Attached is a memorandum on the nuclear non-use problem together with
some new drafting.
I have not in this paper attempted to relate this issue explicitly to the
more complex problem of balancing our overall Soviet relations with our
Chinese relations since I cannot very confidently judge what it may be
desirable to do with respect to the former in the light of the most
recent developments in the latter. Your trip2 and its
results and consequences may of course make it desirable to inject some
momentum into our Soviet relations—although it is not self-evident that
the initiative in this respect needs or ought to be all ours.
Undoubtedly, the Soviets are edgy, not only because of your China trip
but because many aspects of our relations are beset by problems: CSCE and MBFR are moving slowly or stalled because we cannot easily
control Allied behavior3 (itself a reflection of Allied suspicions and
anxieties about our Soviet relations and of uncertainties in our
European relations due to economics); SALT is stalled over a seemingly basic incompatibility of
interests and objectives; the gas deals are hung up because of our
uncertainties over energy policy and bureaucratic snarls; the US-Soviet
Commercial Commission is stalled because we have not appointed a
successor to Peterson. I cannot
judge how maneuvering over the Middle East interacts with all of this.
Brezhnev is almost certainly in an uncomfortable position with his
colleagues and he must worry about the outlook for his trip to the US.
(The fact that other, less central aspects of our bilateral relations
are doing reasonably well is not enough to offset the various
difficulties cited above.)
The Soviets will undoubtedly try to turn the non-use issue into a
catalyst that breaks the logjam on other matters and as the center-piece
of what might be accomplished during a Brezhnev trip. But this is precisely our dilemma: this
issue almost certainly cannot be solved by us
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without either doing grave damage to our Chinese
relations or further complicating those with Western Europe.
Perhaps, before you go further on any of the alternatives suggested in
the attached paper, we should try to talk all this out.
Attachment
Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security
Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security
Affairs (Kissinger)5
Washington,
February 20,
1973.
SUBJECT
- The Nuclear Non Use Proposal
From the outset the Soviet proposal raised a series of the most
delicate and dangerous problems for us. The stipulations in their
first few drafts would have left the Allies and China exposed to
Soviet attack and even implied that we engage in joint action
against third countries. In the drafting and redrafting we have
managed to soften these implications by adopting “presuppositions”
about the general renunciation of force (Article II) and by limiting
any joint obligations (Article III) against third party conflicts to
generalities—“make every effort.”
Soviet concessions in the remainder of the draft—agreeing to our
“create conditions” language and our “presuppositions”—are linked to
the adoption of the central Soviet proposition. Every Soviet draft
begins with a straightforward renunciation of the use of nuclear
weapons. No American draft has gone this far.
Thus, the central dilemma has not been resolved. There is still a
conflict between our respective perceptions of the effect of this
document on the international community. We wish to leave the
impression that should there be a conventional conflict we would not
be barred from nuclear use. Obviously no piece of paper restricts us
in wartime, but to create the impression in peacetime that we are
limited to a conventional conflict strikes at the heart of our
nuclear guarantees for our Allies. On the other hand, to the extent
that we try to protect the option
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of using nuclear weapons we create a China
problem. Peking’s fear is that the Soviets will gain a US
endorsement of the legitimacy of using nuclear weapons against third
parties that commit “aggression” by conventional means. At least
this was the principal argument in the bitter Sino-Soviet debate on
this at the UN last fall.6
There is probably no way to reconcile these two aspects. The outcome
of our exchange with the Soviets, no matter how clever the drafting,
will tilt us toward protecting NATO and leaving China uncovered, or protecting China
but leaving Western Europe unprotected. Moreover, we may get the
worst case—alienating both NATO
and China. This raises the question of what could compensate us?
The Soviet Angle
It is apparent that the Soviets attach great weight to this project.
Obviously, they realize that from their standpoint it is a
winner—whatever the outcome, the very nature of the subject may cast
doubt on our Allied commitments or give the impression of a freer
Soviet hand against China. By tying the agreement to the Brezhnev visit, they have sought
to impress us with the seriousness of the project and have raised
the stakes. Even if they have other reasons for deferring a spring
visit, they are now less likely to back away from the linkage of
this project and the outcome of the next summit.
For Brezhnev it would
probably represent the crowning achievement of his “peace program.”
Considering the various political undercurrents in the Soviet
leadership (the Shelest affair and Polyansky’s demotion)7 and the aggravating political strains of the economic
situation, it may be that Brezhnev can sell further détente only if he can
show more tangible results vis-à-vis China or Europe. If so, this
gives us some tactical leverage in terms of negotiating a better
document, but it also reduces Soviet ability to defer or abandon it
altogether.
The Allied Problem
By discreetly airing this project with some of the Allies we have
conditioned them to accept something of this sort this year. At the
same time, the UK reaction indicates
a deep concern over the entire affair.8
They grudgingly agree that the document they helped draft might be
published at the summit, and then “confidential and unpublicized”
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discussion continue.
They are operating, however, from an outdated
draft that was artfully obscure. (In fact, I am not sure
that we ever actually gave the British draft to the Soviets.) In any
case we have now gone beyond that draft, and the British (and
French) reaction to the latest US draft would probably be even more
reserved. As the British memorandum points out this affair could
blow up in public. Even if it does not, awareness of the existence
of the negotiations probably deepens the suspicions in the Alliance
that the US is subordinating its Allied commitments to a larger
understanding with the USSR.
This has to be seen in the context of the infection that seems to be
setting in among the Europeans. A series of seemingly marginal
issues in MBFR and CSCE, following the surprises of the
May summit, the leisurely and vague discussions of FBS, are all accumulating to transform
what might have been tactical misunderstandings into a major
malaise. Adding this non-use project at this
time, before another SALT
agreement, or the completion of CSCE and a round of MBFR could intensify the trouble. (I am not arguing the
rights or wrongs of these European anxieties or of the other issues
like Vietnam, on which we and the Europeans have differed. The
observable fact is that the Alliance has not learned to manage the
psychological aspects of détente.)
Our Options
Our strategy has been to gain time and to envelop the basic Soviet
proposition with a series of conditions that avoid binding
commitments and project the final agreement into the future. The
Soviets have accepted some of this, but without giving up their
central demand for a clear renunciation of nuclear use.
The UK suggested something along the
lines of continuing study, and this seems to raise the question of a
commission. The commission idea, however,
works two ways: (a) a commission would seem to put an agreement even
further into the future, but (b) it might
also reinforce anxieties over a private Soviet-American dialogue on
a subject of overriding importance to Europe, Japan and China.
We seem to have the following choices:
1. To postpone the project on the grounds that it is still premature;
we would propose reconsidering after another SALT agreement, after CSCE and at least some progress in
MBFR. This has some logic; a
properly caveated agreement to consider “binding obligations” might
seem a plausible follow on to SALT
II and would be more palatable in the relaxed atmosphere of
post-CSCE Europe. The Soviets
would not take this setback gracefully, and it might have to be
coupled with some new SALT
proposals.
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2. Alternatively, we could fold this problem into SALT. Since we have had the accidents
agreement,9 and have the SCC,10 we could announce
that non-use of force including nuclear use, was being considered in
the context of a permanent agreement. One advantage is that by
linking the two issues we gain some more leverage on SALT—it might even be a way out of
FBS problems—i.e.,
non-circumvention combined with removing the danger of nuclear war
being two principles that might be agreed to under the rubric of
“restraint.” It has the advantage of the strictly bilateral SALT context.
3. Alternatively, we could use the commission concept to reduce the
entire project to a very brief hortatory declaration, devoid of the
details in the existing draft. The declaration would, as at present,
declare the goal of removing the danger of nuclear war, state
agreement to work toward establishing binding obligations, and
establish a commission to examine the matter; the SALT
SCC could be the commission since
it is charged with certain strategic topics, or a special Joint
Commission could be created.
—This has the advantage of avoiding some of the disputation on the
non-use of force and the use of nuclear weapons that are subject to
differing interpretations. It could be presented to the Allies as a
minimal step, worth considering. We could then consult with them
openly, with no implications that policies have changed.
—It might placate the Soviets—though this is uncertain.
—We could tell the Soviets that the existing drafting could be used
to produce a declaration at a later time.
—It is consistent with our “phased” approach which we have tried to
sell to Brezhnev.
4. We could insert the commission into the current drafts, presumably
using the creation of the commission as the rationale for going into
the detail contained in the current drafts. We would set forth some
of the propositions as subjects for the Commission to examine rather
than agreed principles.
—As noted, the Commission does not work entirely in our favor. A new
Soviet-American institution to deal with nuclear strategy and use
cuts across our Allies’ planning.
—On the other hand, the existence of a commission placates the
Soviets, without forcing us to make an outright commitment.
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At Tab A is a redraft of our existing paper, with the Commission
inserted and the old draft suitably modified. At Tab B is the short
hortatory declaration, which focuses on the establishment of the
Commission. Tab C is a possible SALT announcement.11
