Office of the Historian

87. Summary of Conclusions of a Meeting of the Washington Special Actions Group1

Washington, December 11, 1970, 10:39 a.m.–noon.

SUBJECT

  • Indochina Contingency Planning

PARTICIPATION

  • Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger
  • State
    • Mr. Marshall Green
    • Mr. James Wilson
  • CIA
    • Mr. Richard Helms
    • Mr. William Nelson
  • JCS
    • Gen. Wm. C. Westmoreland
    • Lt. Gen. John W. Vogt
  • Defense
    • Mr. David Packard
    • Mr. G. Warren Nutter
    • Mr. Dennis Doolin
    • Vice Adm. William Flanagan
  • NSC Staff
    • General Alexander M. Haig
    • Mr. John H. Holdridge
    • Col. Richard T. Kennedy
    • Mr.D. Keith Guthrie

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

1.
The WSAG received a briefing on the contingency plans, prepared in response to Dr. Kissinger’s memoranda of November 4 and 28, for actions to meet the developing military situation in Cambodia and for military operations throughout Indochina to meet possible enemy offensives during the coming dry season.2
2.
With regard to the four plans related to the Cambodian situation, the WSAG noted that the Chup Plantation and Kampol-Takeo operations seemed most relevant to the current military situation. The Chup Plantation operation might also be useful in preventing a slow build-up of enemy forces preparatory to a major offensive later in the dry season. Implementation of the Kampol-Takeo operation would necessarily be related to the conduct of the U Minh Forest offensive already [Page 216] underway in South Vietnam. The WSAG agreed that there did not now seem to be any requirement to implement the remaining two plans, covering operations along Route 1 and to secure Kompong Som, and that successful implementation of the Chup Plantation operation would obviate the need for an attack along Route 1.
3.
With respect to plans for operations throughout Indochina during the coming dry season, the WSAG noted the importance of accurately assessing the probability of simultaneous enemy attacks in Cambodia and in MRs 1 and 2 in Vietnam and of determining whether friendly forces had the capability to deal with such an eventuality. The WSAG also noted linkages between a Chup Plantation operation and possible enemy action in MRs 1 and 2; thus, it might be advantageous to launch the Chup operation at an early date while American forces would still be available to cope with an enemy attack in MRs 1 and 2.
4.
The WSAG noted that possible large-scale operations in South Laos would have to be conducted in the context of a balance of forces heavily favorable to the enemy. CIA is to provide estimates on the total number of enemy troops in Laos and of their distribution between North and South.
5.
The WSAG agreed that two of the key factors in the implementation of contingency operations in Indochina were (1) Thai military capabilities and willingness to participate and (2) Souvanna’s attitude toward stepped-up operations by friendly forces in South Laos. In this connection, the importance of advance coordination with the Thais was noted, and it was agreed that Ambassador Unger’s views on Thai participation in the various contingency operations should be obtained.
6.
The WSAG noted that progress on the road being constructed by the Chinese in North Laos made it necessary to present the President with options for dealing with the problem. The options paper previously prepared is to be reviewed at the next WSAG meeting.

[Omitted here are the minutes of the meeting.]

  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–114, WSAG Meetings Minutes, Originals, 1969–1970. Top Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in the Situation Room of the White House.↩
  2. Regarding the contingency plans in response to Kissinger’s memorandum of November 4 (Document 65), see footnote 2, Document 81. The contingency plans prepared in response to Kissinger’s memorandum of November 28 envisioned operations against one or a combination of four contingency target areas: the Chup rubber plantation (northeast of Phnom Penh near Kompong Cham), Phnom Penh, Kompong Son Port area, and Kampol–Takeo (rice-producing areas south of Phnom Penh). (Memorandum from Laird to the President, December 9, attached to a memorandum from Kennedy and Holdridge to Kissinger, December 10; National Archives, Nixon Presidential materials, NSC Files, Box 511, Country Files, Far East, Cambodia, Vol. XI, 11/1/70–1/71)↩