Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972

231. Paper Prepared by the National Security Council Staff¹

Washington, May 16, 1972.

MIDDLE EAST

I. The Soviet Perception

A. The Soviet Perception of Where We Stand

When Gromyko visited Washington and met with you privately on September 29, 1971,² he indicated that—as part of a settlement—the Soviet Union was prepared to (1) agree to a ban on arms supplies to the Middle East, (2) withdraw all Soviet military forces from the Middle East, and (3) participate in and guarantee the settlement arrangements. These steps could take effect as part of an interim solution, provided this was linked closely to a final settlement within a year. Gromyko urged that talks begin in the special channel aimed at reaching a specific U.S. Soviet understanding by the time of the Summit. You told Gromyko that this was a constructive proposal, and that you were willing to have exploratory talks begin to test the feasibility of reaching such an understanding.

This Soviet offer of September 29, 1971, still stands. It, and our expression of interest in it, are the basis of their continuing appeals to us to finalize a bilateral agreement.

The issues were discussed in a tentative way in the special channel last October and November. We indicated positive but very general interest in their propositions. On October 19, for example, you wrote Brezhnev that their proposals were “very constructive” and that exploratory secret talks were “desirable.”³ But not until January 21, 1972,⁴ did we indicate to the Soviets that intensive U.S.-Soviet discussions could proceed. It has been made clear repeatedly to Dobrynin that there were extraordinary difficulties involved, and we could not count on easily duplicating the success we had achieved on Berlin in the special Nixon–Brezhnev channel. On Berlin, all or most of the parties genuinely wanted an agreement, and we had able Ambassadors to do the negotiating and leak-proof procedures to protect the special channel. On the Middle East, Dobrynin was reminded, the substantive positions were much harder to reconcile, and the danger of leaks, particularly on the Egyptian side, was considerable.

The Soviets have shown impatience throughout, even to the point of sending us a note⁵ while we were in China urging that intensive efforts begin on the Middle East once we returned. They have stressed the importance to U.S.-Soviet relations of making progress on the Middle East. They see their own offer as generous; they say they will be flexible on everything else except on the demand for return to the 1967 frontiers; and they say they have resisted Sadat’s pleas for offensive weapons⁶ in the interests of Brezhnev’s new “positive” approach to U.S.-Soviet relations.

The basic issue, of course, is what concessions we and Israel have to make in return for the proposed Soviet concessions.

The Soviet offer is indeed positive but of course it is hardly selfless. An agreement on that basis would extricate them from a difficult situation. Their client cannot win a war with the Israelis. Therefore a continuation of the present simmering crisis can only lead to one of two situations: either a conviction on the part of the Arabs that their alliance with the Soviet Union is inadequate to produce a settlement, or a war by the Egyptians which would face the Soviets with a decision on military support and a risk out of all proportion to anything that could be achieved. Thus, in our view, the Soviet offer—while positive—does not eliminate the continuing need for realism and flexibility on both sides.

We have tried to make clear to the Soviets throughout that, in view of the difficulties involved, progress was possible only if we first achieved a partial or interim solution, e.g., a reopening of (and partial Israeli withdrawal from) the Suez Canal. The Soviets have no objection to an interim settlement, provided it is tied tightly to a comprehensive settlement. The key to a final settlement, we then suggested, might be to find some formula for a continuing Israeli presence, without sovereignty, at Sharm el-Sheikh, in order to provide some security for Israel after an overall Israeli withdrawal from Sinai. The Soviets informed us in February that they would consider any suggestions for such a formula.⁷ (It was easier for them to react to U.S. proposals on this, Dobrynin explained, than to make proposals of their own.) In mid-March we suggested some kind of multilateral arrangement among the riparian states on the Gulf of Aqaba, as a possible figleaf to cover an Israeli presence (without sovereignty) at Sharm el-Sheikh.⁸

In Moscow in April, Brezhnev and Gromyko raised the Middle East again and pushed hard:

• —They tried to imply that we were reneging on a promise since we had agreed in September to reach an understanding by the Summit. I made clear that you had agreed in September to seek a general understanding by the Summit; the problem was that we did not yet have one. They had to bear in mind the complexities, and that any U.S. pressure on Israel would have to wait until after the election in any case. Further talks were advisable in the special channel in advance of your Moscow visit; they agreed.
• —Brezhnev repeatedly stressed the danger of events in the Middle East getting out of control. An army as big as the Egyptian Army, he pointed out, was not easy to keep tranquil, especially in present conditions.
• —Brezhnev presented two notes [attached]⁹ outlining a detailed Soviet position for a final settlement. They represented nothing different from what the Soviets had been discussing with State, aside from reiterating the offer Gromyko had made to you.
• —Dobrynin had stated explicitly in November that, while they had to insist in principle that the Egyptian, Jordanian, and Syrian settlements were all interconnected, they were prepared to proceed de facto with the Egyptian settlement separately. In Moscow in April, Gromyko and Brezhnev hardened the Soviet position. Gromyko now stressed that a final settlement had to be a “complex” or “global” one, i.e., embracing Syria and Jordan as well as Egypt. Different segments of it could be negotiated in different stages (e.g., an overall Egyptian settlement, or an interim accord on the Canal), but the obligations were interdependent and had to go into force simultaneously.
• —The one specific proposal we had made for a final settlement (the concept of Israeli presence without sovereignty) Gromyko indicated was unacceptable. (In November, Dobrynin had said the Soviets were willing to explore any proposals on this.)

In sum, in April the Soviets were still extremely eager for some kind of general bilateral understanding by the time of the Summit. They were clearly worried about an explosion in the Middle East—but they were not so worried that they were prepared to soften their terms. The U.S. side agreed to try in the special channel to work out some general principles, which could then be elaborated on at the Summit. At the very least, the two sides could set a direction at the Summit.¹⁰

Since then, Sadat has visited Moscow again¹¹ and Brezhnev has written you again (on May 1)¹² with yet another appeal for intensive bilateral talks looking to an accord at the Summit. Brezhnev wrote you that “due to Israel’s position the number of uncertain moments in the situation there is greater than before, and that it is fraught with serious consequences.”

The Vietnam crisis, of course, intervened since then to make impossible any further substantive progress in the special channel.

B. The Soviet Strategy

The Soviets have three inter-related interests¹³ in raising the Middle East at the Summit:

• First, they have an interest in using the opportunity to seek movement toward an Arab-Israeli settlement, although probably not at major cost to Cairo. They feel the heat of increasing Egyptian disillusionment over their inability to help Egypt recover its occupied territory.¹⁴ Sadat has repeatedly pressed Moscow for either the means to regain his territory militarily or Soviet pressure on the U.S. to help bring about a diplomatic settlement. The Soviets, while providing substantial quantities of air defense and ground equipment, must know that offensive military action by Sadat now would be defeated. But Sadat may feel the need to break the ceasefire long before he is militarily ready, with the possibility of forcing the Soviets to come to his aid. The appearance of movement toward a diplomatic solution helps the Soviets restrain his actions and resist his demands for offensive weaponry.
• Secondly, the Soviets have an interest in enhancing an improved relationship with the U.S. as well as in avoiding a confrontation which would threaten it.¹⁵ Pressing for a Mideast settlement at the Summit is an opportunity for them to portray themselves as constructive on a major concrete issue. They also have genuine reason to worry that Sadat might break the ceasefire this summer if he feels that the Summit has produced no promise of diplomatic progress. The Soviets have probably done what they can do to remind Sadat that he cannot achieve a significant military victory; to us they will probably exaggerate the likelihood of his breaking the ceasefire in order to increase our concern. But the Soviets cannot reasonably rule out Sadat’s capacity for a foolish step, and they must prefer not to face the choices and risks that would be posed for them if a war erupted and Sadat was taking a beating.
• Thirdly, the Soviets have a general interest in enhancing their position in the Middle East vis-à-vis the U.S. To begin with, this manifests itself in their desire to play an equal role in any settlement that is achieved.¹⁶ They feel the need to be seen as a power that can affect the course of events in this area; for this they want to be cut into the peacemaking process again. They have been extremely sensitive ever since the middle of 1970 about unilateral U.S. initiatives—first our initiative for a standstill ceasefire and then our attempt to negotiate an interim settlement on the Suez Canal. You will probably feel this sensitivity in your discussions. Beyond their focus on the central Arab-Israeli situation, the Soviets are of course continuing to push to strengthen their position in the Middle East overall, including the Persian Gulf and eastern Mediterranean. They have signed a Friendship Treaty with the Iraqis,¹⁷ and they are trying for one with Syria. In doing this they have continued to snipe at our position in the area, leveling propaganda at our homeporting arrangements in Greece and in Bahrain.

This interest in enhancing their own position¹⁸ probably reduces their willingness to pay any high cost to pressure the Arabs to make the concessions necessary for achievement of a settlement. And the longer the crisis festers, the greater the strain on U.S. relations with the Arab world and the pressures on pro-Western Arab governments. On the other hand, progress on the diplomatic front also serves the Soviets’ interest by reducing the risks to them in long-term expansion and consolidation of their gains.¹⁹

The Soviet strategy thus seems to be:

• —To reiterate their proposals for a Soviet troop withdrawal, arms ban, and guarantee, in order to appear forthcoming in a way which obviates their need to press the Arabs for concessions.
• —To press Sadat to preserve the ceasefire for an extended period, in order to head off an explosion.
• —To press us for active negotiations and concessions (stressing the danger of an explosion), in order to champion the Arab cause²⁰ and hold out to the Arabs some prospect of recovery of the territories through diplomacy.

At the Summit, the Soviets will reiterate their offer and assign to us the responsibility for making the next move. They will press again for formalizing a bilateral “confidential arrangement” as soon as possible, even at the Summit itself. We should not expect any further loosening of their positions on the substantive terms (although it is not inconceivable that, in light of our failure so far to be forthcoming and their recent session with Sadat, they might come up with something new).

The Soviet positions on the principal issues continue to be as follows (as reflected in the two notes Brezhnev delivered in Moscow, at Tabs A and B):

• —Withdrawal of Israeli Forces: “The major question which predetermines all the rest,” as Gromyko put it in Moscow, is the withdrawal of Israeli forces. The Soviets claim to have no doubt that we are capable of putting “effective pressure” on Israel to bring this about. This means withdrawal of all Israeli troops from all the occupied territories, back to the pre-June 1967 borders. Gromyko flatly rejected any possible formulas for a continuing Israeli military or quasi-military (police) presence, even under UN auspices and with a full recognition of Egyptian sovereignty. Temporary stationing of UN personnel at Sharm el-Sheikh would be acceptable, however.
• —Global Settlement: The final settlement has to embrace Egypt, Syria, and Jordan. No particular settlement (e.g., an Israeli-Egyptian accord) can go into force until the other components are present, though the Soviets concede that the separate settlements need not all be negotiated simultaneously. Thus the withdrawal of Soviet troops would not begin to be implemented until after agreement was reached on full settlements with Egypt, Jordan and Syria. Gromyko insisted on this interdependence of the settlements, even though I pointed out that it had the disadvantage (for them) of delaying Israel’s withdrawal, too.
• —Interim Settlement: The Soviets also allow the possibility of, e.g., a Canal settlement with Egypt, provided it is treated as a stage in the implementation of a pre-agreed “complex” or comprehensive solution. In this context, “we could take up and solve the Canal problem first,” Gromyko told me, and this part of any private U.S.-Soviet accord could also be made public and implementation could begin as soon as it is reached. The Soviets nevertheless will be unhappy with the interim approach to the extent that it stretches out the time frame of the implementation process, and to the extent that the Israelis are reluctant to make any follow-up commitments in advance of prior implementation of the interim settlement.
• —Other Aspects of a Settlement: The Soviets insist on a return to the pre-1967 situation in Gaza and also in Jerusalem, i.e., Jordanian sovereignty over East Jerusalem, with the addition of demilitarization of the whole city and UN-enforced freedom of access to all holy places. They believe a solution to their Palestinians’ problem must be an integral part of a settlement. The Soviets also accept the ideas of demilitarized zones on both sides of all borders; freedom of navigation for Israel in the Suez Canal, Gulf of Aqaba, and Straits of Tiran; a ceasefire (though limited to the period during which Israeli troops are withdrawing) international guarantees by the UN or the great powers; and (as Gromyko offered to you) Soviet troop withdrawal as part of a settlement, and willingness to agree to arms limitation once a settlement is reached.

II. Our Interests and Strategy

A. U.S. Interests

Israel now finds itself in an advantageous military position and will not trade away what it sees as essential to its security simply to secure a formal diplomatic peace. The United States is committed to Israel’s survival. At the same time, we have always felt a strong interest in securing a settlement that would end the perpetual crisis. As a superpower we have felt a special responsibility to help restore stability, as well as a special awareness of the danger of U.S.-Soviet military confrontation in another eruption of Middle East war. As long as the crisis festers, moreover, our remaining political ties with the 50 million people of the Arab world, which were once substantial, are further and further attenuated, and our economic ties—which continue to be substantial—are increasingly jeopardized. The permanent state of tension means continuing and intensifying internal pressures over the long term on the remaining moderate Arab regimes.

We continue to believe that the terms of a settlement inevitably must be negotiated between the parties themselves. This is the only process that the Israelis will accept, and our ability to move the Israelis depends in part on our ability to establish such a process.

Nevertheless, this Administration has involved itself actively in Middle East diplomacy in various forums, in the effort to help provide a framework for a peace settlement. From 1969 to early 1971 we conducted talks bilaterally with the USSR, and in the Four-Power forum, to develop the November 1967 UN Security Council Resolution into a framework for negotiation. In June 1970 the U.S. took the initiative unilaterally to propose a ceasefire and military standstill to try to establish conditions for Egyptian-Israeli talks.

In May 1971 the U.S. took up the idea (which both Egyptian and Israeli officials had broached) of seeking an interim settlement to reopen the Suez Canal and pull troops part way back.

B. Our Strategy

The principal issue for us at the Summit is the degree to which we want to join the Soviets now in a joint “confidential arrangement” committing both of us to press certain concrete proposals on our respective clients. Gromyko’s offer to you last September, our willingness then to try to reach some general understanding by the Summit, and their continued pressure to finalize an agreement, have now made this a major issue in U.S. Soviet relations.

We have always made clear to the Soviets that there are severe limits on what the United States can deliver. You have to be able to return from Moscow and truthfully say there were no “secret deals” at the Summit. You also do not want to engage in intensive technical negotiation in the heated atmosphere of a Summit and without the meticulous preparations that gives us a good idea in advance of how we will come out. More substantively, this whole question puts us up against one of the crucial difficulties of the Middle East problem: The Israelis will not yield easily, and on some points they will not yield without a war. If we are not careful we could end up with a new eruption in the Middle East and linked with the Soviets against the Israelis. This is out of the question.

Our objective in a Middle East negotiation is to induce Israeli cooperation but in a way that does not exacerbate fears or create temptations and invite a war. The problem is to come up with proposals which the Israelis—under pressure—may accept.

The State Department recommends that we resist any Soviet proposals for cooperative diplomacy, and that we continue to insist that the regional parties must be the focal point of negotiations. State argues that Israel is unlikely to accept either the substance or the procedure of a U.S.-Soviet deal, though State recognizes that a Mideast stand-off in Moscow would leave a very unpredictable situation in the post-Summit period. My view is that the Mideast has become too big an issue in U.S.-Soviet relations for us to simply stonewall at the Summit.

Our task then at the Summit is to find ways to be forthcoming and positive to the Soviets but without committing ourselves to anything which we cannot accomplish or which is in fact dangerous.

Since the Vietnam crisis deprived us of any chance to prepare adequately for a consummated agreement at the Summit, even on general principles, our positive thrust at the Summit now should have two elements:

• —suggesting an intensive work program, looking toward an agreement later this year, and
• —urging again that we concentrate on the interim approach, as the only realistic way to make any progress toward a final settlement.

The work program could be a modification of what was already suggested to Brezhnev and Gromyko in April: you and Brezhnev could discuss general principles at the Summit, and hopefully set a general positive direction. Intensive follow-up discussions could then continue through the special channel over the summer, and I could come back to Moscow in September. The two sides could reach agreement then or soon after on an overall solution, and also proceed immediately to publication and implementation of an interim agreement.

We might also try to persuade the Soviets that a boost to realistic movement toward a settlement would be the establishment of some sort of contact—perhaps secret—between Egypt and Israel, in which both would signify willingness to discuss all possible solutions.

On the substance, the most positive contribution we can make at the Summit is to focus the U.S.-Soviet discussion on the partial or interim approach. For two years there has been a frenzy of activity without substance on our side, and substantive proposals without realism on their side.²¹ The whole point of direct Presidential involvement at this stage is to cut through all this, and to concentrate our energies and skills on something that can actually be achieved.

The U.S. turned to the idea of an interim settlement in 1971 (a) because it seemed unlikely that an overall settlement could be achieved in one step, (b) because both the Israelis and the Egyptians seemed to show some interest in the idea, and (c) because it seemed a way of showing movement while stretching out the settlement process and pushing the most difficult issues out into the future. To persuade the Soviets to accept this kind of approach would require that they also accept the idea that the period for a settlement would be longer than they had previously anticipated and the fact that they might not be able to get commitments on the ultimate settlement in the early part of this process.

You wrote Brezhnev on October 19, 1971, that a “lasting settlement,” in your view, “will come about only if a start is made on a more limited or ‘interim’ basis.” The rationale is that a partial Israeli withdrawal as a first step is the only feasible prospect at the moment, and it could be made to establish the principle and process of Israeli withdrawal. A modest first step has the best chance of acceptance by the Israelis, and also the advantage for the Egyptians that it is clearly only partial and therefore necessarily implies that more withdrawal has to come. The more ambitious the first partial withdrawal, the harder it would be to persuade the Israelis and the more “permanent” it might become after being carried out. It should be in the Soviet interest, too, to get the withdrawal process started and in a way that makes further withdrawal look likely.

The Israelis have indicated to us their willingness to agree to an interim Suez Canal settlement along the following lines, and we have presented this to the Soviets in order to be able to deal with the issue at the Summit concretely and with preparation:

• —Israel will withdraw its forces from the Suez Canal to the west side of the Sinai passes.
• —This withdrawal, and Egyptian presence on the east bank, will commence when the Canal is opened and functioning.
• —There can be some civilian Egyptian presence (including police) on the east bank once the Canal is opened and functioning, but no Egyptian military crossing or presence.
• —There must be a maximum period for a ceasefire, at least until the beginning of Calendar Year 1974.
• —Israel will postpone its own use of the Canal until a later phase following the opening and functioning of the Canal.

The Israelis have offered these concessions in the special channel on the assumption that the U.S. will not re-commit itself to the Rogers Plan for an overall settlement, specifically the Rogers Plan’s provision for withdrawal of all Israeli forces to the former international boundary with Egypt. Israel will agree to a reference to the fact that the interim settlement represents a move toward an ultimate settlement but with the details to be worked out as outlined in UN Security Council Resolution 242.²² (That resolution provides that the details of an overall settlement are to be worked out between the parties under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring.)

C. Your Talking Points

1. The Soviet proposal which Gromyko presented to you in September 1971 (for Soviet troop withdrawal, arms ban, and guarantees) is constructive and positive. It is evidence of the General-Secretary’s genuine belief that we two superpowers have a special responsibility for peace and an overriding interest in a constructive relationship between us.

• —You agreed with Gromyko in September that we should try to reach a substantive accord by the time of the Summit. Unfortunately, in spite of good-faith efforts on both sides, we have not reached one. The task now is to look ahead, not back, and to set a positive direction at the Summit which can guide intensive talks this year to a successful conclusion.
• —You had a full report on Dr. Kissinger’s talks in Moscow,²³ and you had agreed, as Dr. Kissinger had suggested to the General-Secretary, that we should make a new effort before the Summit. The Vietnam crisis intervened, however, to make this impossible. This is yet another example of how Vietnam has stood in the way of realizing the full potential of U.S.-Soviet cooperation. An early Vietnam peace would protect against a recurrence in the future.

2. The Middle East problem is extraordinarily difficult. It will not be as easy for us to resolve this in our special channel as it was to reach the Berlin agreement.

• —The parties involved are more volatile, and the danger of leaks much greater. The root conflict is much more bitter, and the two sides’ positions may even be irreconcilable in many respects.
• —Realism and flexibility are needed on both sides. We cannot allow the settlement process itself to exacerbate fears or create temptations in the area and ignite a war.
• —However, the U.S. and USSR are both determined to contain the danger to world peace, and this in itself affords great hope.²⁴

3. The United States proposes that the two leaders seek at this Summit meeting to set a firm positive direction and to agree on an intensive work program.

• —This is the intent of the proposal which Dr. Kissinger has just presented in the special channel—it is a basis for concrete discussion for the two sides to fill in. Intensive follow-up talks can begin immediately afterward in the special channel to flesh out what is agreed here.
• —We can aim at a substantive understanding by September, at which time Dr. Kissinger could travel again to Moscow to firm it up.
• —This understanding would have to be kept confidential through this year, and the Soviet Government must understand—as we have indicated to them many times—that implementation could not realistically begin until mid-1973. (After the election it will take time for a new government to be constituted and to establish itself. For many reasons, only a new government will be capable of carrying out the confidential arrangements.) When Dr. Kissinger visits again in September, however, we are prepared for announcement and implementation of an interim agreement immediately.

4. As you wrote to the General-Secretary on October 19, 1971, an interim approach is the only realistic and practical approach. The most positive contribution the two leaders can make at the Summit is to agree to concentrate on this. This approach offers important advantages:

• —It offers the only realistic prospect of achieving movement soon, perhaps even this year. It has the best chance of acceptance by Israel, and the best chance of avoiding getting bogged down in all the major issues which have blocked a comprehensive settlement.
• —Even a modest Israeli withdrawal would establish the principle (and process) of Israeli withdrawal.
• —The more modest the initial arrangement, the more obvious and inevitable it is that further withdrawal will have to follow.

5. To facilitate the whole process of settlement, it would be valuable if the U.S. and USSR could find some way to bring about secret direct Egyptian-Israeli talks in which both would signify willingness to discuss all possible solutions.

6. We continue to seek a final settlement. We understand that the Soviet Union attaches the highest importance to this, and therefore we see the interim solution as an integral part of a final settlement. There are many possible ways to tie these together, and Dr. Kissinger and Ambassador Dobrynin should work this out.

7. We understand that the Soviet Union now seeks a “complex” or comprehensive settlement embracing Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. This of course is most ambitious, and will postpone for a long time the day when Israeli troops withdraw.

• —The talks in the special channel have so far concentrated on the Egyptian phase. The Jordanian phase has been touched upon, and in any case we believe the Jordanian part would be easy to achieve at about the same time. The Syrian part, however, will be quite difficult. Perhaps it will be easier to bring the Syrians along once we are close to concluding the Egyptian and Jordanian phases.
• —We understand the interrelationships. Kissinger and Dobrynin should be able to work out a practical solution.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 484, President’s Trip Files, The President, Issues Papers—USSR, III, [Part 1]. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. A notation on the paper indicates the President saw it. According to a May 16 memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon, this was the full content of the third briefing book for the summit sent to the President. (Ibid., RG 59, S/P Files, Lot 77 D 112, Box 335, Lord Chronology, May, 1972)
2. A memorandum of this conversation is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XIII, Soviet Union, October 1970–October 1971.
3. Document 6.
4. Document 39.
5. Reference is possibly to the Soviet note sent to Washington while Nixon and Kissinger were in China; Document 53. This message does not mention the Middle East, but no other Soviet message dated during the period of the trip to China has been found.
6. Following his April 27–29 trip to Moscow, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat made a speech on May 1 stating that the Soviet Union would “within a reasonable period of time” supply Egypt with the “offensive power to liberate our lands.”
7. See Document 46.
8. See Document 62.
9. Brackets in the source text. The tabs are not attached.
10. See Documents 141, 150, 152, and 159 for discussions of the Middle East during Kissinger’s secret trip to Moscow.
11. Sadat visited Moscow February 2–4 and April 27–29.
12. See Nixon and Kissinger’s comments on Brezhnev’s May 1 message in their memoirs. Nixon, RN: Memoirs, pp. 594–595; Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 1168–1169.
13. The President underlined “Soviets have three inter-related interests.”
14. The President underlined these two sentences.
15. The President underlined this sentence.
16. The President underlined these two sentences.
17. The Iraqi Government signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union on April 9.
18. The President underlined “interest in enhancing their own position.”
19. The President underlined this sentence.
20. The President underlined “in order to champion the Arab cause.”
21. The President underlined this sentence.
22. For text of UN Security Council Resolution 242, November 22, 1967; see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XIX, Document 542.
23. See Document 169.
24. The President underlined these three points.