The White House requested, on an informal basis, the Negotiators’ thoughts on
how the negotiating process may go in coming months. Ambassador Bunker concurred in forwarding the
attached.
Enclosure3
SCENARIO FOR THE UNITED STATES-PANAMA TREATY NEGOTIATIONS
IN THE COMING MONTHS
Since the resolution of the State/Defense differences and the resulting
change in presidential negotiating instructions last August,4
Ambassador Bunker has followed a
course of negotiation which can be characterized as steady but measured,
and unobtrusive.
That course has been dictated by the fact that the two teams have now
reached the most delicate and complex issues in the negotiations, and by
the need to keep the negotiations as removed as possible from the
domestic political scene in both countries.
Ambassador Bunker believes that by
following this course it will not be possible to finish the negotiation
until late this year—if, indeed, it proves possible to conclude a new
treaty with Panama at this point in history which adequately protects
United States interests yet is adequately attentive to Panama’s.
Both negotiating teams are cautiously optimistic on that score, at this
writing.
Panama, while it would welcome speedier negotiations, seems to acquiesce
in that timetable. (Intelligence reports reflect a desire on Torrijos’ part that the President go
to Panama at some point following our elections to observe the signing
of a treaty, which might then be presented to the Congress at the first
session in 1977.)5
Though acquiescing, Panama will not relax its pressures on the United
States to maintain that timetable for—and to make substantive progress
in—the negotiations. Those pressures will be applied chiefly through
international gatherings (the OAS
General Assembly in early June in Santiago; the scheduled meeting of
Chiefs of Latin Governments later that month in Panama City; the
Non-Aligned Group’s meetings in Colombo in August; the UN meetings
beginning in September—with Panama sitting again on the Security
Council).
Consonant with the steady but measured negotiating course, there were
negotiating rounds in Panama in September, October and November; in
Washington (a secret one) in December; and a lengthy one,
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again in Panama, in February.
The Ambassador anticipates that the next round will take place in Panama
in early May. Technical-level talks may precede it. Possibly there would
be another round in late May or during June, locale uncertain.
This hiatus between the February round and the prospective round in early
May results from the fact that State and Defense are reexamining the
specifics of the United States’ positions on major issues. Part of that
reexamination process has been Ambassador Bunker’s direct consultations with the Joint Chiefs of
Staff.6
Both Departments believe that it may be in order for them to return to
the President for revised instructions—as he invited—before negotiating
rounds subsequent to those held in May-June. Timing is difficult to
predict, but the Ambassador does not now anticipate returning to the
President before, say, the late summer. He hopes to be able to present,
again, unified State/Defense recommendations.
In the period before the May-June round, and intermittently thereafter,
the Ambassador wishes to undertake the consultations in the Congress
which the President instructed and which, if not undertaken at this
stage of the negotiation, will result in great problems for the
Executive Branch later, when a treaty is at hand.
These would consist of one-on-one private interviews with approximately
10–12 members of the Senate and 10–12 of the House.
A few of these in each body would be the leaders. The Ambassador has seen
them before on the treaty matter, and seeing them again would be
designed to bring them up to date.
The remainder in the two bodies would encompass members whom the
Ambassador has not before consulted, but who seem to be both interested
in the Canal matter and in a position to be helpful.
Mere “consultation” is not the only objective. The Ambassador will be
seeking also the Members’ counsel on (a) the “shape” of a possible
treaty package, and (b) the strategy and tactics involved in moving any
Panama treaty through the complete congressional processes, including
the timing.
Because these visits to Members must be fitted around both the
negotiating rounds and the congressional recesses scheduled from now
through the National Conventions and thereafter, it is prudent to begin
them now.
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One visit is essential. Senator Goldwater, having announced a change of heart on the
merit of negotiating a new treaty, wishes a briefing from the
Ambassador.7 Another is not essential but useful: a freshman
Member of the House has asked the Ambassador to brief a group of his
colleagues.
Over the months ahead we can anticipate a number of requests for the
Ambassador’s appearance before congressional committees and
subcommittees. The Ambassador intends to ask that any such hearings be
in Executive session, to protect the confidentiality of the
negotiation.8
