26. Draft Study Prepared by the Ad Hoc Inter-Departmental Working Group for Korea1
[Omitted here is the table of contents.]
I. Summary for Korea Task Force
A. Introduction
This study deals with the most likely contingencies to arise in Korea over the next few years and enumerates a wide range of options available to meet those contingencies. The contingencies are described and illustrated so that most conceivable crisis situations can be included under one or another. That the ROK might launch an all-out military attack against NK was considered as a contingency paralleling that of a NK major attack, but was rejected as highly unlikely.
We have defined specific US objectives under each contingency so that options could be examined against them and structured in some relative order of preference for meeting that contingency. The options are not ranked in strict order of merit or effectiveness, but merely grouped as to whether they seem more or less reasonable choices for achieving US objectives.
B. US Interests in Korea
- —The ROK is strategically important to the security of Japan and the East Asia region.
- —We are committed by a mutual defense agreement to defend the ROK against external aggression.
- —US performance in regard to our commitment to the ROK reflects on other US commitments to allies and the UN.
- —The ROK now stands as a successful example of our ability to protect and assist developing nations.
C. Critical Issue
- 1.
- [2 lines not declassified]
- 2.
- [2 lines not declassified]
- 3.
- Should the US contain any NK attack in the Republic of Korea or counter-attack into North Korea?
- 4.
- What bases in Korea or elsewhere will be available to US forces conducting combat operations in Korea? For US unilateral operations? For UN operations?
- 5.
- What will be the US attitude toward ROK unilateral action against NK? Toward use of ROK forces during a US response to NK hostile acts?
- 6.
- For what courses of action in a contingency can we get US public and Congressional support?
- 7.
- What risk of expanded hostilities are we willing to take?
- 8.
- What is the effect on US interests if US response to NK act is limited to political actions?
D. Assumptions
- 1.
- There will be no significant changes in the relative military capabilities on the Korean peninsula. The size and location of US forces will remain essentially unchanged.
- 2.
- The US will still be committed militarily in Southeast Asia.
- 3.
- Both the USSR and PRC will wish to avoid direct involvement in Korean hostilities unless they perceive an immediate threat to themselves.
- 4.
- The attitudes, personalities, and machinery of the ROK and NK governments and political systems will not experience significant change.
- 5.
- There will be no significant change in the nature of the UN role in Korea. The present UN Command and Military Armistice structure will continue.
II. Contingencies and Preferred Actions
A. Key Questions
1. Origin of Crisis:
- —Are our facts complete? Confirmed?
- —Does the Mutual Defense Agreement apply?
- —Is there a question of provocation?
- —Are there hostages?
- —Are we on firm legal grounds?
2. US Military Resources:
- —What is immediately available?
- —How soon can additional resources reach Korea?
3. Japan/Okinawa:
- —What is the status of our agreements regarding use of bases and how do they apply to the given contingency?
- —What are our obligations to the GOJ under the Mutual Security Treaty?
- —How does the GOJ view the crisis in Korea?
- —To what extent does public opposition in Japan and Okinawa place restraints on our use of bases?
4. Attitudes:
- —Congressional?
- —Public?
- —UN member nations?
- —ROK and Japanese, in particular?
- 5. USSR/PRC Support for NK:
- —How have the USSR/PRC reacted?
- —What is the likelihood of intervention by one or both? To what extent?
6. NK Military Resources:
—What is NK military capability to react to US courses of action?
B. Broad Objectives
1. General and Long Term:
To protect US interests in Korea there are certain continuing objectives we would seek to achieve through political and, if necessary, military actions. These objectives are:
- (1)
- Prevent large-scale North-South hostilities.
- (2)
- Maintain a stable compromise among the great powers with interests in Korea.
- (3)
- Keep the Republic of Korea out of hostile hands.
- (4)
- Promote ROK economic development and political stability.
2. Immediate and Short Term:
In addition to the above, responses to crisis situations should be directed at the following objectives:
- (1)
- To assure that crisis is resolved without advantage to North Korea.
- (2)
- To deter future provocations, aggressive acts, or threats to stability.
- (3)
- To maintain US prestige and the credibility of US commitments.
3. General Considerations:
In developing responses to the various contingencies described in this Study, we will be constrained initially by certain objectives applicable to all crises. These are:
- (1)
- Prevent expansion of hostilities.
- (2)
- Minimize US involvement in hostilities.
- (3)
- Minimize cost in US lives and resources.
- (4)
- Adhere to standards of international law.
- (5)
- Assure maximum public and Congressional support for US position and action.
There are factors that under certain contingencies would move us along courses of action that risk contradicting some of our objectives. These factors are: (1) the previous history of NK attacks on US and ROK forces and the consequent implied warning by President Nixon to NK that future attacks will not go unpunished and (2) US and ROK public opinion that would probably demand forceful US action against NK in the event of further serious NK attacks.
Contingency One: Limited Hostile Act by NK against US
Lesser Acts (minor, apparently unauthorized attack; major act of sabotage or terrorism—e.g., kidnapping or assassination of US official; attack within DMZ)
US Objectives for This Contingency
- 1.
- Broad objectives applicable to all contingencies (see p. 62).
- 2.
- Maintain US prestige and the credibility of US commitments.
- 3.
- Deter future NK hostile acts.
Preferred Courses of Action
| Political | Military |
| Probably best suited to most objectives: | |
| —Demand redress (p. 203) | —Increase air and naval reconnaissance with combat escort outside NK territorial limits (p. 30a) |
| —Call MAC meeting to state UNC position (p. 26) | —Reinforce US military forces in ROK (p. 29) |
| —Request NNSC investigation of NK Armistice violations (p. 26) | —Conduct ground, air, or naval show of force (p. 30) |
| —Declare specified waters and air space adjacent to NK to be “warning areas” (p. 33) | |
| Well suited to some objectives: | |
| —Condemn NK through letter to President of Security Council (p. 25) | —Conduct drone or manned reconnaissance over NK (p. 30b) |
| —Boycott MAC meetings (p. 20) | —Interfere with NK communications and navigation systems (p. 28) |
| —Request cooperation of other countries, especially Japan and those represented in Pyongyang (p.28) | —Seize NK assets abroad (p. 31) |
| —Request USSR cooperation in preventing expansion of hostilities (p. 27) | —Increase psychological operations against NK (p. 30b) |
| Poorly suited to most objectives: | |
| —Request UN Security Council meeting (p. 24) | —Return ROK combat units from Vietnam (p. 30b) |
| —Employ economic sanctions (p. 21) | —Support ROK covert raid (p. 32) |
| —Launch artillery, missile or mortar attack across MDL (p. 34b) | |
| —Conduct US or ROK amphibious raid (p. 38) | |
| —Impose naval quarantine by closing one or more straits in area (p. 34a) |
Contingency Two: Limited Hostile Act by NK against US
Severe Acts (attack on or seizure of US vessel or aircraft in ROK or international waters or airspace; attack on US military, Embassy, or commercial installation in ROK; up to brigade-size attack through DMZ against US units [less than 1 line not declassified])
US Objectives for This Contingency:
- 1.
- Broad objectives applicable to all contingencies (see p. 6)
- 2.
- Deter future NK hostile acts and apply appropriate sanctions
- 3.
- Maintain US prestige and the credibility of US commitments
Preferred Courses of Action
| Political | Military |
| Probably best suited to most objectives: | |
| —Request UN Security Council meeting (p. 24) | —Conduct drone or manned reconnaissance over NK (p. 30b) |
| —Request USSR cooperation in preventing expansion of hostilities (p. 27) | —Conduct selective air or naval strike (p. 36) |
| —Request cooperation of other countries, especially Japan and those represented in Pyongyang (p. 28) | —Launch artillery, missile or mortar attack across MDL (p. 34b) |
| —Launch ground raid across MDL (p. 35) | |
| —Conduct US or ROK amphibious raid (p. 38) | |
| —Declare specified waters and air space adjacent to NK to be “warning areas” (p. 33) | |
| Well suited to some objectives: | |
| —Demand redress (p. 20) | —Reinforce US military forces in ROK (p. 29) |
| —Call MAC meeting to state UNC position (p. 26) | —Conduct ground, air, or naval show of force (p. 30) |
| —Appeal for military assistance from other countries (p. 25) | —Increase air and naval reconnaissance with combat escort outside NK territorial limits (p. 30a) |
| —Boycott MAC meeting (p. 20) | —Interfere with NK communications and navigational systems (p. 28) |
| —Support ROK covert raid (p. 32) | |
| —Launch US or ROK limited objective, combined-arms attack across MDL (p. 37) | |
| —Increase psychological operations against NK (p. 30b) | |
| Poorly suited to most objectives: | |
| —Employ economic sanctions (p. 21) | —Mine NK waters (p. 33) |
| —Condemn NK through letter to President of UN Security Council (p. 25) | —Impose naval quarantine by closing one or more straits in area (p. 34a) |
| —Request NNSC investigation of NK Armistice violations (p. 26) | —Return ROK combat units from Vietnam (p. 30b) |
| —Seize NK assets abroad (p. 31) | |
| —Impose naval quarantine by closing one or more straits in area (p. 34a) |
Contingency Three: Limited Hostile Act by NK against ROK
Lesser actions (minor, apparently unauthorized attack; major act of sabotage or terrorism; e.g., kidnapping or assassination of high officials; attack within DMZ; raid along ROK coast)
US Objectives for This Contingency
- 1.
- Broad objectives applicable to all contingencies (see Page 6)
- 2.
- Prevent uncoordinated ROK retaliation
- 3.
- Maintain US prestige and the credibility of US commitments
- 4.
- Deter future NK hostile acts
Preferred Courses of Action
| Political | Military |
| Probably best suited to most objectives: | |
| —Call MAC meeting to state UNC position (Page 26) | —Increase air and naval reconnaissance with combat escort outside NK territorial limits (Page 30a) |
| —Condemn NK through letter to President of UN Security Council (Page 25) | —Conduct ground, air or naval show of force (Page 30) |
| —Request cooperation of other countries, especially Japan and those represented in Pyongyang and Seoul (Page 28) | —Reinforce US military forces in ROK (Page 29) |
| —Declare specified waters and air space adjacent to NK to be “warning areas” (page 33) | |
| Well suited to some objectives: | |
| —Demand redress (Page 20) | —Interfere with NK communications and navigation systems (Page 28) |
| —Request NNSC investigation of NK Armistice violations (Page 26) | —Conduct drone or manned reconnaissance over NK (Page 30b) |
| —Request USSR cooperation in preventing expansion of hostilities (Page 27) | —Seize NK assets abroad (Page 31) |
| —Support ROK covert raid (Page 32) | |
| —Increase psychological operations against NK (Page 30b) | |
| Poorly suited to most objectives: | |
| —Request UN Security Council meeting (Page 24) | —Launch artillery, missile, or mortar attack across MDL (Page 34b) |
| —Boycott MAC meeting (Page 20) | —Launch ground raid across MDL (Page 35) |
| —Employ economic sanctions (Page 21) | —Conduct US or ROK amphibious raid (Page 38) |
| —Offer more military and economic assistance to ROK (Page 23) | —Impose naval quarantine by closing one or more straits in area (Page 34a) |
Contingency Four: Limited Hostile act by NK against ROK
Severe Acts (attack on or seizure of third country vessel or aircraft inside ROK territorial limits; mining of ROK waters; attack on or seizure of ROK vessel or aircraft in ROK or international waters or airspace; attack on ROK military or civilian installation, e.g., an Israeli-type attack on ROK airfield; up to brigade-size attack across MDL against ROK military units; assassination of ROK President)
US Objectives for This Contingency:
- 1.
- Broad objectives applicable to all contingencies (see p. 6)
- 2.
- Prevent uncoordinated ROK retaliation
- 3.
- Maintain US prestige and the credibility of US commitments
- 4.
- Deter future NK hostile acts and apply appropriate sanctions
- 5.
- Minimize USSR/PRC involvement in hostilities
Preferred Courses of Action
| Political | Military |
| Probably best suited to most objectives: | |
| —Request UN Security Council meeting (p. 24) | —Conduct ground, air, or naval show of force (p. 30) |
| —Consult with ROK at Presidential level (p. 24) | —Support ROK covert raid (p. 32) |
| —Request USSR cooperation in preventing expansion of hostilities (p. 27) | —Launch artillery, missile, or mortar attack across MDL (p. 34b) |
| —Request cooperation of other countries, especially Japan and those represented in Pyongyang and Seoul (p. 28) | —Declare specified waters and air space adjacent to NK to be “warning areas” (p. 34) |
| Well suited to some objectives: | |
| —Offer more military and economic assistance to ROK (p. 23) | —Conduct US or ROK amphibious raid (p. 38) |
| —Appeal for military assistance from other countries (p. 25) | —Conduct drone or manned reconnaissance over NK (p. 30b) |
| —Demand redress (p. 20) | —Conduct selective air or naval strike (p. 36) |
| —Call MAC meetings to state UNC position (p. 26) | —Seize NK assets abroad (p. 31) |
| —Boycott MAC meeting (p. 20) | —Interfere with NK communications and navigation systems (p. 28) |
| —Request NNSC investigation of NK Armistice violations (p. 26) | —Reinforce US military forces in ROK (p. 29) |
| —Return ROK combat units from Vietnam (p. 30b) | |
| Poorly suited to most objectives: | |
| —Employ economic sanctions (p. 21) | —Mine NK waters (p. 33) |
| —Condemn NK through letter to President of UN Security Council (p. 25) | —Impose naval quarantine by closing one or more straits in area (p. 34a) |
| —Impose complete naval blockade (p. 33) | |
| —Increase air and naval reconnaissance with combat escort outside NK territorial limits (p. 30a) | |
| —Launch ground raid across MDL (p. 35) | |
| —Launch US or ROK limited objective, combined-arms attack across MDL (p. 37) | |
| —Increase psychological operations against NK (p. 30b) |
Contingency Five: Limited Hostile act by ROK against NK
(Amphibious raid along NK coast; Special Forces raid on NK installation; limited ground attack across the MDL; air strike against NK installation)
[Page 62]US Objectives for This Contingency4
- 1.
- Broad objectives applicable to all contingencies (see p. 6)
- 2.
- Stop ROK provocation
- 3.
- Deter NK retaliation
- 4.
- Maintain US prestige and the credibility of US commitments
Preferred Courses of Action
| Political | Military |
| Probably best suited to most objectives: | |
| —Point out to ROKG inapplicability of Mutual Defense Agreement (p. 22) | —Threaten to suspend military assistance (p. 39) |
| —Consult with ROK at Presidential level (p. 24) | —Threaten to deny logistical support to participating ROK forces (p. 39) |
| —Request USSR and PRC cooperation in preventing expansion of hostilities (p. 27) | |
| —Request cooperation of other countries, especially Japan and those represented in Pyongyang or Seoul (p. 28) | |
| Well suited to some objectives: | |
| —Call MAC meeting to state UNC position (p. 26) | —Ask ROKG to replace US front-line units (p. 41) |
| —Condemn NK through letter to President of UN Security Council (p. 25) | —Deny air, artillery, or other combat support to participating ROK forces (p. 39) |
| —Request UN Security Council meeting (p. 24) | —Withdraw US advisors from ROK forces (p. 40) |
| —Threaten withdrawal of economic assistance (p. 21) | —Increase air and naval reconnaissance with combat escort outside NK territorial limits (p. 30a) |
| —Offer more military and economic assistance (p. 23) | —Interfere with NK communications and navigation systems (p. 2) |
| —Recall US Ambassador (p. 22) | —Conduct ground, air, or naval show of force (p. 30) |
| —Boycott MAC meeting (p. 20) | —Withdraw from combined US-ROK operational planning activities (p. 40) |
| —Order evacuation of northern nuclear storage sites (p. 41) | |
| —Return ROK combat units from Viet-Nam (p. 30b) | |
| Poorly suited to most objectives: | |
| —Demand redress (of NK) (p. 20) | —Reinforce US military forces in ROK (p. 29) |
| —Employ economic sanctions (p. 21) | —Conduct drone or manned reconnaissance over NK (p. 30b) |
| —Appeal for military assistance from other countries (p. 25) | |
| —Request NNSC investigation of NK Armistice violations (p. 26) |
Contingency Six: Large-Scale Attack by NK against US/ROK Forces
(At least division-size ground attack across the MDL, a large-scale strike in the ROK or a combination of both)
US Objectives for This Contingency:
- 1.
- Broad objectives applicable to all contingencies (Page 6)
- 2.
- Assure ROK territorial integrity
- 3.
- Minimize USSR/PRC involvement in hostilities
Preferred Courses of Action
| Political | Military |
| Probably best suited to most objectives: | |
| —Request UN Security Council meeting (Page 24) | —Execute JCS military plan for neutralization of NK air threat (see Annex E) |
| —Appeal for military assistance from other countries (Page 25) | —Execute JCS military plan for the Defense of Korea (see Annex E) |
| —Request USSR and PRC cooperation in preventing expansion of hostilities (Page 27) | |
| —Request cooperation of other countries, especially Japan and those represented in Pyongyang or Seoul (Page 28) | |
| Well suited to some objectives: | |
| —Employ economic sanctions (Page 21) | |
| —Offer more military and economic assistance to ROK (Page 23) | |
| —Consult with ROK at Presidential level (Page 24) | |
| Poorly suited to most objectives: | |
| —Condemn NK through letter to President of UN Security Council (Page 25) | |
| —Demand redress of NK (Page 20) | |
| —Boycott MAC meeting (Page 20) | |
| —Call MAC meeting to state UNC position (Page 26) | |
| —Request NNSC investigation of NK Armistice violations (Page 26) |
[Omitted here are Section III, “Analysis,” Section IV, “Guidance for Preparing Action Documents,” and 13 annexes.]
-
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–070, Washington Special Actions Group, WSAG Meeting, 7/11/69 Korea. Top Secret. Prepared in response to NSSM 34, Document 4. Prepared by a Working Group of the Korean Task Force. Although NSSM 34 called for review of this study by the NSC Review Group, it was scheduled for review by the Washington Special Actions Group; see Documents 28 and 29.
Apparently the sections of the study were prepared at different times because they have different dates. Section IA was drafted on May 20; section IB on June 7; sections IC and ID on June 11; section IIA on June 7; section IIB on June 11; and section III on June 2.
↩ - See Section II, Contingencies and Preferred Actions, B. Broad Objections, above.↩
- Pages 20–66 of the study are not printed.↩
-
Under this contingency we may be presented with a situation initially, or one may develop, which would change relative importance of US objectives, i.e., we may be forced to move from actions containing ROK adventurism to actions required for salvaging ROK interests or integrity. The following actions are suited to this latter purpose:
Political Military —Consult with ROK at Presidential level (p. 24) —Provide logistical support (p. 42) —Request USSR and PRC cooperation in preventing expansion of hostilities (p. 27) —Provide air defense south of MDL (p. 42) —Request cooperation of other countries, especially Japan and those represented in Pyongyang or Seoul (p. 28) —Provide air, naval, and artillery fire support to ROK (p. 43) —Commit US ground combat forces (p. 43) —Conduct ground, air or naval show of force (p. 30) —Increase air and naval reconnaissance with combat escort outside NK territorial limits (p. 30a) —Interfere with NK communications and navigation systems (p. 28) —Reinforce US military forces in ROK (p. 29) —Conduct drone or manned reconnaissance over NK (p. 30b) [Footnote is in the original.]
↩