Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume IX, Vietnam, October 1972–January 1973

273. Backchannel Message From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Ambassador to Vietnam (Bunker)¹

Paris, January 13, 1973, 0152Z.

WHS 3012. 1. My six hour meeting today with the North Vietnamese² substantially completed the basic issues of principle on the protocols. On the International Control Commission Tho finally agreed to 1160 members as against the 250 they originally proposed. We also agreed that we would not work on a protocol for the two-party joint commission. Instead the two South Vietnamese elements in the four-party commission will also function as the joint two-party commission and simultaneously carry out their tasks under both commissions. When the four-party commission completes its tasks, the two South Vietnamese parties will continue to function as the two-party commission. The remaining basic issues in the protocol will be settled tomorrow and after I leave the experts will continue the drafting and conforming of the texts, in order to have the protocols completed by the time we initial the basic agreement.

2. As you know, the GVN has effectively bought the signing procedure we have worked out. They still strongly prefer to have only one document, of course, but realize there will be a separate two-party document mentioning the PRG, which they will ignore as much as possible.

3. I briefed the South Vietnamese this evening,³ and Tran Van Do and Bui Diem were present. Diem will probably go to Saigon this weekend while Do goes to London. The South Vietnamese now understand that the text is complete. We have sent you the full text and given a copy to the South Vietnamese here as well. My following cable⁴ gives some talking points for presenting the agreement to the Palace. The key theme to emphasize is that no further changes are possible, and any attempt at procrastination will risk the American relations. We will furnish a Vietnamese text shortly. I told the South Vietnamese that we are on the home stretch, with only work on the protocols remaining. They apparently have finally received instructions on the latter but are unfortunately behind the power curve because of their tardiness.

4. Thank you for your Saigon 0322⁵ which is very helpful. Reference paragraph 1, your procedure for informing Thieu about Haig’s trip looks fine. Reference paragraph 2, Haig will be authorized to repeat the assurances you outlined. He will carry a Presidential letter to that effect. Reference paragraph 3, we will keep the South Vietnamese informed of the protocols and give them texts as rapidly as feasible. Reference paragraph 4, your assumption is correct that Haig will be authorized to tell Thieu that we will initial the agreement regardless of his reaction. Reference paragraph 5, we are taking into account your views. Although we must say something on January 18, we now plan simply a Ziegler announcement which will state that I am returning to Paris on January 23 to conclude negotiations and that the President will report to the people and the Congress on the negotiations when I return. This should reduce some of the risks you point out. We must realize however that the combination of Haig’s trip, the bombing halt, etc. will lead to great speculation even before then.

Warm regards.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 415, Backchannel Messages, To Amb. Bunker, Saigon thru April 1973. Top Secret; Flash; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only.
2. See footnote 2, Document 271.
3. See Document 272.
4. Not found.
5. Document 269.