Attachment
Washington,
August 5,
1971.
Letter From President Nixon to Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev3
Dear Mr. Secretary:
Ambassador Beam has reported
to me his recent conversation with Foreign Minister Gromyko.4 Of course, I am in close touch with the
conversations conducted between Ambassador Dobrynin and my Assistant for
National Security Affairs, Henry
Kissinger.5 I should like, in the light of these
conversations, to set forth certain thoughts concerning relations
between the United States and the Soviet Union.
My Administration has from the outset conducted its policy toward the
Soviet Union, and all other states, on the basis of mutual
recognition and respect for the legitimate interests of each side.
This is particularly important in the relations between our two
countries, for our size and power impose upon us a special
responsibility to understand each other’s purposes and to deal with
care and restraint with those issues that affect our respective
security interests.
In the numerous negotiations in which, I am pleased to say, our two
countries are now engaged in various forums, my premise has been
that both of us will approach the issues concretely and in a spirit
of mutual accommodation. We do, of course, confront many
divergences, some due to misunderstanding or inadequate
communication but many the result of differing needs and
interests.
It is clear that in relations between great powers such clashes of
interest will not be resolved by superficial formulae nor by
attempts to obtain a unilateral advantage.
Experience has clearly shown that unless a genuine effort is made to
resolve conflicting views and interests to the satisfaction of each
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party, there will
either be no agreement or any agreement reached will not last and
may indeed lead to new misunderstandings and tensions. No power, and
certainly not a great power, can be expected to abide by
arrangements that operate to its disadvantage.
It follows from this approach that it is futile to expect powerful
nations to be swayed by pressure, exerted either directly, or
indirectly, through third parties. I wish to emphasize this point in
order to avoid any misinterpretation of my Administration’s efforts
over the past two and a half years to normalize and improve
relations with a number of countries. Thus, the several steps which
I have already taken toward better contacts with the People’s
Republic of China and, in particular, my forthcoming visit to Peking
have no hidden motives. They are designed to end the hostility that
has unfortunately existed between the United States and the mainland
of China for over twenty years and to lay the basis for relations
which will be mutually beneficial and contribute to peace and
stability in Asia and the world as a whole. Such a relationship
between two peoples which have had a history of past friendship is
not aimed at any third country, including, specifically, the Soviet
Union. Indeed, I firmly believe that in restoring contacts that have
been so long broken, the United States will be contributing to a
wider normalization of international relationships.
United States policy with respect to the countries of Eastern Europe,
an area which we recognize is historically of special concern to the
Soviet Union, is likewise intended to contribute to a broad
improvement of international relations, to widen contacts and to
stimulate mutually beneficial cooperation in practical matters. In
shaping our policies toward these and other countries, we raise no
conditions concerning the internal order or the foreign associations
of the countries concerned; the only test is whether there is a
mutual readiness for good relations on a basis of reciprocity.
Friendship with the United States, in my view, does not imply
hostility toward any other country.
Mr. Secretary, as you are aware, I have maintained a close personal
interest in the developing relations between our two countries and
particularly in the major negotiations in which both our governments
have been involved. I have noted with satisfaction that a
businesslike manner, constructive tone and spirit of compromise have
been manifest in these negotiations. As Mr. Kissinger has already explained to
Ambassador Dobrynin, I have
felt there has at times been excessive emphasis on shorter term
tactical considerations to the detriment of longer term objectives.
Precision about details is, of course, important in any agreement if
it is to be viable. But I believe we should never lose sight of the
goals to be achieved. American negotiators, acting under my
instructions,
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will
continue to be guided by this general approach and will not engage
in bargaining simply for its own sake.6
The agreement announced on May 20 represented a commitment at the
highest levels of the political leadership of both our countries to
achieve a successful outcome in the negotiations for the limitation
of strategic armaments. My representatives in Helsinki are under
instructions to complete an early equitable agreement on ABM’s as well as a parallel agreement
on certain measures with regard to the limitation of strategic
offensive weapons. We will then have a basis for a more complete
limitation of offensive weapons. The final result will strengthen
security, permit valuable resources and talents to be used for
constructive purposes and, together with progress in the resolution
of other differences, contribute to a stable and peaceful world. As
the two countries possessing the most powerful arsenals of
destructive weapons, we have, I believe, a unique obligation and a
unique opportunity to achieve these goals.
I am likewise confident that a successful outcome can be achieved in
the negotiations on Berlin in which our two countries are joined by
Britain and France. I have always believed that constructive
cooperation in Europe and world peace generally will be difficult if
not impossible to obtain if Berlin remains a source of tension and
crises. Peace will not, of course, be automatic once a satisfactory
Berlin agreement is reached; but at least one major threat to it
will have been set aside. A foundation will have been laid for
removing other long-standing sources of strife and tension in the
center of Europe. In this connection, my Administration has welcomed
the improvement in relations between the Federal Republic of Germany
and its eastern neighbors, including the Soviet Union. I am
convinced, and hope you share this conviction, that a successful
completion of the Berlin negotiations will further accelerate this
trend and strengthen peace between East and West in Europe.
I also remain deeply committed to the search for a lasting settlement
of the crisis in the Middle East. This will be achieved only if all
the parties to the conflict there are confident that their vital
interests are safeguarded. The task is complex and requires
patience. As great powers we have a special responsibility not to
undertake any action that would complicate the situation. The United
States seeks no uni-lateral advantages or special position. We
believe that this should be the attitude of all outside powers.
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In assessing the issues which affect the constructive evolution of
our relations, one should not overlook the complications posed by
the continuation of the conflict in Southeast Asia. As long as the
war persists, it inevitably introduces distortion into the policies
of some key countries beyond the basic principles outlined in this
letter. As Dr. Kissinger has
explained to Ambassador Dobrynin, we have made an eminently fair proposal
for bringing an end to that conflict on a basis just to all sides. I
would hope that the Soviet Union would exercise its influence to
achieve peace in that area of the world. Such an action would give a
great impetus to the policies of reconciliation we intend to
pursue.
Without reviewing in detail the other issues on which our Governments
are in contact, I wish merely to state my expectation that our two
countries can make steady progress in improving bilateral relations
and in expanding the numerous areas of practical cooperation—such as
trade or the exploration of outer space—where our interests run in
parallel, where each of us can learn and benefit from the
accomplishments of the other and where resources and experience can
be shared.
I do not minimize the problems that remain and will persist between
us. Differences in social and political systems, in historical
background and in geographic position will not disappear. But I
believe that if our two countries conduct themselves with restraint
and display understanding and tolerance of our respective interests,
we of this generation will be able to pass on to our children a
better and safer world.
Sincerely,
