming, then you can do it because you have to publish this paper as soon as possible.

I am assuming your voice will carry a lot of weight.

Vorster: With the whites, yes. But with Kapuuo and his American adviser, I don’t know.

Kissinger: Who the hell . . .?

Vorster: Swartz, a Wall Street lawyer. If you want a shrewd guess, it is the British who are behind it.

Kissinger: I owe you an apology. I was going to ask you at lunch to say grace but I forgot.

Vorster: I said it silently for you.

Kissinger: Thank you.

Vorster: And Endicott and Swartz, I don’t know what they are up to.

Kissinger: Who is Endicott?

Vorster: A Britisher.

Kissinger: Kaunda in a conversation a few weeks ago said the same as you: that some foreign powers are interested in the uranium and are for independence too. And he said: “And I don’t mean the Americans.”

Vorster: We think the American was brought in to have a facade of American involvement.

There are only two possibilities: Either Swartz is in your pay or the British pay, one or the other.

Kissinger: We are in the lucky position that with eight Congressional committees involved, there is nothing that can be done without everybody knowing about it.

He is not in our pay.

Vorster: If you say so, I accept it.

Botha: His senior partner, Burns, testified before the Fraser Committee which you were supposed to testify to. Burns was asked who is paying him? He made it clear he wasn’t being paid by the American Government or the South African Government. But a South African paper quoted him as saying it was the South African Government.

Vorster: I think it would be worth your while to investigate Mr. Swartz and Mr. Endicott.

Eagleburger: We will.

Vorster: Because it is a shady business they are up to, and there is a lot of talk about mining deposits.

[Mr. Covey comes in.]

Kissinger: Anything wrong, Jock?

Covey: No, sir. It is 11:30.

Kissinger: Mr. Prime Minister, I had scheduled a press conference.¹⁰ I hope I do it as skillfully as yours yesterday.

[Mr. Rogers enters with the revised and agreed copy of the document on Namibia, Tab E.¹¹ Further corrections are discussed.]

Kissinger: We refer to “Geneva talks,” “Geneva meeting,” “Geneva conference.” Why don’t we refer to “Geneva Conference” throughout, so they don’t think it is three different things?

Vorster: Fine.

[The Secretary hands Prime Minister Vorster a marked-up copy of Tab E.]

Vorster: We can live with this.

Kissinger: This is a good program. If you weren’t Dutch Reformed, I’d say this is damned good. [Laughter]

Vorster: I can live with this, but I have to run the gauntlet.

Kissinger: Mr. Prime Minister, let me sum up. On South-West Africa, if Dar asks me to proceed, I will go to Dar and Lusaka prior to coming to Pretoria, sticking to the three points they gave us but receiving some of their ideas which will include some of these. You will take it to the Conference before I go. Then we will take it back and say “Take it or leave it.”

If I don’t go to Dar, you will publish it as soon as possible—the middle of next week—so we can be ready before the General Assembly.

On Rhodesia, we will operate on the basis of the two papers you have, the political and economic. In fairness we have to say the British made a mistake in that Council, because it will have to be adjusted in a negotiation. We showed our good faith by presenting it to you without examining it carefully.

If I go to Dar, I won’t give it to the Africans but I will go to Pretoria to get you to get Smith to propose it. You will get Smith to agree 99%, and I will tell him, to explain our moral position—that I, who don’t want to do it and who resisted doing it for seven and a half years, now think he has to do it.

If this document is put forward under conditions in which I am not taking a trip, it should not be put forward in such detail. It should be a two-page document which can be put forward simply. But it should be put forward quickly so we have a platform.

Smith will have to put it forward anyway. In this situation, he will put it forward knowing we will use it as the basis for resisting violence. And we will veto sanctions.

All this is subject to my confirming by Friday the position of the President. I am 90 percent certain—the only uncertainty is the elections.

On Namibia, this proposal is for independence and a unitary state. If it is rejected, it can only be because of the radicals and the Soviets. The same on Rhodesia. We cannot be in the position of supporting the white minority governments, but we can be in the position of opposing violence.

In South Africa, I will say there is not a South African-U.S. program. I will say I was asked by the African leaders to open contact with you; I was asked to present some ideas. After two missions to Africa, I can say we made considerable progress at this meeting.

Vorster: Will you use that word?

Kissinger: “Progress.”

Botha: “Substantial progress.”

Kissinger: It cannot be a South African-U.S. program. We cannot afford it in America—as painful as it may be to you—that it appears there is a quid pro quo we gave to South Africa. And in fact there is no quid pro quo; none was asked for.

Vorster: No.

[Botha and Vorster confer.]

My Ambassador tells me we cannot ignore the question of normalization of relations between South Africa and the United States.

Kissinger: You can say what you want. You did not ask for it.

Vorster: I did not and I will not.

Kissinger: But it may result in the normal course.

Vorster: The question will be put to you at the press conference, and I want to know what you will say.

Kissinger: I will say no quid pro quo was asked.

Vorster: No, not on that.

You will be asked if you will go to South Africa.

Kissinger: I will say that if I go to black Africa, in the normal course it may be impossible to conclude it without going to South Africa.

Vorster: They will ask if you will see Smith.

Kissinger: I will say it’s premature to discuss and there are no present plans.

Vorster: Because you can’t ignore the Rhodesians. If you ignore them, they will take it amiss. Can you say: “It is not impossible”?

Kissinger: No. You can tell Smith.

Vorster: And if he blows it?

Kissinger: Then you’d better not tell him. Nyerere and Kaunda may say they won’t deal with anyone who met Smith.

I will say I have had no contacts with him and there are no present plans to meet him. If they ask: “Do you absolutely rule it out?” I will say I don’t know what the future will bring.

If I leave any indication I will meet Smith, all hell will break loose in America, and it will fail on the worst possible grounds.

But I will meet him.

Vorster: You can play it as you want.

Kissinger: We’ll leave it open whether we announce it after or during, or whether there is a picture.

Now, Mr. Prime Minister, an embarrassing subject. I will be asked if we discussed the situation in South Africa. I will say what we discussed.

Vorster: Will you tell my colleagues what we discussed?

Kissinger: I will say, if they ask me, that we discussed it. If they ask what I said, I’ll say I said what I said in my Philadelphia speech.¹² That doesn’t lend itself to television.

Muller: There was an article in the Sunday Telegraph by Peregrine Worsthorne on the riots in Capetown, which their editor experienced himself.

Kissinger: I like him. I don’t have it.

Muller: We will get it to you.

Kissinger: If I am asked if I’ll see the black leaders in South Africa, I will say I will meet people of different points of view.

Vorster: You can go further; you can say you will meet whomever you want. There are no holds barred.

Kissinger: No, then the black leaders will make demands on me of whom I should meet.

I will say I have been assured I can meet people of varying points of view.

Vorster: Anyone but the Black Parents’ Association, which is a front group.

Kissinger: [Reads over Mr. Eagleburger’s list of likely questions]¹³ What about the UN debate? I won’t say we will veto any resolution.

They will ask about Namibia. I will say it was one of the questions discussed.

On paying the white Rhodesians, I will say there are misconceptions; there are programs and the question isn’t about buying people to leave the country but to promote the development of the country.

Vorster: I would hammer on that because it can’t get abroad that you are buying out the whites.

Kissinger: For our own reasons too, Mr. Prime Minister.

Eagleburger: I have checked the press items, Mr. Secretary, and there is nothing interesting. [He hands some recent tickers to the Secretary.] “Tanzanian officials say one of the issues being discussed is whether to accept your trip.”

Kissinger: That is what I have been telling them.

Mr. Prime Minister, I want to say, I appreciate these discussions and consider them useful, more useful than I can say to the press. It is a very difficult time for your country and I know it is not easy.

Vorster: I appreciate it too. Our policy is an open door as in the past. I hope to see you in South Africa.

Kissinger: I am looking forward to it.

Vorster: And you will be most welcome.

[The Secretary escorted the Prime Minister out through the lobby to the front door.]

1. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 345, Department of State, Memoranda, Memoranda of Conversations, External, September 4–14, 1976. Secret; Nodis. Initialed by Rodman. The meeting was held in the Dolder Grand Hotel. Brackets are in the original.
2. Tab A, “Annex C,” is attached but not printed. The document is entitled “Rhodesia: Possible Constitutional Arrangements for the Period of Transition.” See footnote 10, Document 202.
3. Attached at Tab B is a paper entitled “International Economic Support for a Rhodesia Settlement,” drafted by Rogers on September 5 and designated “Rev[ision]—2.”
4. Attached at Tab C is an undated paper on Namibia entitled “Basis for a Proposal.”
5. No memorandum of conversation from this meeting has been found.
6. September 8.
7. Attached at Tab D is a draft paper entitled “South Africa’s Position,” September 6, 10 a.m.
8. Tab C.1 is Tab C as given to the South Africans on September 4.
9. Tab C.2 is a revised “Basis for a Proposal,” on Namibia given to the South Africans. Point 1 reads “The Constituent Assembly will be moved from Windhoek to Geneva to conduct further talks on independence.” Point 6 addressed the date for independence.
10. For the text of Kissinger’s September 6 press conference, see Department of State Bulletin, September 27, 1976, pp. 377–382.
11. The retyped agreed copy and the revised copy with Kissinger’s revisions are attached at Tab E.
12. See footnote 7, Document 202.
13. Not found.