75. Memorandum of Conversation1
PARTICIPANTS
- Han Hsu, Acting Chief, PRC Liaison Office
- Chi Chao-chu, Interpreter
- Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger
- Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
- Arthur W. Hummel, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian Affairs
- Department of State
Secretary Kissinger: It’s been a long time since I have seen you. Are we ever going to see your Ambassador?
Ambassador Han: I think so.
Secretary Kissinger: I thought we should meet briefly before I go to the Soviet Union so that your Prime Minister will have some idea of what we are doing and to give you some of my views.
- First, on my trip to the Soviet Union—I think it will not be a happy trip because we are not in complete agreement about my activities in the Middle East. I keep telling them I am merely following your Vice-Minister’s advice. Seriously, they are very much interested in joint activities with us in the Middle East, but we are not. Thus, this will be a difficult subject. We may agree to something on paper that looks like joint action, but it will not be substantive. We have no concrete ideas on this subject. In fact, I will pursue the strategy that I have outlined to you.
- Secondly, we will discuss strategic arms limitation. The negotiations have not been making very much progress, and we may discuss some limited subject like multiple warheads. I have no idea of what progress will be achieved, but I don’t expect much. We will inform you after my return.
They want to discuss force reductions in Europe. No substantive agreement on this is likely. There may be token progress but nothing of strategic significance. Even that may not be achieved on this visit.
Then on bilateral subjects with the Soviets, we may come to agreement on cooperation on an artificial heart and maybe on another space mission—matters of a technical kind.
At any rate, there will be no great surprises.
[Page 470]What the Soviets want from us is overtly cooperative relations in the Middle East. They have also asked us for a complete ban on nuclear testing which we would then ask others to observe. We will reject this.
These are the major issues with the Soviets. Do you have any questions?
Ambassador Han: No.
Secretary Kissinger: Then on the Middle East, in effect we are pursuing the strategy I discussed with your Prime Minister, to engage the U.S. more directly in order to restrict Soviet influence. We also wish to break up the ties between Iraq and Syria. We are making some progress in that matter. We hope we may get a disengagement agreement with Syria by the end of April. We have Israeli representatives coming here, the Syrians will come later, and then I may go back for another Middle East trip. You can see that your Vice-Minister has started me on a course of very extensive activities. Will he be coming to the special session of the General Assembly?
Ambassador Han: We have no news now.
Secretary Kissinger: On the subject of Europe, your Prime Minister should know that there is less here than meets the eye. We must frankly state our views but that does not change the basic structure of our relations.
On our bilateral relations with you, I want the Prime Minister to know that we are prepared to proceed along the implications of the last communiqué we signed in Peking.2 We would be prepared to discuss that here, or if later this year. I should make my annual visit to Peking to pursue the subject then.
But I would like your government to know that what I have discussed with your Prime Minister is unchanged with respect to basic orientation,3 and we have understood the changes he made in the draft last year to which he specially called our attention.4
One matter that I had mentioned to him in Peking was certain withdrawals we would carry out with regard to Taiwan this year, [Page 471] F–4s, Phantoms. There is going to be a delay of a few months in the withdrawal of the second squadron. It will be withdrawn by May of 1975 for technical reasons. We are just delaying somewhat the schedule that I gave the Prime Minister by a few months. But they will definitely both be withdrawn and the first one is coming out by the end of June, on schedule.
Also, you might tell our friends in Peking that we are working on the Korean matter in the spirit of the discussions we had last year.
Ambassador Han: Those are the major items I have. Some of these things were mentioned in the discussions with the Prime Minister. We were not there and do not know about this. We will report what you have said.
Secretary Kissinger: One other subject. India has come to us with a desire to improve relations with the United States in order not to be so tied to the Soviet Union. We may be starting discussions with them to see how this may be brought about. We will keep you informed of any developments. We are likely to have some technical discussions with them on economic relations and other things. No military matters obviously. But our strategy is to attempt to wean them away from the Soviet Union.
You have not been back to Peking since you arrived in Washington?
Ambassador Han: No.
Secretary Kissinger: I have been there more often than you have. I am getting practically to be an Arab. When the Foreign Minister greets me at the airport next time, I may embrace him.
I remember with great pleasure my conversations with Chairman Mao and Prime Minister Chou. We are proceeding in the spirit of those discussions. Please communicate my best wishes to our friends in Peking.
Ambassador Han: Thank you. I will do that.
Secretary Kissinger: Are you properly treated here?
Ambassador Han: Yes, all right.
Secretary Kissinger: (Pointing across the room) What do you think of this piece of art?
Ambassador Han: (Laughing). I don’t understand it.
Secretary Kissinger: That’s why I have it here.
Ambassador Han: I have seen it in several of the published photographs taken in your office.
Secretary Kissinger: (Pointing to art object on shelf) Perhaps you have noticed that. That was given to me as a gift by your government when I visited in November.
Ambassador Han: We will make a full report of what you have said. I know you are very busy.
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 96, Country Files, Far East, China Exchanges, January 1, 1973–March 31, 1974. Top Secret; Nodis. This meeting was held in the Secretary’s office.↩
- See footnote 7, Document 60.↩
- On February 16, Solomon sent Kissinger a memorandum that detected “a number of public and private signals which seem to constitute a low-key warning to us about future problems in the development of U.S.–PRC relations.” Solomon suggested “you may wish to consider some form of personal message to Premier Chou giving him whatever reassurances you can about our commitment to follow through on normalization, despite the President’s domestic difficulties.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 96, Country Files, Far East, China Exchanges, November 1, 1973–March 31, 1974)↩
- Kissinger reported to Nixon on his discussions with Zhou on the communiqué see Document 62.↩