Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XVIII, China, 1973–1976

139. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, January 15, 1976.

SUBJECT

• Ambassador Unger’s Meeting with the Secretary

PARTICIPANTS

• The Secretary
• Ambassador Unger, Republic of China
• Philip C. Habib, EA

Ambassador Unger asked the Secretary what guidance he had for him in the period ahead, now that the President’s visit had taken place. The Secretary asked what the Ambassador thought would be the reaction in Taiwan to normalization carried out according to the Japanese model. The Ambassador said that as far as it went this might be satisfactory but it did not cover the security question. There ensued some discussion as to what kind of formula it might be possible to persuade Peking to issue unilaterally at the time of normalization and also what might be said on the U.S. side. Ambassador asked whether, assuming Peking continues to desire to maintain good relations with the United States, it would not be possible for us to make the satisfactory resolution of this problem a condition for our proceeding with normalization.

There followed some discussion of what might occur on Taiwan if normalization does not give the island reasonable assurance of a stable future. Ambassador Unger mentioned possible initiative by independentists for example to try to establish a Republic of Taiwan and he expressed concern about Peking’s likely reaction to this. This led to some discussion of the possibilities of Peking taking military action against Taiwan and also of action short of military assault such as blockade. The Secretary several times referred to the reluctance if not the likely refusal of the U.S. Congress to intervene militarily to help Taiwan.

The Secretary then referred to the probable timing of normalization saying first that it might come sometime in 1977 but then adding that mid-1978 might be the first likely time. He anticipated that around a year from now the PRC may choose to make an important issue of Taiwan and would emphasize in any case that it regards Taiwan as an internal Chinese matter. In the year ahead the Secretary said that there is not much to do on this matter and it would be advisable to keep the issue quiet and to play it down. Ambassador Unger said that he took this to mean that he should in a continuing, steady fashion keep before the GROC that we continue to intend to carry through normalization of our relations with the PRC so that the conditioning process continues. This point however does not have to be vigorously played but can be handled in low key.

Ambassador Unger returned to the question of actual arrangements which will have to be made if normalization is to be carried out without serious destabilizing effects on Taiwan. In addition to the security question already discussed he mentioned a whole range of economic issues including most favored nation treatment, the continued supply of nuclear fuel etc. and Mr. Habib mentioned also the continued supply of military equipment. The Ambassador said that it not only would require our formulating our plans in the executive branch but certain matters might require consultation with the Congress and even some Congressional expression; he felt this would be important particularly with regard to the security question. He added that it may also be necessary in advance of any final decisions or announcements to have further consultations with Peking on some of these matters. The Secretary acknowledged these points and turned to Mr. Habib to inquire whether studies of these matters were underway and Mr. Habib confirmed that they were.

1. Source: Department of State, Papers of William H. Gleysteen: Lot 89 D 436, Box 8132, PRC Related Papers 1976. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Unger on January 16 and designated as a “rough draft.” A copy was sent to Habib and notations indicate he and Gleysteen saw it. Unidentified handwritten notations read: “Gleysteen only” and “Lord should be aware of this & if your [illegible] Solomon.” On January 12, Unger met with Scowcroft and informed him that the decision against rapid normalization of relations with the PRC had “defused consternation on Taiwan,” and that Jiang Jingguo was a leader with whom the United States could successfully work. Unger also advised that the United States continue to withdraw troops from Taiwan in a measured manner. (Memorandum of conversation, January 12; Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Box 5, People’s Republic of China)