Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume VII, Vietnam, July 1970–January 1972

66. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, November 13, 1970.

SUBJECT

• Your Meeting with Secretary Laird and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Moorer at 10:30 a.m., Friday, November 13, 1970—Room 3E 880, Pentagon

Background

The purpose of this meeting is to discuss the special plan² which you were briefed on last month and which is scheduled for execution next week.³ It is apparent that Secretary Laird and certainly General Pursley are having second thoughts on the operation. It is likely that they will surface a related plan which has been worked out by Defense and which involves the announcement by a Swedish citizen that he will make available a large vessel to carry U.S. Prisoners of War south from Hanoi to Saigon and presumably vice versa. This announcement is apparently just about to be made and Laird will take the position that the other operation would run directly contrary conceptually.⁴ Admiral Moorer on the other hand is very concerned that any delays in the highly classified project will result in a loss of at least six months time due to the peculiarities of weather and other operational factors.

The second problem area which could arise at today’s meeting is the fact that a U.S. reconnaissance aircraft was shot down yesterday by air defenses in North Vietnam in the vicinity of the Mugia Pass. This follows a period of several other efforts of the North Vietnamese to shoot down reconnaissance aircraft. I understand no reaction was taken as a result of any of these incidents. Secretary Laird has sent over to you, however, the 72-hour plan which you and he discussed with the President. I have done a summary which is in your reading material.⁵

Conduct of the Meeting

I have called General Pursley and requested that Admiral Moorer definitely be included in the meeting so there is a complete understanding by the military on what position Laird took and what position you take. In my view, you should:

• —Listen to Laird’s pitch which will probably be quite ambivalent in front of the Chairman.
• —Maintain a neutral stance on whether we should proceed with or delay on the operation.
• —Make it clear to Secretary Laird that he raised the plan and made the recommendation, that it is apparent that the President is very interested and that you expect him to carry the ball.

With respect to North Vietnamese action against U.S. reconnaissance aircraft and this morning’s shoot-down, you might wish to:

• —Ask Secretary Laird what significance he attaches to this incident (the first shoot-down since May of 1970).
• —Ask Secretary Laird why there was no U.S. reaction in light of existing authorities.
• —Ask Secretary Laird and Admiral Moorer if they think there should be a reaction.
• —If there is no reaction, but enemy anti-aircraft and SAM activity continues against our reconnaissance aircraft, where should we go from here.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 997, Haig Chronological Files, Haig Memcons 12/70–12/71, 1 of 3. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. According to Kissinger’s schedule, he met with Laird at the Pentagon between 10:17 and 11:45 a.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76, Record of Schedule) No further record of the meeting was found.
2. Reference is to Operation Ivory Coast, the planning phase for a joint Army–Air Force raid into the Son Tay POW camp 23 miles from Hanoi. According to a memorandum from Carver to Helms, December 4, Defense began planning for the mission in May 1970. Carver’s memorandum outlined CIA assistance to the project. (Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files: Job 80–R01720R, GAC Chrono, Oct 70–Dec 70)
3. According to an October 12 memorandum from [name not declassified] to Cushman, Brigadier General Donald D. Blackburn informed him that on October 8 he had briefed Kissinger who was “highly enthusiastic” and dismissed JCS concerns about the public’s reaction and possible casualties among the North Vietnamese guards. He added that Kissinger would only discuss the plan with Nixon in person and since the President was not in Washington, Kissinger decided to postpone it until November. (Ibid., DDI Files: Job 80–T01629R, Box 4, JOIC Support to SAVA re Son Tay Raid) See Document 72.
4. In backchannel message WH02196 to Kissinger, November 12, Haig reported that Laird and Pursley believed that because of the Swedish announcement the administration should change its plans for Ivory Coast. (Ibid., Box 336, Subject Files, Items to Discuss with the President, 8 September 70–December 70) In a December 1 note to Laird, Capen wrote that he intended to “keep the pressure on my Swedish contact” to pursue the plan, but that he was having difficulty getting the Swedish Red Cross to cooperate. (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–76–67, Box 98, Viet (North) 385.1)
5. Haig sent the summary to Kissinger under an undated covering memorandum along with a copy of the plan, which Pursley had sent to him on November 10. The plan called for air and naval operation against supply lines in North Vietnam and could be launched with 48 hours notice. Haig believed that it did not adequately address the effects of monsoon conditions, impact on the enemy, and ability of the United States to mobilize its aircraft carriers in time. Kissinger approved a follow-up investigation of these questions and asked for a 1-day plan as well. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 103, Vietnam Subject Files, 3-Day Plan for Air Strikes Against North Vietnam Nov 1970)