99. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security
Affairs (Kissinger)
to President Nixon1
SUBJECT
- Chinese Communist Initiative
At Tab B is the text of the exchange which President Yahya had with Prime Minister
Chou En-lai and President
Yahya’s comments on the
Chinese reply. Chou En-lai made
the point that the Chinese reply represented the coordinated position of
Chairman Mao, Vice Chairman
Lin Piao and himself.
At Tab A is a draft Note Verbale which would respond to the ChiCom
communication and:
- —states U.S. pleasure at Peking’s offer proffered at the
February 20 Warsaw meeting to receive a U.S. representative to
discuss outstanding issues between our two Governments;
- —welcomes high level discussions seeking the improvement of
relations between our two countries; and
- —proposes a meeting of our respective representatives at the
earliest possible moment to discuss the modalities of a higher
level meeting.
[Page 249]
Tab A2
The U.S. representative at the meeting between the two sides in
Warsaw on January 20, 1970, suggested that direct discussions be
held either in Peking or Washington on the broad range of issues
which lie between the People’s Republic of China and the U.S.,
including the issue of Taiwan. This proposal was an outgrowth of the
consistent policy of the United States Government to seek
opportunities for negotiating the settlement of outstanding issues
between the two governments. The United States therefore welcomed
the remarks of the representative of the People’s Republic of China
at the Warsaw meeting of February 20, 1970, in expressing the
willingness of the Government of the People’s Republic of China to
receive in Peking a U.S. representative of Ministerial rank or a
special Presidential envoy.
In the light of the remarks of Premier Chou En-lai to President Yahya, as well as the continuing
United States interest in U.S.-China discussions at a higher level,
the United States Government believes it would be useful to begin
discussions with a view of bringing about a higher-level meeting in
Peking. The meeting in Peking would not be limited only to the
Taiwan question but would encompass other steps designed to improve
relations and reduce tensions. With respect to the U.S. military
presence on Taiwan, however, the policy of the United States
Government is to reduce its military presence in the region of East
Asia and the Pacific as tensions in this region diminish.
The United States therefore proposes that representatives of the two
governments meet together at an early convenient moment in a
location convenient to both sides to discuss the modalities of the
higher-level meeting. These modalities would include the size of the
delegations, the duration of the meeting, the agenda and a clear
understanding on the status and amenities which the U.S. delegation
would enjoy while in the People’s Republic of China.
[Page 250]
Tab B
Ambassador Hilaly dictated the
following in Mr. Kissinger’s
office at 6:05 pm, December 9:
The message was duly conveyed and Prime Minister Chou En-lai’s reply given after
three days of deliberations was as follows:
“This (meaning the reply) is not from me alone but from Chairman
Mao and Vice Chairman
Lin Piao as well. We thank
the President of Pakistan for conveying to us orally a message from
President Nixon. China has
always been willing and has always tried to negotiate by peaceful
means. Taiwan and the Straits of Taiwan are an inalienable part of
China which have now been occupied by foreign troops of the United
States for the last fifteen years. Negotiations and talks have been
going on with no results whatsoever. In order to discuss this
subject of the vacation of Chinese territories called Taiwan, a
special envoy of President Nixon’s will be most welcome in Peking.”
Chou En-lai said, in the
course of the conversation:
“We have had messages from the United States from different sources
in the past but this is the first time that the proposal has come
from a Head, through a Head, to a Head. The United States knows that
Pakistan is a great friend of China and therefore we attach
importance to the message.”
President Yahya’s
comments:
“I think it is significant that Chou
En-lai did not accept or reject the proposal as soon
as it was made and that he consulted Mao an. Lin
Piao before giving the answer. This in itself
reflects a trend which holds out some possibility. Further, at no
stage during the discussion with the Chinese leaders did they
indulge in vehement criticism of the United States. The banquet
speech of Vice Chairman Tung Pi-wu also made no reference to the
United States by name. These are additional indications of
modification of the Chinese approach in their relations with the
United States.”
