Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XIX, Part 2, Japan, 1969-1972

135. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 22, 1972, 10 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• Nobuhiko Ushiba, Japanese Ambassador to the United States
• Ryohei Murata, Political Counselor, Japanese Embassy
• Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
• John A. Froebe, Jr., NSC Staff Member

SUBJECT

• Review of Mr. Kissinger’s Recent Moscow Trip

Mr. Kissinger’s Moscow Visit

Ambassador Ushiba asked Mr. Kissinger about the results of his recent trip to Moscow—in particular what had been said on Far Eastern problems. Mr. Kissinger said that the Asian situation had not been discussed in any depth. The Soviets asked about what had transpired at the President and Prime Minister Tanaka’s Hawaii meeting. He noted that the Soviets are obviously concerned about Japan’s normalization of relations with the PRC. Responding to Ambassador Ushiba’s mention of recent reports that the Soviets were deploying additional ground forces to the Chinese border, Mr. Kissinger said there probably is some truth to these reports.

Mr. Kissinger explained that his talks in Moscow centered on the prospects for U.S.-Soviet agreement on trade and SALT. He quipped that the United States seemed to be able to settle its trade problems with everyone except Japan. Answering Ambassador Ushiba’s question as to whether trade, lend lease, and related issues in U.S.-Soviet relations would be settled as a package, Mr. Kissinger said they would. Ambassador Ushiba asked if the U.S. had planned to extend long-term government credit to the Soviet Union, to which Mr. Kissinger replied that we would, although starting at a low level.

Replying to Ambassador Ushiba’s reference to the President’s mention at Hawaii of Joint U.S.-Japanese participation in the economic development of Siberia,² Mr. Kissinger said that the United States is prepared to discuss this further with Japan, and noted that he thought a Japanese government representative was scheduled to visit Washington shortly to discuss this and other economic problems. Ambassador Ushiba said that an unofficial representative, Mr. Anzai (Board Chairman of the Tokyo Gas Company), is already here. Ambassador Ushiba said the Japanese government wants most of the money involved to be put up by private capital. Mr. Kissinger said that the U.S. was fully in agreement with this approach, and suggested that Mr. Anzai talk to Commerce Secretary Peterson, noting that the White House would encourage movement in this direction.

Ambassador Ushiba asked when Mr. Kissinger expected that the U.S. would reach agreement with the Soviet Union on trade and related questions. Mr. Kissinger said that on trade, agreement would probably be achieved within a month. Mr. Kissinger said that he had learned from Prime Minister Tanaka that doing it fast was the most effective approach. Replying to Ambassador Ushiba’s question as to whether the Administration would have a problem with Congress over most favored nation treatment of the Soviet Union, Mr. Kissinger said he did not think so. He added, however, that the Administration would wait until after the election to submit legislation to Congress on this question.

Ambassador Ushiba asked about the opposition’s charge that the Administration does not apply sufficient pressure to the Soviets on the question of the Jewish exit tax. Mr. Kissinger said that the opposition thinks this tactic will rally the Jewish vote to it. Mr. Kissinger noted that Senator McGovern is now in fact accusing the Administration of not being tough enough on the Communists.

Ambassador Ushiba asked when Mr. Kissinger thought the U.S. would reach agreement with the Soviet Union to resume discussions on SALT. Mr. Kissinger replied that this would probably come about yet this year, noting that the negotiations on this would be difficult. He explained that the problem involves two possible approaches—qualitative versus quantative limits. Qualitative limits are much more difficult. The first month of the negotiations will be confined to a discussion of principles. Mr. Kissinger agreed with Ambassador Ushiba that manifold technical problems are also involved. He related he had taken the opportunity of the President’s Moscow visit to discuss this problem with the Soviet Defense Minister and Deputy Prime Minister. Their initial reaction was that they were enraged because a foreigner knew as much of the characteristics of their weapons as he did, but later settled down to a more rational discussion of the problem.

Ambassador Ushiba asked what the situation was on the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Mr. Kissinger said that in the course of his most recent visit to Moscow the Soviets had, in a diplomatic note, agreed to hold separately the CSCE and a conference on the MBFR, at the same time that these problems would be considered in the same general framework. The Soviets thus are ready to link the two. The CSCE will open in November and the meeting on MBFR next January. Responding to Ambassador Ushiba’s reference to a rumor that the PRC wants to send an observer, Mr. Kissinger said he had heard this as a joke—along with the story that the PRC wants to join NATO.

Mr. Kissinger asked if Ambassador Ushiba knew who had given him the Japanese doll that he had brought back from the June trip to Tokyo. Ambassador Ushiba said that he did not know but that he would find out.

Tanaka Visit to Peking

Mr. Kissinger asked if Ambassador Ushiba had any additional news on Prime Minister Tanaka’s upcoming Peking visit.³ Ambassador Ushiba, after reviewing the dates and the contents of the joint statement released September 20, explained that the Prime Minister’s visit would not necessarily result in diplomatic relations between Japan and the PRC at this point. Ambassador Ushiba said he was not sure that Prime Minister Tanaka planned to go all-out for diplomatic relations now. The principle constraint is the strong Taiwan lobby in Japan, particularly in the Liberal Democratic Party, as well as the tough ROC reaction. At the same time, approximately 70 percent of Japanese public opinion favors immediate diplomatic relations with Peking. This sentiment, however, is strongly stimulated by Japanese media. On the other side of the question, the Prime Minister is very much aware of the hidden opinion in Japan that is opposed to moving too quickly. Therefore, Japan may move towards diplomatic relations with the PRC in two steps: for the immediate future Japan may have only improved indirect relations with Peking, somewhat like those that the U.S. now has with China, leaving full diplomatic relations for a later stage. Mr. Kissinger commented that it was the Administration’s experience with American public opinion that if you do not yield to this kind of domestic opinion, you will be ahead in the long run.

Vietnam Situation

Ambassador Ushiba asked about the current situation in Vietnam. Mr. Kissinger said that we are continuing our intensive negotiations with Hanoi. It is too early yet to say what will come of them. If Japan could desist from encouraging Hanoi, at least in the near term, it would be helpful to the U.S. position. Ambassador Ushiba asked if Mr. Kissinger saw any prospect of a settlement before November. Mr. Kissinger said it was impossible to say. If the U.S. sets a deadline, Hanoi will wait for the deadline to see if they can extract another concession. Ambassador Ushiba asked about the Viet Cong’s most recent public statement on the settlement. Mr. Kissinger said that such Viet Cong statements have in the past proved unhelpful, and added that the VC must come through with something better than this in order to be acceptable to the United States.

Ambassador Ushiba asked where the military situation stood, noting recent Communist gains around Danang. Mr. Kissinger acknowledged recent Communist tactical gains, but said that this sort of military gain is too costly to the other side. He added that the other side might still attempt some drastic military initiatives next month. Basically, however, from the military standpoint the North Vietnamese are in bad shape. They have now lost something like 600 out of the 700 tanks they possessed at the outset of the spring offensive.

Soviet Policy Toward the Korean Principle

Ambassador Ushiba, noting his government’s satisfaction with the outcome of the Korean question in the General Assembly, asked if the Soviet Union had evidenced any concern over Korea. Mr. Kissinger said that the Soviets of course want to avoid any evidence of PRC influence on the Peninsula. But at the same time they are in a dilemma as to whether increased PRC influence would be preferable to that of the United States and Japan.

Soviet Position on Japan’s Northern Territories

Mr. Kissinger said that in Moscow he had mentioned Japan’s concern about the northern islands. In principle the Soviet Union does want better relations with Japan. The question, however, is whether they want them sufficiently at this point to make the concessions Japan is insisting on vis-à-vis the northern territories.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 538, Country Files, Japan, Vol. VIII, May–December 1972. Secret; Sensitive. On September 28, Haig, acting on behalf of Kissinger, approved this memorandum of conversation without further distribution. (Ibid.) Froebe drafted suggested talking points for Kissinger’s meeting with Ushiba. (Ibid.)
2. Nixon discussed Japan-U.S. economic cooperation in Siberia during his recent meeting with Tanaka. See Document 134.
3. Tanaka accepted an invitation to visit the People’s Republic of China, September 25–30.