173. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security
Affairs (Kissinger)
to President Nixon1
Washington, June 26, 1970.
SUBJECT
-
Kosygin Reply to Your Letter
on Laos
After a three-month interval Premier Kosygin has replied to your March 21 letter,2 appealing to interested states to renew
international
[Page 532]
consultations
concerning Laos (Tab A). The reply, as anticipated, rejects your appeal.
The tone, however, is polemical and tough.3
Kosygin emphasizes that your
appeal “sounds unconvincing” because of our “armed intervention” in
Laos, and our failure to make a similar appeal at the time when
operations intensified last autumn and led to the capture of a series of
areas long under the control of the “patriotic forces.”
As for convening the Geneva conference (1962) in “one form or another”,
this is rejected by Kosygin as
“unreal in present conditions …4 when there is going on a war unleashed by
the USA against the Vietnamese people as well as armed intervention in
the affairs of Laos and now also Cambodia.”
He adopts a much tougher position than heretofore on the Souvanna Phouma
Government, claiming that there is “no such government (of national
union)” as created by the Geneva accords. It must be created by the
“political forces” of Laos, he asserts. And he cites as the basis for
internal consultations among the Laotians, the proposals of the Pathet
Lao. He adds, however, that even these consultations cannot lead to the
restoration of peace: “the war cannot be brought to a close” or
consultations “moved off dead center” as long as the U.S. continues
bombing and “generally interferes in Laotian internal affairs.”
Substantively, this reply represents some hardening of the Soviet
position, which is consistent with the tougher line reflected in the
recent letter from Souphanavoung to Souvanna Phouma and the increased
military action of the Communist side. It comes close to saying the
Geneva agreements are a dead letter, and that even those parts
pertaining to the coalition government are no longer valid. This is
probably intended to increase the pressures on Souvanna, who is always
concerned with signs that the Soviet might formally withdraw recognition
of his government. The letter stops short of this, however. One possible
sign of flexibility is the failure to make cessation of the bombing a
precondition to talks among the Laotians.
The hard line taken by Kosygin in
his reply can be considered pro forma, in that the Soviet position on
Laos has consistently been to support Hanoi and the Pathet Lao, and to
blame the U.S. for all the problems of Vietnam, Laos, and now Cambodia.
The tone of the reply may also reflect Soviet frustrations over the way
that Soviet influence in Hanoi has declined recently as Chinese
influence has grown. Koysgin
[Page 533]
may in effect be saying that
the Soviets simply do not want to be involved in Indo-Chinese affairs
under present circumstances.
I do not believe that the reply merits any further action on your part.
We do not wish to become engaged in an unproductive exchange with the
Soviets. However, for the purpose of setting the record straight on the
causes of the tensions in Indo-China and denying the Soviets the last
word on this, I believe it would be useful for me to set the record
straight with Dobrynin when I
next see him and lay it on the line as to the presence of North
Vietnamese troops in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia as the source of all
the trouble.
Tab A
Letter From Chairman of the Council of Ministers
of the Soviet Union Kosygin to President Nixon
Dear Mr. President:
We would like to make several observations concerning your letter
regarding Laos.
It was pointed out in your letter that the Government of the United
States does not spare any efforts to secure peace in Laos by means
of the full implementation of the 1962 Geneva agreements. One could
only welcome such a statement, if it indicated the intention to end
the American intervention in Laos, which would conform to the
obligation of the USA under these agreements. Unfortunately, the
situation has been and is entirely otherwise; the American Air Force
continues the bombardment of the territory of Laos; American
“Advisers” are in the ranks of the armed forces of one of the
Laotian sides and frequently participate directly in military
operations.
In these conditions the appeal to other states by the U.S. Government
to fulfill the 1962 Geneva agreements and to maintain the
independence, neutrality and territorial integrity of Laos sounds
unconvincing at the very least. You, Mr. President, directly admit
the presence of “American Military—air activities in Laos.” But
instead of the cessation of these actions your letter only poses the
question of international consultations. More to the point, for some
reason the U.S. Government did not raise the question of
international consultations when, last autumn, as a result of
American armed intervention, military operations in the Plain of
Jars and the central part of the country sharply intensified which
led to the seizure of a series of areas that for a long time were
under the control of the patriotic forces of Laos.
[Page 534]
We cannot share also your appraisal of our position on the question
of holding consultations among the countries participating in the
1962 Geneva conference on Laos. Bilateral consultations and exchange
of opinions between governments on the question of the situation in
Laos take place almost continually. In particular our attitude
toward the February 28, 1970 message of Souvanna Phouma was
communicated to the Laotian representatives in Moscow and Vientiane.
A reasoned (motivirovanny) answer was given by us to the government
of England concerning the inappropriateness of sending message on
this question on behalf of the two Cochairmen. The Soviet Government
maintains contacts with appropriate socialist countries. As far as
we know, the British Cochairman also has exchanged opinions on this
question with a number of countries in addition to the Soviet
Union.
If the U.S. Government has in mind not this type of consultation but
the convening in one or another form of a conference of
participating states of the 1962 Geneva conference, then it is
completely obvious that the convening of such a conference is unreal
in present conditions, when there is going on a war unleashed by the
U.S.A. against the Vietnamese people as well as armed intervention
in the affairs of Laos and now also Cambodia. It is hardly possible
to deny this.
Let us take only the question of the representation of Laos at such a
conference. The Government of National Unity of Laos, established in
conformity with the 1962 Geneva agreements, would have to be
represented at it. But after all it is well known that at the
present time there is no such government. It is necessary to
recreate it, and only the political forces of Laos themselves can do
this. The patriotic front of Laos, in its March 6 statement,
proposed concrete measures aimed at the re-establishment of the
Government of National Unity and the restoration of peace in Laos.
Precisely in connection with this we expressed the opinion in our
March 13 letter that the matter of the normalization of the
situation in Laos should begin with consultation among the political
forces of Laos, and that a good foundation for these consultations
is the proposals advanced in the above-mentioned statement of the
patriotic front.
I would like to point out that our letter of 13 March in no way
contends that consultations among Laotian political forces can by
themselves, if left to their own, lead to the restoration of peace
there. As was justly pointed out in the March 6th statement of the
patriotic front, the war in Laos cannot be brought to a close and
the matter of a settlement will not get off dead center while the
U.S.A. continues bombing Laotian territory and generally interferes
in Laotian internal affairs.
The Soviet Government has already stated its opinion concerning how
much American armed invasion in Cambodia has complicated the
situation in Indo-China as a whole. I do not intend now specially to
[Page 535]
dwell on this
question. In this instance it is necessary only to note that this
invasion makes even more unreal raising the question of some kind of
“international consultations” on Laos.
In conclusion I would like to express great regret, which is shared
by my colleagues in our leadership, that the U.S. Government,
instead of taking realistic measures for the cessation of the war
against the Peoples of Indo-China and the establishment of peace in
Southeast Asia, has taken the the path of spreading this war. This
complicates the situation not only in Southeast Asia but in the
whole world and naturally cannot but affect also the relations
between our countries. I would like to express the hope that the
Government of the U.S.A. and you personally will arrive at the only
correct conclusion the cessation of interference in the internal
affairs of the People of Indo-China and the withdrawal of American
forces from this region. We are convinced that such a decision would
radically change the situation in this region in favor of peace and
would meet the interests of the whole world.
Respectfully,
