Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume IX, Vietnam, October 1972–January 1973

102. Backchannel Message From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Ambassador to Vietnam (Bunker)¹

Washington, November 12, 1972, 1945Z.

WHS 2243. Deliver at opening of business.

I would like to have your assessment of where things stand with President Thieu following Haig’s trip and Thieu’s reply to President Nixon. Thieu must be under no misapprehension that there can be changes beyond those enumerated in the President’s letter or that there will be further meetings with the North Vietnamese after the next one. We are committed to reach a final agreement at next meeting and therefore must plan accordingly. We do not have time now for a protracted give and take negotiation with the GVN prior to that meeting.

With regard to withdrawal of NVA troops, we may not be able to get even what we already intend to request as outlined in the President’s letter to President Thieu:

• —De facto unilateral withdrawal of some NVA divisions from the northern part of South Vietnam.
• —The change in Article 9h which would stipulate that troops should be reduced on a one-to-one basis and that they should return to their homes.

In my judgement ultimately we will be able to get these things through difficult bargaining but it will certainly be impossible to get an explicit or implicit commitment from the NVN to pull out all their troops. We may be able to get a target date such as the parties doing their utmost to accomplish reductions in military numbers within three months. We may also be able to get acceptance of this being done under international supervision. We will at least try for these changes. In any event, it seems to me that there are some advantages to the fact that the agreement does not explicitly recognize that NVA troops are in South Vietnam since official recognition of their presence would tend legitimize their right to be in the South. Fact that DRV continues to maintain fiction it has no troops in South adds weight to assertion they have no right to be there in any numbers. In addition to changes specified in President’s letter, we will try to obtain technical changes but we cannot guarantee complete success in advance on these either. However, we will not be able to obtain further substantive concessions. Haig brought the maximum obtainable.

We will be most happy to have a South Vietnamese interpreter in Paris to look over the text for language problems.² (In that regard I would be interested in knowing now what the very derogatory word in Vietnamese is that is used to describe U.S. forces in the current text.) They should get their Ambassador back to Washington as soon as possible if they want to use him for contacts here. It may help in a cosmetic sense. In your view, would this satisfy Thieu’s request for “joint task forces to find ways to implement those changes in the draft agreement”?³ As I said, we cannot engage in protracted give-and-take.

The schedule Haig gave Thieu is the one on which we are going to proceed. We may be able to vary a few days but by the end of the first week in December it will essentially be completed. The President will of course talk to General Haig when he returns, but we can’t be under any illusions that the schedule can be modified in any significant way.

I therefore would like on an urgent basis your best thoughts on where we stand and how to proceed. Since we are under tight time constraints, I would like to have this assessment prior to the time Haig is able to give me a full rundown on his return to Washington about noon on Monday.⁴ I am sending a copy of this message to Haig who can straighten out any misimpressions I may have in a message directly to you with copy to me.

On a new subject, it appears to me that ARVN is still not moving out aggressively in MR–3. This impression may just be a result of distortions in the reporting system, but I would appreciate having assessment of whether ARVN is taking advantage of this period to gain greater control in MR–3 and inflict heavy losses on the enemy units in that area.

Warm regards.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 857, For the President’s Files (Winston Lord)—China Trip/Vietnam, Sensitive Camp David, Vol. XXI (1). Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only.
2. As suggested by Thieu in the November 11 meeting; see Document 99.
3. The quotation is from Thieu’s letter to Nixon; see footnote 2, Document 100.
4. November 13.