Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XV, Soviet Union, June 1972–August 1974

113. Message From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)¹

Zavidovo, May 9, 1973, 1254Z.

Hakto 30. Please inform President as follows.

1. Spent another eight-plus hours with Brezhnev and Gromyko Tuesday.² We covered bilateral issues, including trade, summit communiqué. A series of new bilateral agreements should be negotiable by the time of Brezhnev visit which though not major in themselves will keep momentum going. On trade, Brezhnev again displayed great eagerness for long-term projects as well as major additional credits. I gave generally favorable response but pointed out that specifics should be worked out in joint US-Soviet Commercial Commission and that immediate task for us is to get MFN legislation for which I assured Brezhnev you would fight.

2. In separate session with Gromyko I hit hard on Vietnam peace agreement violations, serious consequences of DRV offensive and obstructionist behavior of Poles and Hungarians. Gromyko, like Brezhnev earlier, said Soviets support strict observance of agreements by all sides. Relationship of Vietnam situation to Brezhnev trip to US can hardly be lost on Soviets. On Middle East, Soviets toward end of session seemed to recognize uselessness of the maximalist position in their paper which they had given me earlier and showed some flexibility. We will explore in the next few weeks whether something can be done at the summit.

3. During four hour dinner Brezhnev was voluble and jovial and again struck theme of long-term US-Soviet friendship and his high regard for you, and displayed great anticipation of his US trip. I stressed several times the need for new concrete SALT accomplishment, a point I also made strongly with Dobrynin. Soviets claim they have not had time to study our specific proposals. Whether this is true or not, Brezhnev can be in no doubt that for US the nuclear war prevention agreement can not rpt not stand alone as major summit accomplishment.

4. I will have more considered overall assessment of this trip and how it fits into our present situation and general foreign policy strategy on my return.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 32, HAK Trip Files, HAK Moscow, London Trip, May 4–11, 1973, HAKTO & Misc. Secret; Sensitive; Immediate; Eyes Only.
2. See Documents 111 and 112.