17. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security
Affairs (Kissinger)
to President Nixon1
Washington, October 19,
1970.
- SUBJECT
- Your Meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, October 22,
1970
Gromyko will be the
highest-ranking Soviet official with whom you will have met since
assuming office, although you saw his deputy, Kuznetsov, at the Eisenhower funeral last year,2 a man who is
actually Gromyko’s senior in
Party terms. You failed to see Gromyko when he was here for the UN last year, because the Soviets, while probing for an
appointment, failed technically to ask for it. They later claimed to
have been snubbed.
This memorandum discusses
- —the setting of your meeting, which is perhaps the most
important US-Soviet encounter
since you entered office;
- —Gromyko’s probable
purposes and line; and
- —your purposes and general exposition.
Tabs with more detailed status reports and talking points on the subjects
that are most likely to come up are attached in the order in which they
would probably arise. There is also a sketch of Gromyko’s career and personality.3
The Setting
The meeting occurs at a moment of unusual uncertainty in both capitals
concerning the intentions and purposes of the other side.
On our side we have been asking ourselves whether there is in process
some turn to the hard side in Moscow’s relations with us, based on
Soviet performances in the Middle East, their military foray into the
(to us) sensitive area of Cuba, their probe of our resolve in the Berlin
air lanes, their continuing strategic military build-up, the generally
hostile
[Page 57]
tone of their
propaganda, their apparent effort to divide us from the Europeans, their
continued failure to play a constructive role in Vietnam, etc.
Contrasting this, we have continued to see an interest on their part in
certain aspects of SALT, including a
rather striking if obscure overture for a deal involving joint actions
against “provocative” third countries; continued willingness to move
ahead on a treaty dealing with the seabed, and on at least certain
limited forms of cooperation in the areas of science and space. Whatever
their precise motives, there is no doubt that the Soviets are interested
in a summit meeting.
As usual our analysis of Soviet policy and its purposes has been
complicated by ambiguity or lack of good evidence concerning the
attitudes of Soviet leaders, the jockeying that must be going on among
them in this pre-Party Congress period and, generally, the distribution
of power and influence within the Soviet oligarchy.
Recent events may be part of a deliberate pattern of testing our
resolve—and your personal mettle—and of determining to what degree the
Nixon Doctrine,4 our domestic problems, and the emergence of
strategic parity may be affecting our foreign policies.
In part at least, the Soviets may have thought from our handling of the
Middle East cease-fire and from our failure to react to increased
military activity on their part in and around Cuba that they had
acquired some increased freedom of maneuver.
By the same token, however, many recent Soviet actions may have their
principal explanation and motivation in the particular situation
involved and their more or less simultaneous timing may be fortuitous.
(Of course, even if the latter hypothesis were the more valid, Soviet
conduct could quickly develop into a pattern if it were sensed in Moscow
that US resolve and power were in process
of retracting and for this reason our actions regarding Cambodia,
Jordan, Cuba and Berlin, as well as your trip may have a sobering
effect.) In any event, we must examine our future policies toward the
USSR in the coming period with more
than routine attention.
In Moscow, at the same time, there appears to be uncertainty concerning
our policies and our evolution. It is of interest that apart from
Gromyko, there are currently
in the US two other high-ranking Soviet
officials: one, Zimyanin, the
chief editor of Pravda, outranks Gromyko in the leadership (where
Gromyko still remains
essentially a technician
[Page 58]
on the
fringes of power); the other, Zamyatin, a former diplomat and subordinate of Gromyko’s, is now the head of TASS, which, apart from being something
like a Western news agency, is also the most far-flung Soviet
intelligence gathering machine and the regime’s
transmission belt for information, guidance and indoctrination to the
Soviet population and Communists abroad. Each of these three officials
(and they were preceded in the last several months by a score of
well-connected scientists, scholars and America experts), is undoubtedly
part of a major Soviet reconnaissance, the results of which could have
considerable bearing on the important pending Soviet decisions for the
Party Congress, especially those relating to the next five-year plan. In
short, this may be a moment of fundamental decision-making in Moscow,
too.
For the Soviets, the question of what our policies in major areas like
the Middle East, Southeast Asia, Europe and in the military competition
are likely to be, are crucial questions because, given the Chinese
challenge and its costs, the obvious problems of the maturing but
lagging Soviet economy and the continuing instability in Eastern Europe
requiring periodic use of actual Soviet power and maintenance of
potential power must all somehow be brought into rational framework in
the next five-year plan. In addition to the normal jostling for position
among Soviet leaders (possibly more serious right now since all the top
men are in their late sixties and must sooner or later give way to
younger men), the substantive issues involved are bound to involve
differences of opinion and assessment and may, indeed, be highly
controversial.
Experience has shown that on the whole we do
best
- —if we consult our own interests and not attempt to influence the
domestic trends in the Kremlin;
- —that we recognize that for outsiders Kremlin infighting is a
highly opaque matter which we can do little, at least by deliberate
action, to influence anyway (even if the outcome is undoubtedly a
matter of great concern to us); and
- —that we will serve our interests most successfully by getting our
purposes and policies across to the Soviets as clearly as
possible.
Gromyko’s Purposes and Line
Gromyko will have a dual purpose
when he sees you:
- —to gauge you personally and your attitudes; and
- —to attempt to influence US
policies in ways desired by his masters in Moscow.
His reports (and those which may be separately sent back to Moscow by the
other Soviets present), as well as the reports of the other high-level
Soviets currently here will be read by all members of the Politburo and
hence by all factions, if factions there be, in the Kremlin.
[Page 59]
They could thus be of great
importance at this particular point in Moscow’s decision-making and
political maneuvering.
I understand from Dobrynin that
Gromyko’s general attitude
will be to put the past behind us and to see where we go from here. He
will stress that to the Soviet leaders the events of the summer look
like a deliberate turning towards a tougher line by us. He will inquire
whether this is a settled policy and indicate a willingness to improve
relations while at the same time being prepared to stick out a hard
line.
It will almost certainly be part of Gromyko’s tactic to put you on the defensive by reciting
an indictment of your policies. He will do this (1) to get a debating
advantage, (2) to test your reaction, (3) to draw from you denials or
modifications in our policies, and (4) to
influence your decisions after his departure.
But while using this tactic, incidentally almost certainly in a fairly
conciliatory manner, he may also try to test your
interest in certain agreements and deals. This effort is partly
related to Moscow’s own interest, right now, in attempting to decide on
whether certain beneficial arrangements can be made with the US and partly to its effort to determine
whether you are looking for agreements as a means
of cutting back on overseas involvements.
His major points are likely to be the following:
- —the Soviets were favorably impressed by your initial
statements about entering an era of negotiation and by several
aspects of your letter to Kosygin of April 1969 detailing the elements of
your approach;5
- —but they soon began to feel that your deeds failed to match
your words (he may go so far as to suggest that this was due to
the influence of “forces,” like the “military-industrial
complex,” interested in keeping the cold war alive and in making
profits from armaments.
Uppermost in the indictment that Gromyko may attempt to put forth
will be
—the allegation that we mounted a deliberate campaign this summer to
discredit Soviet credibility and trustworthiness by our charges that
they violated the Suez standstill agreement and, more recently, were
attempting to violate the 1962 Cuban understandings.
[Page 60]
Other points that may come up in his critical remarks
about us might include
- —the charge that we are holding Germans back in their Eastern
policy;
- —the claim that we are sabotaging the Soviet proposal for a
European security conference which, Moscow claims, almost all
Europeans want;
- —our one-sided support of Israel;
- —our “saber-rattling” in the Mediterranean;
- —our decisions to proceed with Safeguard Phase II and our MIRV program.
(Note: The Soviet press and other high, medium and low-ranking officials
have also complained of the following which Gromyko, however, probably would not
raise:
- —our China policy, which allegedly encourages Chinese
hostility toward the USSR;
- —your trip to Romania6 which allegedly
gave heart to unsavory “nationalist” elements in Romania and
elsewhere in Eastern Europe;
- —our discriminatory trade policies toward the USSR;
- —our Vietnamization policy, which the Soviets claim prolongs
the war while saving us casualties;
- —our alleged role in the overthrow of Sihanouk7 and subsequent “invasion”
of Cambodia, which the Soviets claim played into Chinese
hands.)
The point about this catalogue, which in one form or another has appeared
in the Soviet press or has been rehearsed in private is that it is a
mixture of actual Soviet perceptions and of typical Soviet hypocrisy.
Indeed, in some respects it reflects the fact that some of your signals
may have been unclear while others have in fact gotten through to the
Kremlin leaders, unpalatable though they may have been to them.
As noted, Gromyko will probably
also display interest in certain kinds of collaboration with us. The
areas involved (and discussed in greater detail in the Tabs) may be the
Middle East, Berlin, certain aspects of SALT and summitry.
In sum, while trying to put you on the defensive and testing your
reactions that way, he will want to get a more precise measure of your
commitments and your view towards negotiations.
[Page 61]
(Note: The Soviets not only see the US as
subject to numerous contradictory cross currents but they are uncertain
whether to regard you personally as favorable or
unfavorable—”unrealistic” or “realistic” in their terms—to a modus
vivendi, by which they mean not only certain mutually beneficial
agreements but our acceptance of them as a world power and of their
hegemonial position in Eastern Europe.)
Your Purposes and Basic
Message
Your overriding purpose in this conversation is—to put across the points—
- —that you make the fundamental decisions concerning foreign
policy,
- —that your purposes are clear,
- —that you are precise, careful and thoughtful,
- —that you are prepared for serious progress in US-Soviet relations but only on the
basis of strict reciprocity.
Beyond that, you should make the
following points:
- —that you meant what you said about entering an era of
negotiation and that at this stage in your Presidency you may
have the greatest flexibility to negotiate.
- —You are in a better position to make basic settlements than
your immediate predecessors because you don’t have to worry
about attacks from the right.8
- —This is early enough in your tenure so that a course set now
can have effect in either direction of conciliation or, if you
are driven to it, resistance to encroachment.
- —that there does, however, remain a strong latent
anti-Communism in our population which could be aroused if the
impression grew that the Soviets were “testing” you and
attempting to take unilateral advantage of our effort to reorder
some of our priorities in line with the needs of the
seventies;
- —that we did not mount any organized
campaign to cast doubt on Soviet trustworthiness and credibility
but that whatever the legal technicalities may have been, you,
your Administration, and our people did get the clear impression
that at Suez the Soviets had deliberately abetted and
participated in the violation of a clear understanding that
there be a military standstill;
- —that, in addition, we cannot help but view with concern the
continued growth of Soviet strategic power, not because we think we have
[Page 62]
a God-given right to superiority but because the Soviet programs are
taking a form (SS–9s especially)
that are hard to consider with defensive intent;
- —that you firmly believe that negotiations will be successful
and yield viable results only if conducted with a sense of
security and that you are quite prepared to see the Soviets
approach this matter in the same way; but that an effort on
their part to gain unilateral advantage or military preeminence
will inevitably produce countermeasures and set back the
prospect for negotiation;
- —that you believe firmly that an orderly structure of world
peace must rest on mutual respect of the interests of all
concerned and that the disregard of the legitimate interests of
one side by the other will merely postpone the advent of an era
of genuine negotiation;
- —that while our two countries obviously carry special
responsibilities by virtue of our power, size and influence, you
consider notions of condominium unacceptable and
incongruous.
[Omitted here is a list of Tabs A–J.]
Tab A
MIDDLE EAST
Where the Situation Now
Stands
- 1.
- The U.S. persuaded the UAR to accept its peace
initiative9 by
implying that if there were a ceasefire/standstill we would show
restraint in military assistance to Israel and in a negotiation
would press Israel to withdraw in a settlement.
- 2.
- The U.S. persuaded the Israelis
to accept by assuring them that talks would begin from the then
existing military balance. For this purpose, a standstill was
linked to the ceasefire.
- 3.
- The Soviets presumably shared the UAR interest in engaging the U.S. The Soviets must also have understood the
basis of our approach to Israel:
- —They certainly understood that a standstill was part
of the cease-fire. On July 23, Secretary Rogers told Dobrynin we assume that
a standstill as part of the ceasefire is also acceptable
to the USSR. Dobrynin said, “Yes, of
course.”10
- —The USSR is
legalistically correct in saying that it was not party
to the negotiation of the actual terms of the
ceasefire/standstill agreement on August 7. However,
they were informed of the terms and, on August 12, of
the U.S. understanding of
the agreement regarding new construction and movement of
missiles.
- —The Soviets also now claim that Secretary Rogers said the
cease-fire/standstill was not an integral part of the
U.S. peace
initiative. However, in addition to knowing the U.S. reason for insisting on
the standstill, the language in the formula which both
Israel and the UAR
accepted stated that they had accepted the
ceasefire/standstill “to facilitate Ambassador Jarring’s
mission.”
- —They knew your statement of July 3111 and never contradicted it.
- 4.
- The Soviets continue to participate in continuing development
of the UAR missile complex. They
have never formally acknowledged that Soviet personnel are
involved, and there is some evidence that UAR crews are beginning to take
over some SA–3s.
- 5.
- It may be that the USSR urged
Syria to withdraw rather than reinforce their units after their
defeat by the Jordanians and after Israeli and U.S. moves, but we have no
evidence.12
- 6.
- The situation now is that:
- —Both Israel and the UAR have indicated a willingness to see the
ceasefire extended when it expires November 5.
- —Israel would be content to see the ceasefire continue
without negotiations. It has said it will not begin
talks until the UAR
standstill zone is restored to what it was on August
7.
- —The UAR wants
negotiations with the U.S. heavily pressing Israel to withdraw.
The UAR is willing to
continue the ceasefire as long as there is hope of
talks. If that hope wanes, the UAR will feel compelled to renew the war of
attrition to regenerate pressure for talks. The UAR is not willing to
remove “one missile” from the standstill zone to get
talks started.
- —Riad told
Secretary Rogers
that the UAR must seek a
resolution in the UN
General Assembly to use with the UAR army to get the cease-fire extended. It
is not clear what kind of resolution he will seek. One
possibility is a simple reaffirmation of the 1967 UN resolution and a
[Page 64]
call for
continuation of the ceasefire. The other is a more
radical call for Israeli withdrawal.
What Gromyko Will Say
- 1.
- Gromyko will probably
repeat these general points:
- —the U.S. is slandering
them with allegations of violations; the USSR was not party to the
standstill agreement;13
- —the U.S. is
undermining negotiations and abetting continued Israeli
occupation;
- —Israel violated the standstill;
- —the U.S. never made
negotiations contingent on the standstill.
- 2.
- He may repeat the specific suggestion
he made to Secretary Rogers—that the U.S. give thought to washing out the past
difficulties and to proceeding on the following basis:
- —that the ceasefire be extended for a limited
period;
- —that talks be resumed under Jarring’s
auspices;
- —that the US–USSR talks be resumed; and
- —that the Four Power talks continue.
- Gromyko added that
proceeding on the above basis would obviate the need for General
Assembly debate.
- 3.
- What this adds up to is Gromyko asking the U.S. to forget the standstill
violations and press Israel again to begin talks on the basis of
the new military balance as if nothing had happened.
The U.S. Position
The U.S. problems with Gromyko’s specific proposal are
that:
- —Israel would not accept without U.S. pressure.
- —Pressing Israel on the basis of Soviet failure to observe
an understanding would be exceptionally difficult.
- —It would set a bad precedent for other U.S.-Soviet agreements such as
SALT.
The U.S. must see some evidence of
Soviet performance before it can press Israel into talks. The choice
is between:
- —Continuing to press for some rollback of missiles and
- —Acknowledging the violations as a fait accompli but
insisting on some other demonstration of Soviet readiness to
participate seriously in the negotiating process.
The U.S. has already moved to redress
the balance on its side by:
- —Removing the self-imposed restraint on assistance to
Israel;
- —Providing Israel with a set ($55–90 million) of the best
U.S. electronic equipment
to cope with the missile complex;
- —Assuring Israel of $500 million in financial assistance
(as contrasted to $189 million promised last March).
The U.S. may now have an interest in a
tacit extension of the cease-fire which would unhook it from the
U.S. peace initiative. Only in
that way, perhaps, can Israel move away from the position that it
will not talk until the missiles are rolled back. But some evidence
of constructive Soviet performance will still be necessary.14
The tactical question is whether to volunteer suggestions now that
could form the basis of a new understanding or to await a Soviet
move. In view of our interest in creating a new situation and in
view of the fact that the UAR still
cannot get its territory back militarily, it would seem preferable
to wait Moscow out.
What You Might Say
- 1.
- You are not going to discuss details. The facts are
known.
- 2.
- Whether the USSR was a legal
party to the standstill negotiation or not, the U.S. position and intent were well
known in Moscow. The agreement was violated. This not only
undercuts prospects for negotiation but raises the most serious
questions in our minds.
- 3.
- The only U.S. interests in the
Middle East are a stable peace and the freedom of the nations in
that area to pursue their interests free from external
domination.
- 4.
- It is a fact that Israel will not leave the occupied
territories unless it is either pushed out (with incalculable
consequences) or there are negotiations in good faith. We
support the latter.
- 5.
- To get negotiations started, there will have to be assurance
that the USSR and UAR will help establish a sound
base for them. The U.S. in July
and August negotiated such a base. It has been undercut. Now we
would welcome Soviet suggestions as to what new base might be
established.
- 6.
- The quid pro quo for Israel’s vacating the occupied
territories is promises of living in peace or securing
arrangements by which confidence in these assurances can be
restored.
- 7.
- A debate in the General Assembly is now in prospect at
Egyptian instigation. That will either improve the atmosphere
for continuation of the ceasefire and for talks or make them
more difficult.
- 8.
- The U.S. has made clear that it
would like to see the ceasefire extended. But this will be up to
those on the ground.
- 9.
- As regards arms shipments (if Gromyko raises the subject), the U.S. remains ready to discuss an
agreement curtailing them for both
sides.15
Tab B
BERLIN, GERMAN EASTERN POLICY
Where the Situation Now
Stands
We originally took the initiative following your first European trip
to suggest that if there is to be an era of negotiation, Berlin
should be removed or at least reduced as a source of recurrent
crises.16
Consequently, we and our Western allies, including the FRG, worked out a series of measures
which we felt would enhance the viability of West Berlin, make
crises less likely but leave the basic four-power responsibility for
the city as a whole untouched.17 We did not
have in mind any new arrangements concerning the military garrisons
since these are already covered by agreements and
understandings.
We always recognized that any agreement about
Berlin would be vulnerable to sudden Soviet and/or East German
violation because geography simply could not be altered.
Consequently, we were always reluctant to consider concessions in
the present status but aimed at its improvement. We did not know whether the
Soviets might have a similar interest but thought it worth testing
them.
Then Brandt came into office
and activated his Ostpolitik. As it turned out, its center-piece, as
distinct from past German efforts to reach agreements with the East,
was an agreement with Moscow on renunciation of force and
recognition of borders. The Germans hoped by this to allay Soviet
fears that they were trying to disaffect the Soviet satellites by
dealing only with them but not with the USSR.18
[Page 67]
Under pressure from the opposition CDU, and coming from Berlin himself, Brandt recognized that he could
never claim success in his Eastern policy if it did not include an
improved arrangement for Berlin. As a result, the Berlin
negotiations became intimately entangled in the Ostpolitik to the
point that the Germans said they would not ratify their treaty with
the Soviets (in which the FRG made
all the concessions, which the Soviets gladly pocketed) unless there
were first a new agreement on Berlin.
In agreement with the FRG, the allies
worked out a proposal that would (1) regularize civilian access to
the city, (2) confirm and strengthen the economic and cultural ties
between West Berlin and the FRG, and
(3) maintain an FRG political
presence in West Berlin.19 In return, the FRG was willing to curtail certain
activities the Soviets found especially obnoxious, like meetings of
FRG constitutional organs.
The Germans argued that the Soviets were so interested in getting the
Moscow treaty ratified (because of their concern with China and
their desire to get German economic assistance—which the Soviets
were already getting anyway), that skillful negotiating tactics by
the Western allies would induce the Soviets to accept the Western
list even though most of the concessions would be Soviet.
There has never been any evidence to support this. In several
Ambassadorial meetings, the Soviets proceeded to put forward a
series of proposals which, in effect, would make of West Berlin a
third German state (somewhat like their old “free city” proposal
minus any demands for our military pullout). They would agree to
various economic and cultural ties between the city and the outside
world, including the FRG; to
safeguards for civilian access; but not to any political ties
between the city and the FRG. In
addition, the Soviets demanded termination of a whole series of
“subversive” activities, like radio broadcasts and rejected any
discussion of East Berlin, although they do not reject the
continuation of four-power (US,
UK, French, Soviet)
responsibilities for the city as a whole, mainly because they do not
want to be excluded from a role in the Western sectors. In fact, the
Soviet proposals have aggravated the Berlin position, not eased
it.20
Gromyko’s Probable Line
In discussing this subject, which is now deadlocked over the issues
described above, Gromyko may
- —reiterate Soviet readiness to safeguard the economic life
of West Berlin and civilian access to it;
- —reaffirm the continued validity of four-power
responsibility for the city as a whole;
- —but reject any political ties between the FRG and West Berlin;
- —in effect enunciate the idea of West Berlin as a third
German state with membership in the UN but without any change in the Western
military/civilian presence;
- —reject the idea that there can be any discussion of East
Berlin which the Soviets regard as the capital of the GDR and a closed
subject.
(Note: There have recently been some indications that the Soviets
might consider some low-key FRG
political representation in West Berlin. This has aroused interest
in Brandt’s entourage
(Bahr) who has frequent
surreptitious contacts with Soviet officials. We may at some point
be faced with German schemes for reducing or transforming the FRG’s political presence in West Berlin
in an effort to get an agreement which would then permit Brandt to claim success and submit
his Moscow treaty for ratification. But as a quid pro quo for such
an arrangement the situation may evolve in which the Germans pay
twice, on Ostpolitik and on Berlin.)
In Response to Gromyko, You Should
- —avoid details;
- —avoid leaving the impression that you are willing to
scale down the Western position since the Soviets will immediately carry this back to the
Germans (and the French, who, if anything, have
been the most reluctant to negotiate about Berlin at all
because they want to keep their position in Berlin
unimpaired as leverage vis-à-vis the Germans);
- —reiterate your basic view that there can be little hope
of peace and quiet in Europe if Berlin boils up into crisis
periodically;
- —state your conviction that there ought to be improvements
in the life of the West Berliners, if only on humanitarian
grounds;
- —note the basic reality that the FRG feels intimate ties with the city and that
there can be no thought of making it a third German
state;
- —express the hope that the Ambassadors will continue their
work and reach a mutually acceptable agreement which would
be bound to have beneficial effects beyond Berlin
itself.21
[Page 69]
Tab C
EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE
Current Situation
The Soviets have long proposed a conference designed to ratify the
status quo in Europe, including the permanent division of Germany
and Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe. Until recently, however,
their proposed agenda has avoided all concrete issues and dealt with
such matters as economic cooperation and renunciation of force.
We and the NATO allies have taken
the view that a conference at some point may have a role but that it
is pointless and dangerous if it is held and results in failure.
NATO in Brussels with our
participation has been attempting to identify concrete issues that
might be dealt with. The problem is that the real issues between
East and West in Europe relate to Germany and these are being
negotiated separately. Lately, the idea has gained ground that the
question of mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) might be a subject to be
discussed and the Soviets in their latest proposals suggested that a
conference might set up a commission which could negotiate the
reduction or withdrawal of foreign forces from Europe (an old Soviet
staple). Our own studies are still in process and it is proving
extremely complex to come up with options or packages that would be
(1) realistic given Soviet geographic proximity and our remoteness,
(2) negotiable, and (3) leave NATO
with forces with which to conduct a rational strategy.22
(Note: The idea of a conference has also been advocated by Romania
which believes that the mere existence of an ongoing negotiating
forum would afford it additional protection against Soviet pressure
or attack; the Romanians also have the idea that somehow the
conference could be used to vitiate the Brezhnev Doctrine.23
Tito, as you recall, was
rather cool to the idea [though Yugoslav diplomats have also
advocated it strongly] unless there was careful preparation and a
very concrete agenda.)24
[Page 70]
Gromyko may
- —start by accusing us of dragging our feet;
- —note that the Soviets of course would have no objection if we
and Canada participated;
- —claim that the very holding of a conference would improve the
atmosphere;
- —note that the Soviets have no objection to eventual talks
about mutual reductions in foreign forces.25
You may wish to say that
- —you have no objection in principle to a conference and we
have not made special efforts to prevent it;
- —you do believe that conferences of this kind should not be
held for their own sake but deal with concrete issues and have
some promise of success;
- —simply to talk about more trade and exchanges seems
unnecessary because other forums already exist for that;
- —each of us should take a careful look at the question of
mutual force reductions and then determine whether some
negotiating effort is worthwhile.26
(You may wish to refer to Tito’s comments to you.)
Tab D
SALT
It is doubtful that Gromyko
will have a detailed response to our last Helsinki proposals
(overall limit on ICBM and SLBM launchers, limit on bombers,
ABMs confined to capital city
protection or eliminated, no MIRV
ban).27
He may, however, seek to test your reaction to an ABM-only agreement.28 Despite the difficulties you have had in
the Congress with Safeguard the Soviets seem concerned about the
ultimate expansion of Safeguard in a way that would erode their
deterrent.
[Page 71]
Gromyko may allude to the
rather vague but potentially quite far-reaching Soviet proposal for
a US-Soviet agreement to act jointly
against “provocative” attacks or threats from third countries. (They
seem mainly to have China in mind.)
Gromyko may also raise again
the question of our forward-based aircraft and short-range missiles
and assert a Soviet right to have “compensation” for these weapons
in any agreement since they can reach Soviet territory.
The Soviets in Vienna appeared to display less interest in a MIRV ban than we had assumed. They
rejected our proposal for a flight-test ban (on the ground that it
would leave them at a technological disadvantage) and for a
deployment ban (on the ground that it would involve on-site
inspection). Their own proposal for an uninspected deployment and
production ban was unacceptable to us because of its
unenforceability.29
Gromyko may make some critical
comments about our Safeguard and MIRV programs and may also charge that our “campaign”
to impugn Soviet credibility was complicating the SALT talks.
The principal Soviet interest in testing our position on SALT is that they probably are
attempting to settle on their military outlays in the next five-year
plan and want to determine whether and what kind of deal might be
negotiable.
In your own comments you may wish
to make these points:
- —despite the disappointments of the summer, and especially
the problem over the Suez standstill violations, you intend
to pursue the SALT talks
when they resume in Helsinki on November 2;
- —an ABM-only agreement is
of no interest to us, even assuming the technical issues
involved (protection against secret SAM upgrading and a definition of what radars
will and will not be permitted) can be settled;
- —any agreement must provide us with assurance that the
Soviet program that threatens our deterrent (whatever Soviet
intentions may be) is contained;
this means limits on the SS–9; (Note: The Soviets have displayed great
sensitivity to statements that they are planning a
first-strike.)
- —we think our proposals, while not perhaps perfect and not
as far-reaching as you would have liked, should be a good
basis for negotiation and we await with interest the
considered Soviet response;
- —on the question of joint measures against countries
launching, planning or threatening a “provocative” attack we
can consider
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- —technical measures such as
improved communications and means of identification
so as to avoid any misunderstandings that might then
embroil the two of us against our will;
- —but we do not believe
SALT is the
proper context for negotiating the type of political
understanding at which the Soviets have been
hinting; this should in any case be the product of
the general evolution of our relations.30
Tab E
VIETNAM
Background and Purpose
- —We have often spoken to the Soviets about Vietnam, but
generally have not found them ready to do anything for us. We do
not want them to become a negotiating intermediary.
- —But we can count on them to report what we have said to
Hanoi, and they will probably report accurately.
- —Therefore, we want to be very tough in this meeting. We do
not want Gromyko (or the
North Vietnamese) to get the idea that we are softening our
position.
His Position
- —I doubt that he will raise Vietnam. If he does, it will
probably be to tell us that the North Vietnamese will continue
to fight unless we meet their demands. He may say that we must
agree to a coalition, which he pushed with Secretary Rogers.
- —He may also say that we should negotiate on Mrs. Binh’s eight points.31
Your Position
I think it would be appropriate for you to raise Vietnam. You may
wish to make the following points:
- —We think the military and political situation in
Indochina has now reached the point where a stable
settlement can and should be reached.32
[Page 73]
- —Your speech was intended to reflect that
appraisal.33 The principles you proposed for a
cease-fire, and the points you proposed for
settlement, were designed to allow serious
negotiations.
- —Our strategy is to try for such negotiations. We
will recognize the legitimate interests of all
parties.
- —If we cannot conclude a settlement, we will continue with
our present policies, which we believe are working.
- —Hanoi’s situation is not getting better, and they will
not find it easier to make a bargain later. The South
Vietnamese are getting stronger.34
- —Hanoi’s political proposals are unacceptable. They are a
victor’s peace, not a realistic position.35
- —They ask us to dismantle the organized
non-Communist forces, which they have been unable to
do in a generation of fighting.
- —They are not even asking for a coalition—no
matter what they call it—since they want to dictate
whom they will accept in each of the elements. This
is just a disguised takeover.
- —We will not accept their preconditions.
- —They must deal with the South Vietnamese
Government on political issues. That Government is
an existing reality.
- —We are getting some intelligence reports which suggest
that Hanoi will step up the pace of its military activity
soon.
- —This could have the most drastic consequences. Nothing
could be a bigger mistake.36
- —We have no intention of making a precipitate withdrawal
or a disguised defeat.37 Moscow should
realize that our efforts to preserve stability in that area
are in its interests as well as our own.
Tab F
CHINA (Contingency)
The Soviets believe we are trying to put them under pressure by
flirting with China. They charge we timed our overtures to coincide
with the acute Sino-Soviet tensions last year and thereby encouraged
[Page 74]
the Chinese. They used
to get read-outs from the Warsaw talks38 but
do not now and may think that things are happening that they do not
know about.
You may wish to say that
- —our China policy is directed against no one, including
the USSR;
- —China is a great power and we intend gradually to
establish communications with it;
- —we take no sides in the Sino-Soviet dispute and have no
interest in seeing any conflict between the two;
- —no one should any longer take for granted that US-Chinese hostility39 will be permanent;
- —we do not anticipate rapid movement.
Tab G
TRADE CONTACTS (Contingency)
The Soviets want credits and are interested in joint ventures for
trucks and other heavy equipment. They are bitter that we are not
forthcoming both because they consider this “discriminatory” and
because they really need Western technology.
You may wish to say that
- —you favor increased contacts among our scientists;
- —you have no objection to trade deals within existing
legislation;
- —but a major change will occur only when problems like
Vietnam and the Middle East are resolved;
- —contrary to some, you believe that
extensive economic relations should be the result of better
political relations; experience has shown that if it is the
other way round, economic relations quickly suffer when
crises occur.40
[Page 75]
Tab H
CUBA. LATIN AMERICA (Contingency)
It is almost certain that Gromyko will not raise the Cuba issue. If he does he
may reaffirm the 1962 understandings and accuse us of fomenting a
crisis.
(Note: The Soviets almost certainly were probing our reactions in
Cuba, though we do not know what the Moscow politics behind the move
may have been. There had been a gradual increase in Soviet military
activities in the Caribbean this year, culminating in the project at
Cienfuegos. Having been brought up short, the Soviets are
undoubtedly sensitive about publicity but at the same time want to
establish their right to show the flag periodically. Their interest
in this may be heightened by the turn of events in Chile and
Bolivia.)
You may wish to say that
- —Cuba is a neuralgic point for us;
- —we adhere to the understandings of 1962 provided both
Moscow and Castro do (no export of revolution
or subversion);
- —we will watch the situation but curtail publicity.
- —we will be governed by the understandings regarding the
definition of a submarine base of the oral note of October
9.41
Tab I
SUMMIT (Contingency)
Gromyko may broach this,
noting that it would be the turn of the US President to visit the USSR.
(Note: Summitry involving you may figure in Soviet leadership
politics. Podgorney and Kosygin (Brezhnev seems safe for the time being) might like
to button down a summit next year as at least some reassurance
against demotion at the Party Congress next year.)
You may wish to say that
- —you favor direct communications with other
leaders;
- —summits between the US and
the USSR are different from
others because they tend to raise both great hopes and great
fears or disappointments,
[Page 76]
hence they have to be handled with care
and there has to be some assurance of concrete
results;
- —you would like to visit the USSR again;
- —assuming no great crises and progress on some of the
great issues of our day you hope to visit the USSR and meet with its leaders
before the end of your term.42
