Office of the Historian

53. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of State Rogers, Secretary of Defense Laird, Director of Central Intelligence Helms, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Moorer)1

Washington, October 16, 1970.

SUBJECT

  • Cease-Fire in Vietnam

To further prepare the U.S. position on possible Vietnam cease-fire negotiations, the President has asked for additional analysis in order to:

1.
Establish specific and comprehensive negotiating criteria on all aspects of enemy behavior under an in place cease-fire; and, related thereto, develop our criteria for determining violations. These criteria would include definition and development of measures for:
  • —what “in place” means for various types of enemy units,
  • —what infiltration and resupply activities are permitted,
  • —a prohibition on acts of terror,
  • —construction of military installations or fortifications,
  • —subversion,
  • —political activity.
2.
Define the limits on GVN activities and possible U.S. postures with regard to monitoring and controlling GVN violations.
3.
Assess U.S. and GVN verification capabilities, including the use of in-country and out of country facilities.
4.
Develop alternative roles for international supervisory bodies including how such mechanisms would function in the field.
5.
Establish criteria and measures of the situation in the countryside that include GVN control and political attitudes which would permit our side to assess how, over time, the GVN’s position holds up under in-place cease-fire conditions, and determine what time limits might be established in anticipation of a possible deterioration in the GVN’s position.
6.
Determine the critical aspects of and develop criteria for assessing enemy strength and performance (e.g., of the VCI) under a cease-fire.
7.
Specify measures the GVN could take both before and during a cease-fire to strengthen its cease-fire position.
8.
Consider possible cease-fire arrangements in Laos and Cambodia.
9.
Develop alternative U.S. cease-fire negotiating postures encompassing the timing of U.S. initiatives, the scope and nature of GVN and possible third party involvement in the negotiations, the form of specific U.S. proposals, and giving consideration to possible enemy initiatives and responses.

This analysis will be undertaken by the Vietnam Special Studies Group under the direction of the VSSG Working Group. It should be completed by December 1, 1970.

Henry A. Kissinger
  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 66, Vietnam Subject Files, Cease-Fire, Vol. II 1970. Secret.↩