Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume VII, Vietnam, July 1970–January 1972

39. Memorandum From K. Wayne Smith of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, September 14, 1970.

SUBJECT

• NSSM 99: Cambodia Strategy Study

Background

The Cambodia strategy study (at Tab A)² is completed. It is the result of three weeks of concerted effort by my staff, particularly Bob Sansom, and the bureaucracy. We received full-backing at the working levels in all agencies, including several all-night sessions. The JCS, in particular, has been very helpful.

Given the time constraints, the product is, I believe, first-rate and thorough on the subject of U.S. strategy options toward the GOC. We have drawn on every source available in Washington and devised several analytical tools for examining the links between Cambodian outcomes and Vietnamization.

As a result of this process, the agencies have had ample opportunity to express their views fully. More importantly, they have been forced to analyze and defend them in detail. As a result, initial agency views have been modified, and, with one exception, it is now understood that there are several reputable options, not just State’s, JCS’s, etc.

The exception is the OSD option designed by Secretary Laird. Laird followed the study and consistently “gamed” his option to fit the outcome he is seeking.

Originally, Laird instructed his ISA representatives to insert an option calling for no additional assistance to Cambodia or RVNAF support whatever the consequences.

As the analysis developed and it appeared that the GOC without additional assistance and extensive RVNAF support could not survive, Laird became concerned that his option would be ignored as the straw man at the lower end of the NSSM 99 options spectrum.

These fears apparently caused Laird to add several ingredients to his option in an attempt to obscure its essential characteristics. He inserted the stipulation that his option did not preclude ARVN support for the GOC but gave verbal orders via ISA (“not to be put in print” according to the ISA representative) that it was his view that no U.S. financial or combat and logistics support would be provided if ARVN did intervene.

The Secretary is probably aware of State’s assessment that the GVN would not go to the GOC’s rescue unless it had U.S. backing.

Meanwhile, the State Department had been supporting the Laird option. State openly spoke of a Laird-Rogers golf course agreement that Cambodia’s fate should be of little concern to the U.S. Laird ordered that his option limit FY 71 funding to the $40 million already provided. However, State does not share Laird’s spending habits and is prepared to give the GOC up to $100 million if a supplemental can be obtained. (Despite his consistent guidance during preparation of the Cambodia paper, Laird has just come in with a recommendation that “now is the time” for the President to seek a $260 million MAP supplemental for Korea, Cambodia, Turkey, Republic of China and Greece. He believes the Congress will act before October 15th because the situation in Southeast Asia is favorable and the U.S. decision to redeploy troops from Korea has had a favorable impact. I will complete action on the latest Laird memorandum as soon as possible.)

State was concerned that there be a reputable option in the paper that provides support to the GOC but which does not risk permanent RVNAF involvement to defend the GOC. Such GVN involvement would couple Cambodia’s fate with Vietnamization and indirectly commit the U.S. to the preservation of the GOC. State first inserted a strong refutation of the Laird-modified minimum assistance strategy, saying that OSD’s interpretation failed to face up to the basic issue: should or should not RVNAF be employed to defend Cambodia?

After realizing that Laird was moving in all directions at once, State withdrew its support and criticism of his option and inserted its own (Strategy 2) which provides for a $100 million supplement to assist the GOC and precludes permanent RVNAF involvement in the defense of Cambodia except for cross-border options. (The JCS then inserted a rebuttal to Laird’s option arguing that it did not provide the resources for what it claimed to accomplish—page 25).

The Strategies

There are a total of four strategies in the paper:

• —Strategy 1: A Minimum Resources Strategy (OSD’s option) that deems the GOC non-essential to Vietnamization and precludes RVNAF defense of the GOC (or with Laird’s caveat does not preclude RVNAF involvement but prohibits U.S. support for it.) No additional U.S. military assistance would be provided to the GOC although $45 million in available economic assistance would be provided.
• —Strategy 2: A Limited Resource/Involvement Strategy (State’s preference) which deems the preservation of the GOC non-essential to Vietnamization, precludes (unequivocably) RVNAF involvement to defend the GOC (as opposed to cross-border operations), but calls for an additional $100 million in U.S. economic and military assistance to give the GOC the chance to go it alone.
• —Strategy 3: A Defense of a Viable GOC Strategy which uses RVNAF as necessary to defend GOC on territory ranging from one-fifth to one-half of Cambodia depending on the variant chosen. This option can be defended either from a judgment that the preservation of the GOC is essential to Vietnamization success (the JCS view) or that it is beneficial to Vietnamization even with some RVNAF involvement in Cambodia (my view).
• —Strategy 4: Offensive Operations in South Laos and Northern Cambodia could be conducted as part of a strategy to defend Cambodia. Logically, this option is not an alternative to the three preceding options but could be complementary to any of them. It was inserted by the JCS, at the insistence of General Westmoreland. The VSSG Working Group agreed that the option merits detailed consideration, particularly as a result of the new evidence on the logistic importance of Sihanoukville, and so recommends in the paper. This could be done as part of the follow-on on NSSM 99 Southeast Asia strategy study or as a separate task. In any case, there are many questions that need to be answered. I will raise them in your talking points.

The Analysis

A surprising amount of analysis was done for this paper. For example, the force structures associated with each option and GOC economic assistance requirement estimates are based on relatively sophisticated models put together in a very short time period.

In addition, the paper attempts to shed light on the considerations that might lead one to choose one of the options over the others. Three findings stand out:

• —(1) Based largely on the post-March 18th³ performance of FANK, it was judged that without RVNAF ground force assistance, NVA/VC forces now in Cambodia could probably over-run the GOC if they make a determined effort in the upcoming dry season. This suggests that Strategy 1 risks the downfall of the GOC. So does Strategy 2 unless the enemy is deterred by possible RVNAF intervention even if the U.S. does not plan to encourage or support such intervention.

• —(2) The present situation in Cambodia benefits Vietnamization and pacification in South Vietnam more than the pre-March 18th situation. This conclusion emerges from an analysis of the force diversion effects of Cambodia put together by my staff with help from OSD/Systems Analysis. Before March 18th the friendly-to-enemy force ratio in MR 3 and MR 4 was 2.16 to 1. Yet the same ratio of RVNAF to NVA/VC forces in Cambodia is 1.40 to 1. Because with few exceptions the enemy’s forces now targeted against Cambodia were diverted from South Vietnam, this means that the residual friendly-to-enemy force ratio in South Vietnam has risen in the GVN’s favor from 2.16 to 1 to 2.30 to 1. That GVN control in the border provinces has risen by 10% compared to 6% for the non-border provinces since March 1970 is probably evidence that these force diversion effects have helped pacification.

  Which option is most consistent with the continuation of these circumstances?

  • —If the GOC falls, a likelihood for Strategy 1 and a possibility for Strategy 2 if the enemy mounts a determined attack, the enemy will be able to redeploy most of his combat forces toward Vietnam whereas ARVN will probably have to devote more forces to cross border operations.
  • —On the other hand, for Strategy 3, its higher variants would require more RVNAF forces to hold territory in Cambodia and thus lessen or completely remove the force diversion benefit of sustaining Cambodia. However, the lower variant to Strategy 2 would maintain the present advantage.

• —(3) The South Laos logistics capacity of the enemy is probably sufficient to allow an adequate total supply input to reach Cambodia from North Vietnam. But the enemy will have to pay a higher price to transport the additional 25 tons per day through South Laos that he formerly shipped through Sihanoukville. This could require 12,000 or more additional troops and he would lose more supplies to allied air and interdiction. This finding compels us to re-examine the South Laos interdiction issue and consider options for increased air and ground interdiction.

More important perhaps is the difficulty the enemy will have in distributing his supplies forward to his troops.

These results do not favor any particular option because all call for cross-border operations, the primary factor limiting enemy forward supply and distribution efforts.

Aside from these major analytical findings, the paper generally conveys the view that the fall of Phnom Penh would be a serious political and psychological blow to the U.S. The more weight one gives to this the more one would favor the higher strategies.

Making a Choice

If you believe the fate of Cambodia will have no important impact on Vietnamization’s future, then you choose Strategy 1.

If, however, you believe there are limited military and political benefits to Vietnamization from sustaining the GOC, but that it is too dangerous to link Vietnamization and Cambodia’s fate by committing RVNAF to defending the GOC, then you could choose Strategy 2 and provide additional assistance, i.e., keep RVNAF out and accept the consequences.

If you believe there are limited military and political benefits to Vietnamization from sustaining the GOC and recognize that some RVNAF commitment and additional assistance is required, then you favor the lower variants of Strategy 3 because they require the least RVNAF commitment to Cambodia.

If you believe that the preservation of the GOC is essential to Vietnamization, then you favor the high variants of Strategy 3, give the GOC the most assistance it can absorb and prepare to make whatever RVNAF commitment is required.

My View

My own view is that there are limited benefits to sustaining the GOC and that it is wishful thinking to believe as Strategy 2 (and State) does that FANK can successfully cope with seasoned NVA/VC troops without RVNAF help of more than the rescue variety. Moreover, we have already committed some degree of U.S. prestige to Cambodia, and the $100–$200 million more called for to give the GOC some chance of coping with NVA/VC forces is peanuts compared with the billions already spent in South Vietnam.

However, in going for Strategy 3, I believe the potential disadvantageous force diversion effects of the higher variants should be recognized and a ceiling placed on RVNAF involvement. The JCS, which supports the highest variant to Strategy 3, does not want to face up to the essential cost in RVNAF forces of defending all of Cambodia now controlled by the GOC. The most reasonable ceiling would be to limit RVNAF involvement to the key southeast enclave to be defended in the low variant of Strategy 3. However, this variant does not leave open the possibility that GOC forces could succeed in defending the key land route to Battambang and Thailand to the west. Thus, this ceiling on RVNAF should be combined with the assistance to the GOC called for in the variant 2 of Strategy 3.

Funding

The funding situation is not as bleak as we had been led to believe. The new support requirements for the GOC are (in millions of $):

	Economic Support	Military	Total
Strategy 1	$ 45	$ 0	$ 45
Strategy 2 and Strategy 3, variant 1	60	40	100
Strategy 3, variant 2	125	50	175
Strategy 3, variant 3	100	125	225

The bureaucracy will make every effort to argue that nothing can be done without supplementals. Secretary Laird has already taken this position. Without a supplemental he wants to wash his hands of Cambodia. (He may even want to do so even though he is recommending a supplemental.)

It is clear we could fund at least variant 1 of Strategy 3 without a supplemental and possibly variant 2 as well.⁴ Variant 3 of Strategy 2 will almost certainly require a supplemental.

Whatever strategy is selected, you should ask OMB to develop at least two funding options:

• —one with a supplemental.
• —one without.

Then the President will be free to choose for himself how he wants to proceed. Defense and State (with the mandatory supplemental with Strategy 2) want a supplemental to ease the pain of restructuring current programs. But this may not be necessary.

If both courses of action are spelled out for the option selected, the Administration can proceed to fund the option it selects through restructuring and then later, if it is judged feasible, it can seek a supplemental. Then if the supplemental fails in early 1971, it can still fund the strategy by restructuring.

Accompanying Political Actions

There is a separate section in the paper on accompanying political actions. I believe it is superficial and should be ignored. State persists in wanting to lecture us on diplomatic and political moves as if we were undergraduates. We made several attempts to force State to be analytical. Hopefully, we will have better luck on the Southeast Asia portion of the study.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–47, SRG Meeting, Cambodia (NSSM 99). Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information.
2. Attached but not printed is the response to NSSM 99, “US Strategy Options for Cambodia,” September 13. NSSM 99 is Document 25.
3. On March 18, Lon Nol and Sirik Matak led a successful coup against the government of Prince Sihanouk.
4. In the margin to the left of this paragraph, Kissinger wrote, “Why?”