Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume VII, Vietnam, July 1970–January 1972

73. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, November 21, 1970.

SUBJECT

• Preliminary Report on Operation King Pin

Attached at Tab A² is the preliminary report from the field on the operation which attempted to rescue American POWs in North Vietnam. Highlights of the report are as follows:

Summary of Operations

• —The task force launched and proceeded to the objective precisely according to plan, going the entire distance apparently undetected by enemy radar.
• —The diversionary air forces were tracked and North Vietnamese MIGs reacted as they approached the North Vietnamese boundary; SA–2 missiles were also launched and damaged two F–105s—the crew from one of these planes ejected over Laos.
• —The task force left according to plan except for two helicopters which rescued the downed F–105 crew in good condition; a MIG apparently attacked one of the helicopters which took successful evasive action.
• —There were no friendly casualties during the entire operation except for two minor injuries.

Activities in the Objective Area

• —A thorough search of the buildings and surrounding area turned up no prisoners; it confirmed that the compound had in fact been a prison, though not used recently for this purpose.³
• —Portions of the buildings were used to billet North Vietnamese military personnel.
• —Five enemy soldiers within the compound were killed and two additional ones were killed near the entrance while attempting to escape; further contact was made with the enemy during the sweep near the compound with unknown results.
• —A search of the support buildings resulted in two and possibly more enemy casualties.
• —A foot bridge and a highway bridge were bombed.
• —Except for small arms fire from the vicinity of Son Tay city no fire was received in the objective area.
• —The task group carried out their mission in a highly professional manner and would have recovered any prisoners if they had been there.⁴

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 87, Vietnam Subject Files, North Vietnam Raid 11 Nov 1970. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for information. The memorandum was attached as Tab A to a November 23 memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon briefing him for his meeting that day with the leaders of Operation King Pin. A stamped notation on the memorandum reads, “The President has seen.” According to the President’s Daily Diary, Nixon met with the leaders on November 23 from 4:58 to 6:05 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files) He also presented medals to the team members in a public ceremony at the White House on November 25. The text of Nixon’s remarks is in Public Papers: Nixon, 1970, p. 1081.
2. Attached at Tab A, not printed, is a retyped copy of a message from Manor to Moorer and McCain, November 21, describing the operation. In summing up, Manor wrote: “The courage demonstrated by these truly outstanding individuals who participated in and over the objective area is admirable and I am personally convinced, beyond any doubt, that this force would have recovered all the POWs in that prison had they been there, as reported, upon assignment of the mission.”
3. In a December 4 memorandum to Helms outlining the CIA’s role in the operation, Carver noted that the CIA had indications on November 20 that the POWs had been moved and that reconnaissance photos from November 6 showed unexplainable variations in vegetation at the camp. Carver immediately contacted General Blackburn about the evidence, but Blackburn responded that the “raid was then in train.” Carver also spoke on November 23 with Laird who acknowledged that he had also seen the information but decided to proceed with the operation anyway. (Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files: Job 80–R01720R, GAC Chrono, Oct 70–Dec 70)
4. In a November 27 memorandum to Nixon, Kissinger summarized a report from General Walters on a meeting he had with a source who was close to the North Vietnamese, but whose accuracy he could not evaluate. According to the source, Hanoi had no advance knowledge of the raid, had since regrouped many of their prisoners in the Hanoi area, were upset but intended to “play it low-key for prestige reasons.” Additionally, accompanying airstrikes hit supplies stockpiled in the open nearby. A stamped notation on the memorandum reads, “The President has seen.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 150, Vietnam Country Files, Vietnam, 1 Nov 70)