Office of the Historian

98. Backchannel Message From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) in Saigon1

Key Biscayne, Florida, November 10, 1972, 1230Z.

Tohaig 15/WHS 2320. Thank you for your cable. I favor Option B giving Thieu the proposed changes. But give him only absolute minimum position and warn him that it will be a negotiation, not an ultimatum so that we cannot guarantee outcome. In paragraph 9 regarding the NCNR, would not give him deletion of local councils and three segments. I would concentrate on fall-back only with milder Vietnamese word for administrative structure and both sides appointing half of three segments. I would be forthcoming on technical details like size of ICCS. I do not object to showing him draft protocol with proper caveats.2

Good morning.

  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 857, For the President’s Files (Winston Lord)—China Trip/Vietnam, Sensitive Camp David, Vol. XXI (1). Top Secret; Flash; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only.↩
  2. Haig and Bunker met that evening with Tran Kim Phuong, South Vietnamese Ambassador to the United States, and Hoang Duc Nha. Thieu did not attend. The South Vietnamese spoke from a prepared list of talking points that related mostly to security concerns. “In response,” wrote Haig in backchannel message Haigto 4/257 from Saigon, November 10, 1645Z, “I went over much the same ground I had covered earlier [that day] with Thieu.” Furthermore, Haig noted: “The tenor of discussion was positive and there was no nit-picking nor did they press us for the texts of any other changes than the ones you authorized me to provide them.” (Ibid.)↩