56. Memorandum for the President’s File by the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig)1
RE
- Meeting in the President’s Office with Souvanna Phouma, Prime Minister of Laos (11:05–11:45 a.m.) (Mrs. Porson, State Department interpreter)
While the press photographers were in the President’s office at the outset of the meeting, the Prime Minister mentioned to the President that he had met Senator Fulbright in St. Louis yesterday, where he had delivered a speech; he added that the Senator had not reacted at all to the speech.
When the photographers left, the Prime Minister started by thanking the President for his decision to grant the RLG the funds necessary to defend Sam Thong and Long Thien at a very critical time. As the Prime Minister had cabled the President, if these positions had been lost, it would have had a disastrous psychological effect on Laos. Now, thanks to that aid, the Lao have overcome their difficulties and resumed the offensive. Apparently, the current offensive against the Plain of Jars and Ban Na is going well, and the Prime Minister hoped that all the RLG’s objectives would soon be attained.
The President asked the Prime Minister for his view of the cease-fire proposals that had been made.2 He asked whether he thought the North Vietnamese might respond favorably or whether they might instead try to separate out Laos as a special case.
The Prime Minister said they were trying to separate the Laos question from the over-all Vietnamese question. His reasons for that view were that neither Peking nor Hanoi had expressed any objections to the opening of contacts between the RLG and the Pathet Lao. Moreover, the Cambodian front is creating additional difficulties for the North Vietnamese, in that they find themselves unable to fight on three fronts: Cambodia, Laos, and South Vietnam. It is possible that they may want to step down the level of activity in Laos and accept, in a distorted way, the Prime Minister’s proposals to Hanoi of some two or [Page 140] three years ago, to the effect that if the North Vietnamese would withdraw their troops from Laos, the bombing would be stopped and the North Vietnamese would be allowed by the RLG to use the Ho Chi Minh Trail, over which the RLG had no control and which was the affair of the United States and the North Vietnamese. It is possible, concluded the Prime Minister, that it is along those lines that the other side would like to see the Laos problem resolved.
The President asked the Prime Minister for his estimate of the Cambodian operation—whether he thought it had been helpful to the general situation in Indochina.
The Prime Minister’s reply was twofold: First, the operations in Cambodia had created some difficulties for the Lao, represented by the North Vietnamese offensive and the taking of Attopeu and Saravane. The North Vietnamese object is to create a second supply route to Cambodia and South Vietnam, parallel to the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The second point was that the destruction of the military potential in Cambodia of the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong and the elimination of their main supply route via Sihanoukville had weakened the enemy’s strength. The supplies destroyed in Cambodia can never be built back up because the capacity of the Ho Chi Minh Trail is substantially less than that of Sihanoukville.
The President then asked the Prime Minister for his opinion of why the American casualty rate in South Vietnam is so low—last week we took 40 casualties compared to 200 for the same week in 1969 and 300 for the same week in 1968. Did he think that was due to a lessening of the enemy’s capability or rather were they deliberately trying to break contact and thus reduce the number of casualties?
The Prime Minister said “Both.” On the one hand, the enemy’s manpower potential was clearly weaker—they had lost at least 40,000 men in Cambodia. Additional evidence was the discovery by RLG troops on the battlefields in Laos of the bodies of North Vietnamese women soldiers. It was also important to note that the renowned main strength units of the Viet Minh, those who fought against the French, have by now been decimated, and the new soldiers are less combative. For example, prior to 1963, the RLG forces had never been able to take any North Vietnamese prisoners; since 1963–64, they have taken over 100. Also, there are many pure Vietnamese who have rallied to the RLG side. Therefore, the Prime Minister thought the enemy was running out of strength.
The Prime Minister then commented that he thought that the President’s ceasefire proposal had been rejected by Hanoi and the Liberation Front for propaganda purposes and that basically they want to seek the way to peace.
The President asked what we should do—should we continue to press for a ceasefire or assume that there was no hope? Is there a chance that the other side might nibble?
[Page 141]The Prime Minister said we should back them up to the wall. It is necessary to study the question of the withdrawal of United States forces and to determine roughly when that withdrawal could take place under the conditions the enemy desires. Then we can see how the other side reacts and if, when the date draws nigh, there has been nothing positive from them, it would not be too late to act accordingly.
The President asked whether he meant taking stronger measures?
The Prime Minister said yes, if necessary. He thought that the fact of setting a date would show the United States’ strength and have a definite favorable impact on domestic and foreign public opinion.
He suggested that the measures envisaged might include strengthening the United States forces in Thailand, which Thailand would welcome.
The President then expressed our gratitude for the Prime Minister’s strong support of our peace plan. He assured him that he should not be concerned about Senator Fulbright’s reaction. Unfortunately, there are men like Fulbright, Symington, and others who never miss a chance to attack United States assistance to Laos and Cambodia, especially Laos. As the Prime Minister knew from previous meetings, the President said, he was strongly with him in his efforts to obtain a cease-fire and an independent Laos. We have difficulties with public opinion in the United States, but he, the President, would personally do all he could to resist the efforts of men like Fulbright and Symington who would let Laos go down the drain.
The Prime Minister thought his St. Louis speech of yesterday had made an impression on Senator Fulbright. In it, he had talked of Laos’ 25-year fight for survival, its desire for peace, its satisfaction with the United States’ decision to help it after Chairman Khrushchev had turned down its request for arms, and its total approval of the President’s proposal. He had also stated that there was no agreement signed between the United States and Laos.
The President remarked that that was a very strong case, which it would be hard for Senator Fulbright to attack. He added that, as the Prime Minister knows, we have to do some things in private that we do not admit publicly, and we shall continue to do so.
The Prime Minister thanked the President, saying that the RLG is counting absolutely on United States assistance to bring peace as soon as possible, but peace in justice and independence.
In sum, the President asked, compared to his views expressed at their last meeting at the White House a few months ago,3 was the Prime [Page 142] Minister more optimistic about the prospects for peace and did he think the enemy was weaker?
The Prime Minister’s answer was yes to both. Besides the signs of enemy weakness that he had already indicated, there was an even more important sign. After the publication of the joint communiqué following the meeting between Sihanouk, Souphanouvong, Pham Van Dong, et al., Mao Tse Tung had come out strongly urging the Liberation Fronts of Indochina to wage all-out war. Yet, there was no reaction when the Pathet Lao contacted the Prime Minister. If there was no agreement between the Pathet Lao, Hanoi, and Peking, then Peking would not let the Pathet Lao resolve the Laos problem outside of the over-all Indochina problem.
The President then asked whether the Prime Minister was surprised that the new Cambodian Government has survived as long as it has.
The Prime Minister said no, because he knew the Cambodians. In Cambodia, as in Laos, there is anti-Vietnamese feeling, which is even stronger in Cambodia than in Laos, as was evidenced by the massacres immediately after the coup d’etat. Additionally, the Cambodians have always been better fighters than the Lao or the Vietnamese. For example, during the Indochina war whenever a major strike was called for, it was the Cambodians who handled it. Now that the government of Cambodia has had enough respite to consolidate its armed forces and is continuing to receive outside assistance, the Prime Minister was not surprised that General Lon Nol had been able to take things in hand. He did, however, regret that the new government had not heeded his advice, sent via a Lao dignitary to Phnom Penh, to retain the monarchy and keep the Queen as a symbol, and not to rush things. This was because the peasants and the clergy, as in Laos, are respectful of the monarchy.
He feared that the creation of the republic would create a new opposition faction, that of the monarchists, drawn essentially from the peasants and the clergy. He thought that opposition group would feed the guerrilla forces of the other side. He hoped he was wrong, but that was his view.
The President then expressed his good wishes to the Prime Minister on his return to Laos, saying that we would continue to keep in close touch with him and to work with him. For our part, we shall continue to keep public opinion in the United States informed, so that those Senators who create problems for our aid to Laos will have no base to destroy the program.
Before taking his leave, the Prime Minister wished to bring up one last question, which he had already discussed with Assistant Secretary Marshall Green, namely, the cancellation by AID effective November 1 of the funds for importation of petroleum products used to fuel the [Page 143] power plants.4 He said the cancellation would have an extremely serious impact on the cost of living and therefore he asked whether it could be put off until the end of 1971, by which time the Nam Ngum hydroelectric plant would be operational, thus causing a 90 percent drop in the requirement for diesel and the like. That was the only request he had to make.
The President said we would have it in mind in reviewing our budget, adding that perhaps there was a Congressional problem regarding funds. He asked General Haig to look into the matter.
In closing, the Prime Minister warmly thanked the President for his help and for seeing him today. The President wished him well and expressed good wishes to the Lao people, whom he liked and remembered well from his visit in 1953. He also asked the Prime Minister to convey his best regards to Ambassador Godley.
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President’s Office Files, Box 82, Memoranda for the President, Beginning October 18, 1970. Secret; Nodis. According to a briefing memorandum from Irwin to Nixon, October 20, Souvanna arrived in the United States on October 15, addressed the UN General Assembly on October 19, spoke with Rogers in New York on October 19, and also met there with Irwin on October 17 and Green on October 16. He planned to return to Laos on October 22. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 LAOS)↩
- See Document 46.↩
- The two met on October 7, 1969; see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume VI, Vietnam, January 1969–July 1970, Documents 132 and 133.↩
- In a memorandum to Kissinger, October 22, Eliot indicated that AID had worked out a plan to continue financing the petroleum imports needed by the Lao Electric Company until December 31 and would devise a solution to the exchange rate problem for imports thereafter. Haig sent a memorandum to Nixon, October 24, with this information. (Both in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 548, Country Files, Far East, Laos, Vol. VI)↩