Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXV, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1973

321. Telegram From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to Secretary of State Kissinger en Route to Cairo¹

Washington, November 6, 1973, 1739Z.

Tohak 23/WH32723. The attached message was just dictated to me by Dobrynin to pass to you.

Oral message from Brezhnev to Kissinger as read on the telephone to General Scowcroft by Ambassador Dobrynin on November 6, 1973 at 11:09 A.M.

“On our part we do not object against the Security Council resolution being adopted on the basis of consensus without voting and with the understanding that the meaning of the definition ‘under appropriate auspices’ would be elaborated in this resolution as holding negotiations on the Middle East settlement under the auspices of the USSR and USA.

“Such a resolution by the Security Council would correspond to the agreement reached between us on that matter during Mr. Kissinger’s stay in Moscow.²

“It goes without saying that the adoption of such a decision by the Security Council will in a major degree depend upon the availability of direct requests from Egypt and Israel to the UN Secretary General with the notification of their readiness to accept the good offices of the USSR and USA. In this connection we take note of Mr. Kissinger’s statement that the U.S. is working with Israel along that line and that in any case the White House is firmly convinced that Israel will accept the USSR/USA auspices when the Security Council adopts such a decision.

“We understand, as does the American side, that there may be certain difficulties in that matter related to the position held by some permanent members of the Security Council.

“In that case, another alternative may be also considered. The parties directly involved in the conflict could directly address the Soviet Union and United States with the request to provide good offices and to take part in the planned negotiations between them.

“In this case there would be no need at all for any additional decision of the Security Council having in mind that the Council has already adopted necessary decisions concerning the essence of both urgent measures and the political settlement as a whole.

“In conclusion, we would like to stress that we, as before, firmly adhere to the understanding reached in Moscow on the question of Soviet/American auspices and are ready to work on the implementation of that mutual understanding.”³

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 41, Kissinger Trip Files, HAK Trip—Mideast, Islamabad, Peking, Tokyo, Seoul, TOHAK 1–69, Nov. 5–16, 1973. Top Secret; Immediate; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Sent to Rodman for Kissinger.
2. See Document 53.
3. In telegram Hakto 9, November 6, 2055Z, Kissinger instructed Scowcroft to call Dobrynin immediately with the following message: “We appreciate General Secretary Brezhnev’s message concerning US–Soviet auspices. We are open-minded as to the form by which the auspices should be established. Either one of the courses outlined by the General Secretary would seem possible to us; we have a slight preference for the first option, i.e., Security Council approval. Does the General Secretary believe that Egypt will go along with the courses that he suggests? It would be very helpful if I could get their response while I am in Egypt.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 41, Kissinger Trip Files, HAK Trip—Mideast, Islamabad, Peking, Tokyo, Seoul, HAKTO 1–60, Nov. 5–16, 1973)