Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XVIII, China, 1973–1976

142. Minutes of a Senior Review Group Meeting¹

Washington, February 27, 1976, 3:03–3:40 p.m.

SUBJECT

• U.S. Troops Withdrawal from Taiwan

PARTICIPANTS

• Chairman:
  • Brent Scowcroft
  • State:
  • Robert Ingersoll
  • Robert Miller
  • William Gleysteen
• DOD:
  • William Clements
  • Amos Jordan
  • Morton Abramowitz
• JCS:
  • Gen. George S. Brown
  • Lt. Gen. William Smith
  • CIA:
  • George Bush
  • James Lilley
  • Theodore Shackley
• NSC Staff:
  • William G. Hyland
  • Thomas Barnes
  • Richard Solomon
  • Col. Clint Granger
  • Michael Hornblow

General Scowcroft: We are meeting to pick up the threads on the issue of troop reductions from Taiwan. The President wants a 50% reduction over the course of the year for a year-end total of 1,400. Now how many people do we have there?

Gen. Brown: 2,277.

Mr. Gleysteen: 2,700 including civilians.

Mr. Jordan: Is that 50% figure based upon the 2700 total?

General Scowcroft: I am talking about a basic 50% reduction. We should make reasonable drawdowns and see where we come out. There have been two studies on this. Defense did a study a year ago [less than 1 line not declassified].² Bill, do you have an update for us?

Mr. Clements: A new paper was prepared this morning.

Mr. Abramowitz: We have provided the NSC staff with a summary of our suggested cuts.³

Mr. Clements: Our study excludes civilians. It is based upon a total of 2,200 military personnel and does not include intelligence personnel. The figure of 2,229 was used. We studied the alternatives of where the cuts should be to get to 50% and the implications of alternate locations. There are several alternatives. We chose alternative two with one small deletion. We would transfer the communications mission to Okinawa and Clark and continue in a minimum posture for the time being.

General Scowcroft: [1 line not declassified]

Mr. Clements: Yes. Before this meeting we were just talking about the recommendation about the F–4 depot maintenance and I am having second thoughts. We can have a savings of $10 million a year by leaving it there. We may come back to that one. Let’s leave those 27 people alone unless there are some political reasons for pulling them out.

General Scowcroft: Those 27 are military personnel. Can’t we civilianize them?

Mr. Clements: Yes we could.

Mr. Ingersoll: That’s a small number.

General Scowcroft: Do we want to keep that?

Mr. Clements: Yes, it is highly efficient. We could civilianize it if we wanted to.

General Scowcroft: Well we don’t have to face that now.

Mr. Clements: We are continuing our planning to reduce our manpower down to 1105 and can plan on meeting with the Japanese and Filipinos about the transfer [less than 1 line not declassified]. There is no problem.

Mr. Abramowitz: There may be a problem with the Philippines. It may complicate our negotiations over the bases.

Mr. Ingersoll: I suggest that a study be made of the present needs before moving. [2 lines not declassified]

Mr. Bush: [7 lines not declassified]

Gen. Scowcroft: After normalization we would still need to retain a sophisticated [less than 1 line not declassified] capability.

Mr. Bush: [1 line not declassified]

Mr. Clements: We are in basic agreement with George.

General Scowcroft: Is the equipment moveable?

Mr. Lilley: Yes. We could move it out. The 80 people would be under civilian control. [less than 1 line not declassified

Bush: [1 line not declassified]

Mr. Clements: 80 people?

Bush: [less than 1 line not declassified]

Mr. Clements: The only glitch between you and Lou is that he talks in terms of 125 people. That would mean a reduction of 350 people.

Mr. Ingersoll: This would increase our reliance on the ROC.

Mr. Shackley: [1 line not declassified]

Mr. Gleysteen: Would there be 3rd country involvement?

Mr. Shackley: [less than 1 line not declassified]

General Scowcroft: It would take two years?

Mr. Lilley: It would be finished between October 1976 and January 1977.

Mr. Abramowitz: If after normalization we could not keep the facility, [less than 1 line not declassified].

Mr. Jordan: We would have to look at the Philippines and Okinawa.

Mr. Bush: [less than 1 line not declassified]

Mr. Gleysteen: There have already been cuts [less than 1 line not declassified].

Mr. Shackley: [less than 1 line not declassified]

General Scowcroft: There would be a two year wait [less than 1 line not declassified].

Mr. Lilley: 18 months.

Mr. Clements: It would take 18 months after you got started.

Mr. Shackley: It is back to the drawing board.

Mr. Solomon: You should look at the present level of [less than 1 line not declassified] and see if it is all necessary, and then study the question of alternate sites.

Mr. Shackley: [1 line not declassified] We could not do it from anywhere else.

Mr. Lilley: There are other unique areas of [less than 1 line not declassified]. Moving would cause some degradation.

Mr. Clements: What is our objective, Brent?

General Scowcroft: Our objective is to have a 50% reduction of the total.

Mr. Clements: [1 line not declassified]

Mr. Shackley: We are looking at different time frames.

Mr. Bush: There are different assumptions on drawdowns by the end of the year.

Mr. Jordan: We can get down to 1000–1100 spaces but it might take a bit longer.

Mr. Solomon: I would like to ask what are the objections to resiting in terms of maintaining a stable base [1 line not declassified].

Mr. Lilley: [2 lines not declassified]

Mr. Shackley: [1½ lines not declassified]

General Scowcroft: [1½ lines not declassified]

Mr. Gleysteen: There is no great problem but it may not be a timely thing to do. We may have to balance things off. The original concept was to have a 50% reduction [less than 1 line not declassified]. With regard to [less than 1 line not declassified] you have to decide whether it would really be worth spending a great deal of money. You can hedge this by some resiting and some reduction of requirements. We should look at the stages leading up to a fallback position on the [less than 1 line not declassified] facility. Then the other factor is that it may not be possible to keep a [less than 1 line not declassified] facility on Taiwan after the normalization of relations with the PRC.

Mr. Ingersoll: Could the [less than 1 line not declassified] facility be used in other locations?

Mr. Lilley: [1½ lines not declassified]

General Scowcroft: [1½ lines not declassified]

Mr. Bush: [1½ lines not declassified]

Mr. Abramowitz: Part of the answer depends on us and under what the conditions would be for the normalization of relations with the PRC.

Mr. Shackley: [1½ lines not declassified]

Mr. Gleysteen: I agree. I don’t think there would be any problem from the ROC side.

Mr. Lilley: But what if normalization does not take place. There might be problems in the Taiwan Straits and there is a discrepancy between PRC and ROC power. [1½ lines not declassified]

General Brown: We are proceeding backwards. We are considering a series of administrative steps which will box us into policy positions instead of the reverse. We should talk about the total. What does the US want to do on Taiwan?

General Scowcroft: We want to get our troops out. That basically is what we are working on.

General Brown: Yes but what functions do the troops perform. Are we trying to have our cake and eat it too?

General Scowcroft: That is not necessarily true. Some of the functions can go on. Maybe we will [less than 1 line not declassified]. All that we are talking about now is getting all our troops out.

General Smith: All the troops? That is the first time I have heard that.

General Scowcroft: Eventually we will have to.

Mr. Gleysteen: As we carry out these steps now we should be realistic about our assessments. It is doubtful that we could retain a facility of this kind.

Mr. Bush: [2½ lines not declassified]

Mr. Gleysteen: That is a real possibility.

Mr. Bush: [2 lines not declassified]

Mr. Jordan: If it becomes an ROC installation you would need a few hundred civilians. [less than 1 line not declassified] 200 civilians would be needed but these could be drawn down to 125. You could continue pulling down the number of American personnel and turn it over to the ROC.

Mr. Gleysteen: We must have some [less than 1 line not declassified] facility if we turn that over to the ROC.

Mr. Abramowitz: [4 lines not declassified]

General Scowcroft: You would then end up with a gap. How long would it take to fill it.

Mr. Lilley: Well, will we be able to keep [4½ lines not declassified].

Mr. Bush: [2 lines not declassified]

Mr. Clements: I agree and that would give time for the Filipinos, Thais and Okinawans to settle down. We could then look at the situation. If we made a precipitous decision today it might be the wrong one.

Mr. Ingersoll: The $22 million is a budgetary consideration.

Mr. Bush: [1 line not declassified]

General Scowcroft: [less than 1 line not declassified] Look at the figures for next year—the FY 1977 budget—and see what you can do.

Mr. Bush: [1½ lines not declassified]

General Scowcroft: (To Clements) You are looking into the relocation of the Communications Command and the other things?

Mr. Clements: Yes. I personally am optimistic about the Philippines.

General Brown: It is hard to say now. It depends on how the negotiations go.

Mr. Miller: [1 line not declassified]

Mr. Clements: I think Marcos will be more cooperative than a lot of other people.

Mr. Miller: It is hard to tell. After a few months we will be in a better position to judge.

Mr. Bush: (To Scowcroft) We will look the stuff over and get something to you in a week or so. If the figures look alright we could then get back together.

Mr. Clements: In the meantime we (DOD) can proceed with what we are trying to do.

General Brown: We can do civilianizing. We want the uniforms out. Those 27 men in the depot can be civilianized.

General Scowcroft: But I don’t want a one-for-one substitution.

Mr. Clements: A net reduction of 1100 people is what we are talking about.

1. Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–67, NSDM 339. Top Secret. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room. The minutes are labeled “Part I of II,” and do not include the second part of the meeting, which began at 3:40 and addressed the topic of the U.S. equipment captured in Indochina. On February 4, Scowcroft approved a memorandum from several NSC staff members that recommended the convening of an SRG meeting to discuss U.S. troop reductions on Taiwan. (Memorandum from Barnes, Solomon, and Granger to Scowcroft, February 4; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–245, NSDM 248)
2. The Department of Defense study provided alternative plans to accomplish reductions of U.S. force levels on Taiwan. (Memorandum from Deputy Secretary of Defense William P. Clements to Scowcroft, November 20, 1974; Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–16, SRG Meeting, 2/27/76, Taiwan) This study was based on a memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense Schlesinger. (Memorandum from Vice Admiral Harry Train to Schlesinger, November 9, 1974, JCSM–442–74; Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files:FRC 330–77–0063, Box 3, China, Rep. of, 1974, 0001–320.2) [text not declassified]; see footnote 13, Document 112.
3. The summary of “50 percent reduction alternatives” is in the Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–67, NSDM 339. the JCS also provided a position paper for this meeting. (Memorandum from Train to Schlesinger, February 26, 1976, JCSM–62–76; Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files:FRC 330–79–0049, Box 67, China [Nats], 320.2, 1976)