Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume IX, Vietnam, October 1972–January 1973

325. Backchannel Message From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Ambassador to Vietnam (Bunker)¹

Washington, January 22, 1973, 0203Z.

WHS 3107. Deliver immediately.

1. Please deliver following letter to President Thieu from President Nixon as soon as possible.

Begin text. Dear President Thieu: Thank you for your letter of January 21, 1973² and the promptness of your response. I want you to know that, despite all the difficulties and differences between our two governments in this recent phase, I have great respect for the tenacity and courage with which you are defending the interests of your people in our common objective to preserve their freedom and independence. I look forward to continuing our close association.

I shall now tell our Congressional leaders that we are proceeding on our course with your essential concurrence. With respect to the issue of North Vietnamese troops, we will send you a note in conformity with the language contained in your letter. Ambassador Bunker will give you a draft. In addition, we will find an occasion within a week of the initialing of the agreement to state our views publicly along the same lines.

With respect to the issue of the police force, I have instructed that Ambassador Sullivan resume his meetings with the North Vietnamese immediately to seek some modification in the protocol. Dr. Kissinger will pursue this question further with your Foreign Minister and in his meetings with Special Adviser Le Doc Tho. In any event, however, we will have to proceed to initial the agreement and the protocols on January 23 and sign them on January 27. If we fail to obtain the proposed modification, we will have to interpret the phrases in the protocol “unusual circumstances” in a way that gives us the latitude that we require.

On the general subject of the protocols, we do not agree that these documents are more legally binding in their obligations than the agreement itself. Furthermore, you will note that we have purposely left many major issues in the protocol, such as points of entry and the status of South Vietnamese parties, thus reflecting your basic approach of leaving questions to be negotiated among the South Vietnamese themselves.

Thus I am proceeding to prepare my January 23 speech along the outlines that General Haig gave you.³ It will include a strong reference to our essential unity and will also point out that your Foreign Minister personally participated in the final phase of the negotiations. As I mentioned in my previous letter, Dr. Kissinger will consult closely, and visibly associate himself with, your Foreign Minister while they are in Paris.

Our overwhelming mutual concern now must be to strengthen your government and people as we look toward implementation of the agreement. From here on the emphasis must be on our close cooperation and a confident approach to implementing the settlement. With your strong leadership and with continuing strong bonds between our countries, we will succeed in securing our mutual objectives. Sincerely. End text.

2. As indicated in the letter you should also give Thieu the following draft note.

Begin text. The following statements were made by DRV Special Adviser Le Duc Tho in the course of the negotiations with Dr. Henry Kissinger:

• —The PRG will no longer accept the introduction of troops, war materials and weapons into South Vietnam. This is the greatest respect of the DMZ. (December 7, 1972)
• —We put down a provision saying that the way to reunify the country is through peaceful means and step by step restoration, through agreement between the two sides. Then how can there be a use of military means by one side against the other side? (September 27, 1972)

The United States considers the DRV statements to have the following consequences:

• First, the DRV’s claim that all Communist forces in South Vietnam are Southerners or volunteers and are under the command of the so-called PRG confirms that all Communist forces in South Vietnam are subject to the obligations of the agreement: for example, the cease-fire in place (Article 3), the prohibition of reinforcement and resupply (Article 7), and the requirement that their reduction and demobilization be negotiated as soon as possible (Article 12).
• Secondly, the DRV’s assertion that there are no North Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam confirms that the DRV is claiming no right to maintain armed forces of its own in the territory of South Vietnam. The United States has made clear to the DRV in the course of the private negotiations that no provision of the agreement confers or implies any such right and that the United States does not recognize any such right derived from any source. End text.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 860, For the President’s Files (Winston Lord)—China Trip/Vietnam, Sensitive Camp David, Vol. XXIV. Top Secret; Flash; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only.
2. Document 320.
3. See Document 310.