11. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security
Affairs (Kissinger)
to President Nixon1
Washington, April 29, 1969.
SUBJECT
- Evaluation of Chinese Communist Ninth Party Congress
I attach evaluations of the recently-concluded Ninth Party Congress
prepared by CIA and the Department of
State (Tabs B and C)2 covered by a brief summary
analysis prepared by my staff (Tab A.)
The analysis suggests a continuing stalemate, with Mao Tse-tung unable to push through his
visionary economic and social programs in the face of opposition within
the Party, but with that opposition unable to force its policies upon
Mao. The real power of the
Army, and particularly of the Army leadership at provincial levels,
continues to grow. The attention of the leadership remains focused upon
domestic issues and probably upon the contest for power, but because of
divided councils there is not even a clear mandate as to the direction
of future domestic policies.
Tab A
The Chinese Communist Ninth Party Congress
The Ninth Party Congress closed on April 24, after an unusually long
meeting lasting more than three weeks. Documentation as to what
happened at the Congress is unusually sparse, consisting only of the
speech given by Lin Piao to
open the Congress, a brief and unilluminating new Constitution, and
the Communiqué issued at the Congress’ close. The editorials which
normally give an indication of policy decisions in such a Chinese
conclave were missing this time, or gave confused signals as to
policy direction.
The most dramatic features of the Congress were the evidence of
continued policy differences, the failure to resolve the existing
power
[Page 28]
stalemate between
Mao and the leaders who
resist his revolutionary programs, the focus upon domestic issues,
the failure to resolve those issues in any clear fashion, and the
lack of foreign policy initiatives.
- 1.
- The continuation of deep differences
was documented by the following evidence:
- —the unusual length of the meeting, and the paucity of
press coverage.
- —the failure to evolve a coherent program or to
endorse Mao’s
specific programs.
- —the pleas for unity in the Communiqué.
- —the failure to condemn specific opponents of the
cultural revolution (aside from Liu Shao-ch’i), or to
call for further specific steps of
“purification”.
- 2.
- The power stalemate was evidenced by
the lists of Party officials which came out of the meeting.
While Mao has succeeded in
excluding from power a number of leaders who oppose him, he has
not been able to dictate a new leadership to the Party.
- —The top leadership of twenty-four remains unchanged
from the pre-Congress list. It consists only in part of
Mao’s close
adherents and continues to contain a number of
administrators and senior Army officials who probably
resist his programs.
- —Normally, the Central Committee is listed in order of
rank; this time, the new Central Committee is listed in
the Chinese equivalent in alphabetical order. It has
been expanded, apparently packed with both low-level
Maoist representatives and military men.
- —The increased power of provincial leaders is
demonstrated. Provincial leaders (most of whom are
military and most of whom are probably conservative)
have consolidated and probably expanded their power. The
Army probably remains in effective control of China
outside the center.
- —However, the standing committee of the new Politburo
has been reduced to five persons, and Mao can probably count
on a regular majority. This suggests a continuing gap
between orders from the center and execution at
provincial levels.
- 3.
-
The continued absorption with domestic issues
is clear. Doctrinal issues and ritual justification for
Mao’s class-oriented
view of society dominated the documents, and it is safe to
assume that competition for positions in the new hierarchy was
the key issue at the meeting. Foreign policy was nearly
ignored.
- 4.
- This is not to say that any consensus emerged as to what
domestic policy should be. The direction of
policy was not determined. The failure either to
endorse Mao’s program or
to set up any workable alternative makes it almost certain that
China will flounder for the next year or two without clear
policy direction.
- —There was no real endorsement of a new “great leap
forward”, nor was there any specific endorsement of
policies, Maoist or otherwise.
- —From other reports, we believe that actual current
planning recognizes that there will be very limited
capital investment, and instead emphasizes development
of agricultural production and economic stabilization
measures.
- —This emphasis conflicts with Mao’s wish to move 40
million city dwellers to the countryside, to revamp
educational policy and to place it under the control of
peasants and workers, and to expand the socialist
institutions in the countryside. Newspaper editorials
suggest a continuing argument concerning all these
policies.3
- 5.
-
Foreign policy will continue to be
subject to the general Maoist position, which emphasizes
revolutionary struggles and thereby generates suspicion of
Communist China in third countries. At the same time there is no
indication that the Chinese leaders intend to become less
cautious in avoiding foreign commitments.
- —Support for class struggles in Southeast Asia, India
and Israel was reaffirmed by Lin Piao, but given little
emphasis.
- —Denigration of the US
was pro forma.
- —Lin Piao
mentioned that the Chinese had refused an urgent Soviet
request to discuss the border issue, but he indicated
that China was considering whether to engage in border
discussions. A momentary damping down of Soviet polemics
against China suggests that in early April the Soviets
indeed expected there might be some hope for
negotiation. The polemics resumed as the Congress
closed, suggesting that this hope has evaporated.
- —The public statements did not manifest any Chinese
concern that war with the US or the USSR is imminent.
- —Treatment of Vietnam was perfunctory, and the Chinese
have not endorsed the North Korean position during the
recent tension.
- —The ineffectiveness of the Maoist line in foreign
policy is suggested by China’s isolation. The Congress
had kind words for no governments and for only one
Party, the Albanian. A combination of moralistic
rigidity towards other Communists, together with a
professed desire to see the overthrow of non-Communist
neighbors, would appear likely to earn the hostility of
both.
