Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume VII, Vietnam, July 1970–January 1972

63. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, November 3, 1970.

SUBJECT

• Report On Southeast Asia By Director of Central Intelligence

Director of Central Intelligence Helms has sent you a long report on his recent trip to Southeast Asia (Tab A).² A summary of Mr. Helms’ appraisal of the prospects for South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia follows.

Overview. Southeast Asian political and military leaders were unanimous in their belief that the outcome of the struggle with Hanoi will basically determine the political shape of Indochina and the rest of mainland Southeast Asia during the next decade.

• —A success for Hanoi would shortly change the political complexion of the area in ways adverse to U.S. interests and those of our allies.
• —If Hanoi can be held in check while the U.S. presence is scaled down to an advisory-level minimum within the next two or three years, the prospects will be greatly enhanced for the evolution of a Southeast Asia with the will and ability to work with the U.S. in a mutually advantageous fashion.
• —These opinions are not fully shared by knowledgeable persons in Washington. But they are nevertheless important, because the estimates of these local leaders shape their own actions and hence the outcome in Southeast Asia.

Hanoi’s intentions. The past year has not been a good one for Hanoi. The Communists’ fortunes have continued to head downward since their major effort at Tet 1968.

• —Nearly all on the scene feel that a major contributor to Hanoi’s current problems is the course of events which followed the change of government in Cambodia on March 18, especially the allied cross border operations.
• —Hanoi has lost its Cambodian sanctuary and has been compelled to campaign on a whole new front, diverting significant assets from South Vietnam in the process.
• —This situation has prevented Hanoi from registering any success of consequence, and this in turn has improved the morale and brightened the prospects of those resisting Hanoi.

There are some very strong reasons why Hanoi would not wish to negotiate under these circumstances, and most observers are convinced that the Communists will make at least one major military effort—sometime before the beginning of the rainy season next May—before moving seriously in the negotiating arena.

• —Indeed, quite aside from negotiations, Hanoi badly needs a significant, tangible victory for its effect on troop and Party morale.
• —Opinion among observers on the ground is divided over where this effort may come, but a majority believe that it will be in Laos or Cambodia rather than South Vietnam.³ Those who might have to face such an effort still have a healthy respect for Hanoi’s capabilities.

Helms personally believes that our most serious problems are likely to develop in north Laos, even though current evidence does not point this way.

• —It is our weakest link, and he believes that Hanoi recognizes this.
• —A Communist victory in north Laos could cause the Laotian government to fall or at least to negotiate political arrangements in accord with Communist demands, including an end to U.S. air action over Laos.⁴
• —Hanoi would hope that a collapse in Laos would also rekindle U.S. domestic opposition to the war.

At present, Hanoi is making a major effort to refurbish its logistical bases in south Laos and Cambodia.

• —If it is successful, it will be able to carry on its military efforts in South Vietnam and Cambodia for what, in political terms, is an indefinite period of time.
• —If it fails, another year will have been gained for the non-Communist governments to solidify their position.

Prospects. The situation vis-à-vis the Communists in South Vietnam is generally well in hand. The major dangers are more economic and political, especially as the 1971 presidential election draws near.

• —President Thieu’s re-election seems most consonant with U.S. interests, but this is a judgment that need not be made now.
• —Whatever the outcome of the election, it is essential to prevent the kind of political splits within the non-Communist camp that produced the unravelling divisions in 1963.

Lon Nol and his colleagues in Cambodia have put to excellent use the time bought by our cross border operations.

• —But Hanoi is exerting pressure and Cambodia will need at least the present mix of overt and covert assistance from us and her other allies, along with certain kinds of “surge” assistance should Hanoi mount an offensive.
• —With this level of external help, Cambodia has a reasonable chance of surviving for the next year. If so, Hanoi will have suffered a major political defeat that will be recognized as such throughout Indochina.

As already noted, Laos is the area where a major Communist effort is likely to be mounted. Our immediate interests there are (1) to prevent Hanoi from achieving a military victory in north Laos and (2) to restrict Hanoi’s use of south Laos as a logistical conduit to its forces in Cambodia and South Vietnam.

• —It is essential that Thai artillery and troops remain in the north, and that the present level of U.S. combat air support be continued there. When the enemy begins serious dry season operations, we will also need more airborne communications intelligence for detecting Communist troop movements.
• —In south Laos, the harassment and interdiction capabilities of our guerrilla forces are limited, and the major burden of inhibiting the movement of enemy supplies will have to be borne by aerial interdiction.

Helms strongly believes that events over the next nine months or so will have a critical and perhaps decisive bearing on the outcome of the struggle.

• —A military or political success by Hanoi would quickly reverse many of the now favorable trends.
• —But if the present degree of stability can be maintained in South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, then Hanoi may be persuaded that it must come to terms.

Comment. Whatever the Communists ultimately decide regarding negotiations, the short term tactical outlook bears careful watching. Opinion within the government is divided over whether Hanoi will mount a major military offensive before next summer, or whether it will concentrate on rebuilding its assets in Cambodia or South Vietnam for later use. In any event, it is clearly in our interest to prevent a large volume of supplies from moving through south Laos and to be prepared for a military push should the Communists attempt one. I agree with Mr. Helms’ recommendations regarding actions to be taken in north Laos.⁵

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 208, Agency Files, CIA, Vol. III. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information.
2. Dated October 23; attached but not printed. A portion of the report is printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XX, Southeast Asia, 1969–1972, Document 94.
3. Nixon underlined the last half of the sentence.
4. Nixon highlighted this and the previous paragraph and wrote, “Something to watch.”
5. Nixon wrote at the bottom of the memorandum: “Very useful report.”