Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume VII, Vietnam, July 1970–January 1972

294. Editorial Note

A critical part of the Nixon administration’s plan to make public its private offer to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (see Document 269) in conjunction with the President’s announcement of the withdrawal of 70,000 U.S. troops, was the need for South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu’s support. In a January 3, 1972, backchannel message to Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker in Saigon, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger, informed Bunker that President Nixon was considering making a troop withdrawal announcement on January 13 that would commit the United States to reduce its force levels to 69,000 by May 1 and continue the reductions to a residual force level of 35,000 by July 1. In addition, draftees would no longer serve in Vietnam. Kissinger also noted that on January 18, the President would make a speech revealing the secret negotiations between Kissinger and North Vietnamese negotiators Le Duc Tho and Xuan Thuy as well as publicly announcing the U.S. peace proposal made earlier to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Kissinger authorized Bunker to show Thieu the proposal for the speech and added that it was critical that Thieu not announce his intention not to seek office after a peace agreement was signed, but to resign and allow a caretaker government to organize national elections. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 869, For the President’s Files—Lord, Vietnam Negotiations, Sensitive, Camp David Cables, 1 Jan–31 Jul 72)

The timing of the speech was also a matter of some debate in Washington. According to White House Chief of Staff H. R. Haldeman, Kissinger told him on January 1 that the President was increasingly nervous about Congressional opposition to the war and wanted to make the speech before Congress reconvened on January 18, believing that this would staunch dissent. Kissinger opposed this approach, arguing that it would only make the war the focus of the Congressional session, but the President persisted and on January 3 told Haldeman that he had chosen the evening of January 18 to make his speech. Haldeman wrote in his diary, “This he figures will be a major blockbuster on the Vietnam thing, and that it’ll be especially effective because the first announcement will suck all the peaceniks out, and the second move will chop them all off.” (January 1 and January 3 entries; The Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition)

On January 4, Bunker informed Thieu about the troop withdrawal plans and, as reported in backchannel message 8 from Saigon, January 4, Thieu accepted the U.S. withdrawal figures, but wanted the United States to maintain some combat units in the residual force while the South Vietnamese were still being equipped and trained. Bunker responded that the details of the troop composition had not yet been worked out. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 872, For the President’s Files—Lord, Vietnam Negotiations, Washington–Saigon Consultations on President’s Jan. 25, 1972, Speech)

On January 13, President Nixon announced that 70,000 U.S. troops would be withdrawn from South Vietnam over the next 3 months, bringing the troop level down to 69,000 by May 1. (Public Papers: Nixon, 1972, page 30)

Consultation with Thieu on the second part of the plan, the President’s revelation of the secret talks and the U.S. proposal, caused more problems than the withdrawal statement. In backchannel message 9 from Saigon, January 10, Bunker wrote that he showed Thieu the proposal that Kissinger had sent him, and that Thieu was surprised that the Nixon administration had made the offer to the North Vietnamese without his prior knowledge. Bunker assured Thieu that the offer was not materially different from the one that Alexander Haig had discussed with him on September 23, although it included more specifics. Bunker recommended to Kissinger, however, that in order to forestall public criticism of Thieu, the President should note in his speech that the South Vietnamese had been consulted in advance. Thieu also expressed concern about President Nixon’s plan to call for a diplomatically neutral South Vietnam, noting that he had stated many times publicly that he opposed neutrality. Thieu did, however, consent not to announce his plans to retire from public life after a treaty was signed. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 854, For the President’s Files—Lord, Vietnam Negotiations, Sensitive, Camp David, Vol. XIII)

Kissinger responded to Thieu’s main concerns in a backchannel message to Bunker, January 10, indicating that the President would say that the administration got Thieu’s concurrence before submitting the eight-point proposal to the North Vietnamese and he would broaden the statements dealing with neutrality to include all countries in Indochina. (Ibid., Box 872, For the President’s Files—Lord, Vietnam Negotiations, Encore Sept. 71–15 Feb. 72, President’s Speech January 25, 1972)

On January 14, Thieu sent a memorandum to Bunker, detailing his concerns with the proposal and complaining that he had not had enough time to analyze it. He wrote:

“Since it is the first time I saw this document, and moreover it is a text of a ‘statement of principles ready to be signed’ and comprising many points related to the global problem of the cessation of the conflict, the restoration of peace in Indochina and the shaping of the political future of South Vietnam; therefore I think it will require more time for careful examination.”

Thieu added, “I affirm the goodwill for serious negotiations and the genuine and eager desire to have a peace settlement through a negotiated way rather than through military way of the GVN,” but had the following warning:

“If President Nixon still intends to make public the text of this ‘statement of principles’ on January 18, then I think that I will not be able to jointly release the full text of the ‘statement of principles.’ On the contrary, on that day, I will only tell the people of Viet-Nam that I have another peace initiative on the political solution of South Viet-Nam through election as mentioned in my July 11, 1969 proposal in order to break through the peace talks and to show maximum good will. That is, after the end of the war and after a peace with guarantee is restored, I will voluntarily withdraw in order for the people of Viet-Nam to reelect a new president and vice president.” (Text sent in backchannel message 14 from Saigon, January 15; ibid., Box 854, For the President’s Files—Lord, Vietnam Negotiations, Sensitive, Camp David, Vol. XIII)

Bunker commented that Thieu’s chief concerns were as follows: The Vietnamese would fear that the United States would withdraw even before all of the conditions in the proposal were fulfilled; that “none of his people are aware of these developments and the surfacing of the proposal will come as a complete surprise;” and that “he is being pushed too rapidly.” Bunker asked if the President could delay his speech a few days, “so that Thieu will not have the feeling that he is being rushed.” (Backchannel message 13 from Saigon, January 15; ibid., Box 869, For the President’s Files—Lord, Vietnam Negotiations, Sensitive, Camp David Cables, 1 Jan–31 July 1972)

In backchannel message WHS 2006 to Saigon, January 15, Kissinger wrote to Bunker that “in view of Thieu’s concerns, the President has decided to delay his address to January 25 in order to permit full consideration of the issues raised by Thieu.” (Ibid.) In a detailed response to Thieu’s concerns, Kissinger wrote to Bunker, “We believe it is essential that we have mutual understanding with Thieu and a coordinated public line before proceeding,” and indicated that the Nixon administration would be willing to work out the differences with him, which he viewed as manageable. He added, “In the meantime, before January 25, we must all ensure that absolute secrecy be maintained.” Kissinger instructed Bunker to “tell Thieu frankly that we regret having passed proposal to the other side without checking with him first,” but that “in the interest of time the proposal was submitted to the other side before the November meeting which never occurred” and that “we would, of course, have consulted with Thieu fully if meeting had taken place.” He added: “We had assumed that Thieu’s agreement in principle to proposal warranted this preliminary action, but on second thought, it is obvious that we erred in judgment.” Kissinger asked Bunker to assure Thieu that his government would have to be completely satisfied with the final settlement before the United States agreed to it. But Kissinger included a warning of his own:

“You should remind Thieu—as he is no doubt aware—that withdrawal of U.S. forces will continue in any event and that timeframe visualized for our withdrawal under the agreed statement of principles approximates our troop withdrawal schedule in any event under the Vietnamization track. The only difference is the residual force and air power which we will hold if there is no agreement. We have a much better chance of doing so vis-à-vis Congress if we make this proposal and it is turned down. On the other hand, if our proposal is accepted, the other side would have agreed to principle of cease-fire which would make much less risky completion of our total withdrawal.”

Kissinger summarized the situation as follows:

“If we don’t go with our joint proposal we face prospect of interacting enemy offensives, domestic pressures in election year, congressional restrictions and possible enemy diplomatic ploys which could bring us to straight withdrawal for prisoner deal in any event. If we do go with our joint proposal, we take public offensive before enemy attacks and congressional moves, and put on table a proposal that moves U.S. forces out essentially no faster than they would anyway, and under circumstance which would greatly enhance our ability to maintain necessary materiel and air support. We are under no illusions that other side is likely to agree to our proposal. But our surfacing it at this time could prove to be essential factor in allowing us to continue our support for the GVN.” (Backchannel message WHS 2007 to Saigon, January 15; ibid.)

Bunker reported in backchannel message 16 from Saigon, January 17, that after discussing Kissinger’s message with Thieu, the South Vietnamese President appreciated President Nixon’s decision to delay the speech. Thieu claimed his principal concern had been “to determine how to present the proposal here to make sure that what he says will have the best possible effect and will neutralize criticism.” (Ibid.) Both Thieu and Kissinger agreed to exchange drafts of the speeches in advance. (Backchannel message from Kissinger to Bunker, January 19; ibid.)

Kissinger sent a draft of the President’s speech to Bunker in backchannel message WHS 2011 to Saigon, (Ibid.) Bunker reported in backchannel message 22 from Saigon, January 22, that Thieu again had a host of questions and concerns. Thieu did not provide his draft to Bunker until the early morning of January 25—the evening of January 24 in Washington—and Kissinger raised his own concern that while Thieu would announce that he would resign after a peace treaty was signed and allow a caretaker government to oversee elections, he had left the text ambiguous whether he would run in the subsequent elections. Kissinger’s comments are in backchannel message WHS 2014, January 25; ibid. The text of Thieu’s speech is in backchannel message 26 from Saigon, January 24; ibid., Box 854, For the President’s Files—Lord, Vietnam Negotiations, Sensitive, Camp David, Vol. XIII.

In the hours leading up to the speech, the two sides worked out their differences in a flurry of backchannel messages between Bunker and Kissinger. Most of these messages are ibid., and ibid., Box 869, For the President’s Files—Lord, Vietnam Negotiations, Sensitive, Camp David, Cables, 1 Jan–31 Jul 72. President Nixon delivered his speech in a television address on the evening of January 25. The text is in Public Papers: Nixon, 1972, pages 100–106.

Bunker sent the final text of President Thieu’s speech to Kissinger in backchannel message 33 from Saigon, January 25. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 869, For the President’s Files—Lord, Vietnam Negotiations, Sensitive, Camp David, Cables, 1 Jan–31 Jul 72) Thieu delivered it in a radio address a half hour after President Nixon finished his speech.

Documentation on the planning and drafting of the Nixon speech is ibid., Box 125, Vietnam Subject Files, President’s 11/12/71 Troop Withdrawal Announcement, and ibid., White House Special Files, President’s Personal Files, Box 72, Tuesday, 1/25/72, Vietnam Speech.