Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XVIII, China, 1973–1976

86. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 25, 1974, 2:50–3:20 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• Ambassador George Bush, Chief-Designate of the United States Liaison Office in Peking
• Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
• Mr. Richard H. Solomon, Senior Staff Member, NSC

SUBJECT

• Ambassador George Bush’s Courtesy Call and Briefing Before Assignment in Peking

The conversation began with Ambassador Bush expressing his personal concern about the state of health of former President Nixon. He made some observations about the lack of balance in the U.S. media—and indeed in public attitudes in general—about the entire Watergate affair and Mr. Nixon’s resignation. He noted the positive contributions Mr. Nixon had made during his tenure, and commented on the fact that his (Bush’s) ability to represent the U.S. in China was one of these positive contributions. At the same time, there was no question that Mr. Nixon had his dark side, and this had dragged him down into the mud; but Ambassador Bush could not accept the lack of balance in the way that the press and certain individuals responded to the Nixon situation.

Mr. Solomon commented that, curious as it seemed, the Chinese showed such a degree of balance. Ironically, their capacity to evaluate historical figures in a balanced way was revealed in the way they talked about Stalin, as Mr. Bush would see when he was in China. [At this point in the conversation General Scowcroft was interrupted to take a telephone call from Mr. Nixon. When he returned he remarked that the former President sounded rather weak, and noted that it was the personal dimension of what had happened to Mr. Nixon that was particularly upsetting.]

At this point Mr. Bush directed the conversation to his forthcoming assignment in the PRC.

General Scowcroft: When you first get there you may feel a bit of frustration which I hope you are mentally prepared for. You will find yourself rather isolated. However, you will find it a most fascinating, a marvelous experience. You will see some real action while you are there. I don’t know when, but we are in the middle of a period of transition, although we don’t know exactly how it will develop.

Our official contacts with the Chinese have been very narrow—you are going up to New York next week with the Secretary—you’ll see Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao Kuan-hua. But we don’t have much dealing with the next generation in the leadership. Anything that you can do in this regard in the way of developing contacts will be helpful, although of course you can’t do anything that they don’t want you to do.

Ambassador Bush: When I was up at the U.N. we brought them out to my family home; they toasted my mother. Ambassador Huang Hua was asking all kinds of questions: Why did they have a toll bridge? Why is our industry so concentrated? We didn’t push them into a relationship, but we found them responsive. Of course they don’t want to see a brash American running around Peking.

General Scowcroft: Those people understand subtlety. But don’t hesitate to write us of your impressions, your feel of the situation in Peking.

Ambassador Bush: You normally get the routine cables which are sent through State channels?

General Scowcroft: Yes—although you probably know that you have a private channel to us here, to the Secretary and the President, which should be used for sensitive material.²

Ambassador Bush: If I don’t plow any new ground?

General Scowcroft: You should use both channels. You can make general reports via the State channel, and then send sensitive or specific elements via the White House channel. Basically, the communications use the same circuits, they just use a different encryption system. the CIA man out there holds the key. But anything you don’t want to get into the bureaucracy you should send via the White House channel.

Ambassador Bush: Lord, Habib, and Hummel mentioned that much of the China business is done here in Washington. I hope you will keep me informed. I don’t want to be out there like Adlai Stevenson [who was never told about the Bay of Pigs operation by President Kennedy when he was our Ambassador to the U.N.].

General Scowcroft: When we have any meetings with the Chinese here we’ll certainly inform you. This will not be a problem.

Ambassador Bush: Is Art Hummel aware of this channel?

General Scowcroft: I think he must know one exists, although he doesn’t normally read that material. But you know you have John Holdridge out there as your deputy. He is outstanding; he spent four years on the NSC.

Ambassador Bush: He came up to the U.N. several times. He briefed us on developments with Al Jenkins.

Mr. Solomon: He has been here through the entire development of our relations with Peking, and knows all the material.

General Scowcroft: I’m glad that you are reading into the past record. It is fascinating.

Ambassador Bush: It’s very useful. It also will be helpful to be at the dinner in New York next week.³

How do you feel about our relationship—not just about the future but its current state.

General Scowcroft: We are on track—well, I’d say that we are in a period where things are a little bit stagnant. There are no major problems, the relationship is just not active. I feel they are having their own preoccupations, sorting things out internally. They are ambivalent about Taiwan, partly because of anticipations that we have built into the relationship. But there is not the closeness of contact that we had a year ago.

Ambassador Bush: Contact on trips [by Secretary Kissinger] or at USLO?

General Scowcroft: It applies to either case.

Ambassador Bush: Does USLO feel there has been a pullback?

General Scowcroft: I’d say it’s more a matter of no movement. For example, last year we tried to get something going on Cambodia. We tried to wrap things up a year ago, but the effort passed without getting anywhere and has faded.

Ambassador Bush: When I had a recent discussion with Huang Chen I remarked that as [Republican] party leader perhaps I could have discussions in Peking on that wavelength. I told Huang I would be glad to give him my views on our political situation. I thought that might be a useful way to draw them out on their own political situation. When I was up at the U.N. Huang Hua said that now I should be called “Chairman Bush.” I said there was a helluva difference between that and the position of Chairman Mao. Huang Chen replied that they would be interested in political discussions both here and in Peking.

General Scowcroft: I’m sure they are intensely interested in our political situation. Understanding theirs is often rather difficult to do. If you compare the letters their leadership sent to President Nixon and President Ford you get some interesting nuances.⁴

Mr. Solomon: They have shown a remarkable degree of loyalty and personal warmth to Mr. Nixon.⁵ The way they communicate their political situation to us is indeed subtle. During Secretary Kissinger’s July, 1971 trip to Peking Chou En-lai made a comment about the gifts which had been brought to Chairman Mao, Lin Piao, and himself on behalf of the President. He replied, “You may say that Chairman Mao and I accept the gifts with pleasure.” This was the first subtle indication that we had of Lin Piao being in trouble.

General Scowcroft: They are fascinating people, very nice—no, civilized. At the same time they can be quite vicious in their politics. This will be a great experience for you.

Ambassador Bush: This assignment will give me a chance to start reading again.

General Scowcroft: Yes, you have been doing things at a different pace during the past several years. If there is anything that we can do for you just whip me off a cable. Anything that you send through the White House channel will be as private as talking here.

Ambassador Bush: I will. There is one point: Henry and General Haig said that I might want to beef up my staff, increase it somewhat. Do you know anything that might be behind this—new facilities? Or is there something currently being planned on this?

General Scowcroft: Well, first there is a matter of pressure we get from other departments, particularly Agriculture and Commerce. When the Liaison Office was set up we sent in what was assumed to be an initial cadre to get the facility in operation. We haven’t changed things much since then—except Jenkins, we haven’t replaced him yet I don’t think.

Mr. Solomon: The communiqué published at the end of the Secretary’s November visit last year contained the sentence about “expanding the scope of the functions of the Liaison Offices.”⁶ Exactly what this means has never been clearly spelled out. It was intended to convey a sense of accelerating the development of our relations. In fact, the Chinese have expanded their staff here in Washington substantially in the past year. They now have over 70 people. With that 400 room hotel they are living in they have plenty of room for expansion. On our side, however, we are faced with constraints posed by the lack of residential housing units in Peking. We had some people living in a hotel there for more than a year.

Ambassador Bush: I gather there was some talk being given to finding a larger plot of ground in Peking, or to renting additional space.

General Scowcroft: Well, this is the kind of issue you will be grappling with directly soon. We wish you the best of luck.

After a final exchange of pleasantries, which included Ambassador Bush recalling some of the courtesies the Chinese had shown his family when they visited his house in the outskirts of New York City, the session concluded.

1. Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files, East Asia, Box 13, PRC (1), 8/9/74–9/30/74. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House. All brackets are in the original. Scowcroft’s talking points for this meeting are ibid.
2. Scowcroft is referring to the Voyager channel, which circumvented the State Department by sending messages to the White House. James Lilley discusses this channel in China Hands, pp. 173–175.
3. A dinner with Qiao Guanhua and Kissinger was scheduled for October 2. see Document 87.
4. The Chinese note to Ford congratulated him on becoming President and declared, “We are glad to note your indication that you will continue to adhere to the principles of the Shanghai Communiqué, and we would like to avail ourselves of this opportunity to reiterate that, as in the past, we shall act according to the spirit and principles of the Shanghai Communiqué which we jointly released during President Nixon’s visit to China.” (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger/Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, China Exchanges, Box 4, unnumbered [2])
5. Zhou Enlai’s message to Nixon stated, “Both Chairman Mao and I have happy memories of your 1972 visit to China, during which we held frank and beneficial talks and issued the Shanghai Communiqué. The unlocking of the doors to friendly contacts between the Chinese and American peoples and the promotion of the relations between our two countries towards normalization are the common desire of our two peoples. The efforts which you have made in this connection will not be forgotten.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 96, Country Files, Far East, China Exchanges, April 1–August 8, 1974)
6. See footnote 7, Document 60.